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ABSTRACT 
Thesis Title 
Legal Issues in the Contextual Diffusion of Independent Regulatory Agencies in 
Nigeria 
Submitted by Terhemen Andzenge - August 2015 
 
In the last three decades, there has been a phenomenon, akin to a revolution sweeping 
through the world, leaving in its wake major consequences of economic, political, legal 
and constitutional dimensions. The role of the state as we know it has been 
reconstructed beyond recognition. From an all-encompassing monolith that owns,  
manages, and provides various infrastructures, goods and services directly to the public 
and also serves as a regulator, it has now been reduced to a mere bystander or an 
enabler. Its footprints in the sands of economic and political times have diminished. In 
its place has arisen the regulatory state, characterised by a thinning out of the state; and 
the emergence of an institutional innovation: the Independent Regulatory Agency. Its 
rise, growth and diffusion across jurisdictions and sectors, and most recently in 
developing countries including Nigeria have been unprecedented. 
 
This thesis centres on the question whether the Independent Regulatory Agency can 
function in Nigeria in a manner analogous to its counterparts in the developed 
economies and be able to ensure the provision of safe, affordable and efficient 
infrastructures and services. The thesis finds institutional fragility, limited capacity, 
information asymmetry, corruption and insecurity within critical political, economic 
and supporting institutions that ideally gives life and legitimacy to the IRA; while 
essential democratic concepts are adhered to more in the breach. These challenges 
present a difficult climate in which the Independent Regulatory Agency can thrive.  
As an alternative, the thesis advocates the adoption of two transitory 
regulatory models:  regulatory contracts and contracting out or outsourcing of 
functions. Their utilisation would achieve the desired regulatory outcomes until 
maturity is attained in the political economy of Nigeria, while simultaneously 
mitigating its contextual limitations.
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION  
1.1 Preamble 
At independence, nearly all African countries including Nigeria considered capitalism a 
tool of neo-colonialism rather than an economic system espousing market driven 
entrepreneurship. As a result, a public sector/state led approach to economic 
development was the preferred option. The government’s role in economic activities 
expanded as it became owner/investor, manager/entrepreneur, 
manufacturer/producer; and regulator of the public goods and services through State 
Owned Enterprises (SOEs). 
The global economic and financial crisis of the 1980s halted the steady flow of oil 
revenues to the national treasury and this affected the capacity of government to fund 
the budgets of SEOs. In addition, the performance of the SOEs was dismal and 
economic reforms became inevitable.  The reforms ushered in an institutional 
innovation, the Independent Regulatory Agency (IRA) model as a panacea for attracting 
the needed private sector financing for the provision of infrastructure and public goods. 
This model has grown dramatically in the last decade. 
The rise, growth and diffusion of IRAs across jurisdictions and sectors, and most 
recently in developing countries including Nigeria, have been unprecedented. The twin 
themes of this thesis are, generally, to ascertain if the IRAs can thrive in an unprepared 
climate of weak institutional endowments which developing countries such as Nigeria 
possesses, and more specifically, whether they are the most appropriate model to 
address the challenges of infrastructure provision and services in Nigeria. 
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1.2 The Colonial Era 
Nigeria as a nation state became a political reality in 1914 with the amalgamation1 of the 
Colony and Protectorate of Lagos, the Protectorate of Southern Nigeria, and the 
Protectorate of Northern Nigeria, which had hitherto been separately governed, into 
one geographic entity. The British colonial administration effected this amalgamation 
for a variety of reasons. These included administrative convenience, economic 
expediency, and the British desire for a more concerted political and economic presence 
in the Nigerian region in order to fend off French and German traders and military 
expeditions.2 The expeditions had become more frequent after the Berlin Conference of 
1884-1885 which triggered the “Scramble for Africa.”3  
Other reasons for the amalgamation included the desire to integrate the various 
subsistent economic enclaves of Nigeria into the world economy, and the strong lobby 
of British businessmen for the regulation of what they perceived as untidy competition 
among British firms. Finally, there was the push by Christian missionaries for the 
British government to enter into areas where they had converted locals from traditional 
practices to Christian civilisation, in order to prevent them from slipping back to 
practices they considered primitive or uncivilised.4 
Prior to the arrival of the British, the territory later to be known as Nigeria was 
home to “sprawling empires, numerous centralized states, and a multiplicity of smaller, 
segmentary lineage societies.”5 These communities had “long-standing inter- and 
international commercial networks” in addition to external links in facilitation of the 
                                                     
1 Oyebode, A., ed., The Foundations of Modern Nigeria, Essays in Honour of Toyin Falola, African World Press, 
Inc., 2003 at 16;  Hopkins, A.G., An Economic History of West Africa, New York: Colombia University Press, 
1973, Chapter 6. 
2 Falola, T and Heaton, M.M., A History of Nigeria, 2008, Cambridge University Press, at 85 – 93 and 116 – 
117.  
3Blij, H.J., Muller, P.O., Geography: Realms, Regions and Concepts, 2007, Wiley-Blackwell Publishers, 13th 
edition at 304-305.  
4 Falola and Heaton, note 2 at 86. 
5 Lewis, P.M., Growing Apart, Oil, Politics, and Economic Change in Indonesia and Nigeria, The University of 
Michigan Press, 2007 at 125-126. 
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booming trans-Atlantic slave trade.6 There were in existence, in one form or another, 
infrastructural backbone bases. Rivers served as avenues for movement of goods and 
trade, while winding road networks connected villages, towns and regions.   
With the unification of all the Protectorates into one administrative entity, the 
colonial government commenced what was to be the foundation for the economic 
policy of the now unified Nigeria.  The economic path had three essential goals.7 The 
first goal was the expansion of the Nigerian market through the exploitation and 
exportation of raw materials, agricultural and minerals resources8 and the importation 
of refined products.9  Nigeria’s huge mineral endowments were an overriding attraction 
to the colonial government because the structure of the world economy then was 
dependent on minerals10  to fuel the Industrial Revolution in Europe.11  
The second goal was to bring Nigeria into a cash economy that would be tied to 
the British currency. This was achieved with the introduction of a monetary system to 
replace the trade by barter system that was in use in the pre-colonial period.12  
The third goal, drawing from the second, was to integrate the scattered 
indigenous people who were mainly agriculturists and traders into the new monetary 
system. This was achieved by introducing uniformity and a common mode of exchange 
for all business transactions among the indigenous people and also with the colonial 
administration. 
The most important export crops produced in colonial Nigeria were groundnuts 
and cotton in the north, cocoa in the southwest and palm produce in the southeast. The 
                                                     
6 Falola and Heaton, note 2 at 9;  Imbua, D.L Two Hundred Years After the Abolition of Trans-Atlantic Slave 
Trade: Reflections on the Legacy of the Slave Trade and Slavery in Nigeria, Tarikh, New Series Issue 2, 2009, 
Published by the Historical Society of Nigeria at 1-14. 
7 Falola and Heaton, note 2 at 119 – 122; Oyebode, note 1 at 267. 
8 Oyebode, Note 1 at 18. 
9 This model of open economy is discussed in detail in Peter Kilby, Industrialization in an Open Economy: 
Nigeria, 1945 -1966, Cambridge University Press, 1969. 
10 Onimode, B, A., Political Economy of the African Crisis, Institute for African Alternatives, 1988, Zed 
Books, London at 4-6. 
11 The Industrial Revolution is the name given to the period in the 18th and 19th centuries when Britain 
was transformed from a predominantly agricultural nation into the manufacturing workshop of the 
world. The period saw rapid scientific, technological and commercial innovations.  
12 Oyebode, note 1 at 19. 
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main mineral exports from Nigeria were tin and, to a lesser degree, gold, silver, lead, 
and diamonds. Coal, discovered in the southeast near the city of Enugu, also became a 
major strategic mineral of the colonial government, extracted to fuel the country’s 
railway.13 In addition, palm oil, palm kernels and rubber were produced in the southern 
part of Nigeria, deep in the interior over 320 kilometres from the coastal ports. 
Benniseed, hides and skins, and tin ore were produced in the north at distances ranging 
from 650 to 965 kilometres from Port Harcourt, the nearest port.14  
The colonial government realised from the onset that its goal of exploiting and 
transporting raw materials and minerals from the interior of Nigeria to the coastal 
towns for onward shipment to the industries of Europe was impossible without the 
development of a transportation and communication infrastructure network. They 
therefore commenced the development of a network of roads, rail lines, waterways, 
telecommunications, and a postal system, which were some of the earliest developed 
infrastructures.15  
Government introduced various schemes to develop the waterways,16 which 
then were the only viable, easy and cheap form of transportation and movement of 
goods. Telegraph cables were also laid, particularly along the railway lines, to improve 
communication and keep the trains running smoothly.17  The colonial government also 
built the Lagos and Port Harcourt ports18 to allow steam powered ships to dock and 
carry cargo to Europe. 
                                                     
13 Falola and Heaton, note 2 at 119 – 120. 
14Gana, A.T, The Quest for Autonomy, Nigeria and Foreign Monopoly Capital, 1966-1978, Unpublished Thesis 
for a Doctor of Philosophy, Colombia University, 1980 at 50. 
15Oyebode, note 1 at 18. See also Gana, note 14 at 50, Toyin and Heaton, note 2 at 120; Tamuno, T., The 
Genesis of Nigerian Railways, Parts 1 & 2, Nigeria Magazine, 83, 1964 at 279-292; Oyemakinde, W., Railway 
Construction and Operation in Nigeria, 1895 – 1911, Labour, Problems and Social Economic Impact, J.H.S.N., 
Vol.7, No. 2, 1974 at 303-324; Oshin, S., Colonial Railway Policy in Northern Nigeria, 1898-1914, ODU, 
Journal of West African Studies, 35, 1989 at 161-187. 
16 Falola and Heaton, note 2 at 120. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Ogunremi, G.O and Faluyi, E.K , eds, An Economic History of West Africa, Mayode Ajayi Enterprises, 
2009 at 158. 
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By far, the most revolutionary infrastructural system to be introduced by the 
colonial government was the railway system.19 The first rail line in Nigeria was between 
Lagos and Ota in 1898 and by 1914 there were separate rail lines in the South Western, 
Northern and the Eastern parts of Nigeria.20 All three lines were joined in 1926 in 
Kaduna, thus completing the most decisive infrastructural backbone integrating the 
three regions into a single economic block.21  Road infrastructure, though initiated 
earlier than the railway, failed to receive meaningful attention until the advent of the 
railways. It was the need to build feeder roads to link the newly constructed rail lines 
that gave rise to road construction.22 The introduction of motor vehicles into the country 
between 1907 and 1909 further served as an impetus to develop road transportation.23 
  
Air transportation infrastructure was introduced to complete the transportation 
and communication cycle in 1931 with the arrival of a sea plane from England. By 1935, 
there were five functioning and fully equipped aerodromes in Lagos and Oshogbo in 
the South and Minna, Kano and Maiduguri in the North in addition to ten landing 
strips spread round the country.24 In the same year, the colonial government 
commenced airmail and postal services between the UK and Nigeria. This was closely 
followed by the introduction of telegraphic and telephone services in 1947.25 
Other crucial infrastructure systems that were deployed by the colonial 
government were in the financial, legal and social sectors. These included court houses, 
banks, insurance companies, hospitals, schools, water systems, and electricity, among 
                                                     
19 Studies on the Nigerian Railway System are numerous, among which are Tamuno, T., The Genesis of 
Nigerian Railways, Parts 1 & 2, Nigeria Magazine, 83, 1964 at 279-292; Oyemakinde, W., Railway 
Construction and Operation in Nigeria, 1895 – 1911, Labour, Problems and Social Economic Impact, J.H.S.N., 
Vol.7, No. 2, 1974 at 303-324;Oshin, note 15. 
20 Falola, T, The History of Nigeria, Westport: Conn. Greenwood Press, 1999 at 74-75 in Oyebode, note 1 at 
35. 
21 Gana, note 14 at 52; Oyebode, note 1 at 349-350. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid.  
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid.  
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others.26 All these had one essential feature: the facilitation of the colonial government’s 
quest to exploit, transport and ship agricultural products and mineral resources to 
Europe and to import manufactured or refined products back to Nigeria.27  
The outbreak of the Second World War provided a further surge in the 
development of additional infrastructures that had been lacking since the amalgamation 
of Nigeria and also to support the war effort.  Falola and Heaton28 note that as a part of 
these initiatives, the colonial government invested in the further development of 
infrastructure such as maritime harbours, railways, airfields and military hospitals. 
Social infrastructure in the form of training centres that would churn out technicians, 
electricians, nurses, carpenters and clerks were also established. 
 
1.3 Nigeria at Independence 
At independence, even though the Union Jack29 had been lowered and the Nigerian flag 
hoisted, nothing much changed, except flags.30  The newly independent nation was 
dependent on the British economic system.31 Simply put, Nigeria’s economy was one in 
which the people produced what they did not consume and consumed what they did 
not produce.32 Walter Rodney33 aptly captured the above situation  by stating that 
Europeans determined the kind of goods to be exported to the colonies and indigenous 
people did not have a choice as to what was sent to them, the latter being essentially a 
consumer oriented society.  
 
                                                     
26 Ibid.  
27Peel, M., A Swamp Full of Dollars, Pipelines and Paramilitaries at Nigeria’s Oil Frontier, 2010, 
BookcraftAfrica, Ibadan, Nigeria at 41. See also Falola and Heaton, note 2 at 121-122; Ikpeze, N., 1991 
“New Industrial Policies and Perspectives for Manufacturing in Nigeria,” In Hans, H. Bass et al (Eds.), African 
Development Perspective Yearbook 1990/91 Vol.II. Hamburg: Lit Verlag; and Oyebode, note 1 at 19. 
28 Falola and Heaton, note 2 at 143. 
29 The Union Jack, also called the Union Flag, is the national flag of the United Kingdom. 
30 Onimode, note 10 at 19. 
31 Meredith, M., The State of Africa, A History of Fifty years of Independence, The Free Press, London, 2005, at 
153. 
32 Onimode, note 10 at 2. 
33 Rodney, W., How Europe Underdeveloped Africa, Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania Publishing House, 1972 at 86.  
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          Apart from agriculture which was exclusively in the hands of Nigerians, all the 
other sectors of the economy including the financial, manufacturing, mining, and 
petroleum sectors and distributive trades, were mostly reserved for and in the hands of 
foreigners.34  
 
1.4 Post Independence 
After independence therefore, the realisation dawned that independence goes beyond 
exchanging the flag and there were enormous challenges and problems to be confronted 
and surmounted. Although, the problems were overshadowed by what has been 
termed the “infectious enthusiasm”35 of independence, it was clear that Independence 
was not an end in itself but a stage in a journey. The infrastructure inherited from the 
colonial government, apart from being inadequate, was ageing and had diametrically 
opposed objectives.  While the development of infrastructure under the colonial 
government was essentially to facilitate the objects of colonialism, the newly 
independent government realized that it had to go beyond this. The provision of 
infrastructures that were essential to the socio-developmental well-being of the new 
nation such as roads, energy, telecommunication and social infrastructure became of 
paramount concern to the government.  
 
1.4.1 Evolution of Development Plans 
In order to address the infrastructure deficits that were inherited from the 
colonial administration, the new government began the process of evolving a 
holistic development plan for the socio-economic development of the nation. In 
1962, the government developed and began the implementation of the First 
                                                     
34 Research Department, Central Bank of Nigeria, 1979, Twenty years of Central Banking in Nigeria, 1959-79, 
Lagos at 13; Teriba, O. and Kayode, N.O. eds, Industrial Development in Nigeria: Patterns, Problems and 
Prospects, Ibadan University Press, 1977 at 160; Oyebode, note 1 at 18. 
35 Gana, note 14 at 75. See also the Independence Speech by Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, the Prime 
Minister on the occasion of the formal transfer of power from Britain to Nigeria in Sir Alan Burn’s History 
of Nigeria, Harper and Row, New York, 1972 at 340; and also Meredith, note 31 at 141 where the euphoria 
of independence was termed a “short-lived honeymoon.” 
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National Development Plan (FNDP) which was to run until 1968 but was halted 
on the outbreak of the civil war in 1967. The FNDP hinged on government’s 
expectation that massive private foreign investments would pour in to help 
jumpstart the economy and build infrastructure.36 However, the expectations of 
the FNDP were not realised as out of the 50% foreign capital that was projected 
to be injected into the economy, a meagre 14% came in.37  
 
 The dismal performance of the FNDP jolted government and prompted a 
rethink which led to a major policy reversal which came in the form of the 
Second National Development Plan (SNDP) in 1974. Under the SNDP, 
government assumed leadership for the planning, building and deploying of 
infrastructure and services to the nation, a radical departure from the FNDP.38 
This shift in policy was a clear renunciation of the philosophy of private sector 
leadership in economic development and the provision of infrastructure, to one 
in which the public sector (a euphemism for the State) takes leadership in the 
developmental process.39 
 
 This renewed role of government was informed by several factors 
ranging from the predominance of an expatriate private investor portfolio that 
had no stomach for long term investments in the new nation to the glaring lack 
of an indigenous private sector that could propel development.40  
                                                     
36Hon. Chief P. S. Okotie-Eboh, The Sovereignty Budget in Nigerian Trade Journal, 2   April/June 1961 at 47 
reproduced in Gana, note 14 at 90. 
37 Falola and Heaton, note 2 at 164. 
38 The thinking that the Nigerian state ought to be the catalyst for economic development was prevalent 
among scholars and planners as far back as the 1960s. See Lewis, note 5 at 135. 
39 Gana, note 14 at 120 and Teriba and Kayode, note 35  at 379 – 380. 
40 Ajakaiye, D.O., Impact of Public Policy on Public Enterprises Performance in Nigeria, Nigerian Journal of 
Economic and Social Studies, Vol.26, No. 3 in Obadan, M.I and Ayodele, A.S, Commercialization and 
Privatisation Policy in Nigeria, National Center for Economic Management and Administration, Ibadan, 
1988 at 8. 
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Government utilised the institution of State Owned Enterprises “SOEs”41 to 
achieve this. SOEs were established in virtually all the sectors of the economy with 
extensive monopoly powers to provide public goods and services such as transportation 
(rail, road, inland waterways, marine and air), oil (oil prospecting, exploration, refining 
and marketing), cement, fertilizer and motor assembly plants as well as steel, paper 
mills, telecommunication, postal system, electric power, banking and insurance 
sectors.42 Social or soft infrastructures made up of schools and hospitals were included. 
A survey43 showed that there were nearly 600 public enterprises at the Federal level 
alone and an estimated 900 at the state and local government levels. By 1990, Nigeria 
possessed the largest SOE portfolio in sub-Saharan Africa.44   
 
The policy change also had ideological connotations as has been captured by 
Omeleke and Adeopo.45 They note that the switch was informed by government’s 
desire to follow the Keynesian theory of aggressive state intervention in the market to 
propel development while simultaneously downplaying the orthodox laissez-faire 
economic doctrines which essentially limited governments to their traditional role of 
maintaining law and order.46 By the mid-1980s therefore, it was all but settled that 
SOEs constituted the “engine of growth” for economic and infrastructural 
                                                     
41 State-Owned Enterprise (SOEs) refers to business entities established by central and local governments, 
whose supervisory officials are from the government or legal entities that carry on business or 
commercial activities on behalf of its owner, the state or government. SOEs are variously referred to as 
state or publicly owned corporation; state-owned company; state-owned entity; state enterprise; or 
government business enterprise. Other names include government-owned corporation, commercial 
government agency or public sector undertaking. See Richard J. Zeckhauser & Murray Horn, The Control 
of State-Owned Enterprises, in Paul W. Macavoy et al., Privatization and State Owned Enterprises: Lessons from 
United States, Great Britain and Canada, 10 (Kluwer Academic Publishers 1989) and also Lawrence 
Azubuike in “Privatization and Foreign Investments in Nigeria, 13 Tulsa. J Comp & Int’l Law, 59, 2005 – 2006 
at 1.  
42 Haque, S., M, Privatization in Developing Countries: Formal Causes, Critical Reasons, and Adverse Impacts, 1 
in Ali Farazmand (ed.) Privatization or Public Enterprise Reform? (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 2000) 
at 217-238. 
43Zayyad, H.R, Privatisation and Commercialization in Nigeria, Bureau of Public Enterprises website, 
www.bpeng.org Survey undertaken by the TCPC, a body set up by the FGN to reform the public sector 
44 Lewis, note 5 at 251. 
45 Omoleke, I.I and Adeopo, A.A, Privatization of Nigerian Public Enterprises: Its Practical Challenges as a 
Reformulated Policy of the Fourth Republic, AJPAM Vol XVI, No. 2, July 2005 at 1-3. 
46 Ibid.  
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development47  with the SOEs portfolio accounting for over 50% of the GDP and about 
66% of the modern sector employment in Nigeria.48   
 
Government ownership, management and provision of public goods, services 
and infrastructure through SOEs were made possible majorly by the accelerated 
exploitation of petroleum which enhanced state revenue. By 1974, oil became the 
mainstay of the economy upstaging agriculture.49 Oil revenues accrued from foreign 
multinational corporations operating in the oil sector which invariably led to the 
establishment of a “rentier state” or “rent-seeking” state.50 The reliance on one 
commodity, a natural resource, for economic and infrastructure sustenance laid the 
foundation for most of the problems that would later bedevil the Nigerian economy, 
such as poverty and corruption.51 
 
1.4.2 Performance of SOEs 
The performance of the SOEs was, for want of a milder word, dismal as it became 
apparent that most of the reasons behind their establishment had been subverted. 52  
By the early 1980s, dwindling oil revenues and a global economic recession led to 
the reduction of the steady flow of oil revenues to the national treasury. This meant less 
money to meet the mounting recurrent and capital budgets of a bulging SOE portfolio.  
                                                     
47 Obadan, M.I and Ayodele, A.S, Commercialization and Privatisation Policy in Nigeria, National Center for 
Economic Management and Administration, Ibadan, 1988. 
48 Odusola, A.F., Privatization of Public Enterprises in Nigeria: The Journey So Far, 2004, in Bello-Imam and 
Mike Obadan, eds, Democratic Governance and Development Management in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic 1999-
2003, Ibadan: Centre for Local Government and Rural Development Studies.  
49 Peel, note 27; Falola and Heaton, note 2. 
50 A rentier state or rent-seeking state exists where an economic system is rent seeking in nature. It is 
derived from the economic concept of “rent” which refers to earnings in excess of all relevant costs 
(including a market rate of return on invested assets). It essentially means the acquisition of benefits from 
natural endowments such as minerals without beneficiation or value added. It is a concept prevalent in 
many resource rich undeveloped nations such as Nigeria.  Ahmet Kuru, The Rentier State Model and 
Central Asian Studies: The Turkmen Case, Turkish Journal of International Relations, Volume 1, Number 1, 
Spring 2002. 
51 Omorogbe, Y.O., Alternative Regulation and Governance Reform in Resource-Rich Developing Countries of 
Africa, in Regulating Energy and Natural resources, eds, Barton, et.al, Oxford University Press, 2006 at 44 
52 Meredith, note 31  at 277 – 229. 
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They were mired in several problems including ineffectiveness in the provision of 
goods and services for which they were set up, inefficiencies in the production of goods 
and services due to high cost of production, inability to innovate, and bureaucratic 
bottlenecks. Other problems included inadequate capitalisation, undue bureaucratic 
control and interference from line ministries and the political class, inappropriate 
technologies, bloated workforces, monopoly powers, managerial incompetence and 
mismanagement of funds and corruption.53 
The performance of the SOEs impacted negatively on the government treasury, 
constituting a drain that led to huge budget deficits and high rates of inflation. On the 
external side, the galloping expenditures of the SOEs led to foreign exchange 
misalignments and a consumer oriented spending culture that worsened as external 
debt obligations rose.54   
By the mid-1980s therefore, it was clear that the nation’s economy was ailing.  
There was a downturn in economic activities on all sides due to the near collapse of oil 
prices globally. This point is better appreciated when it is recalled that Nigeria’s 
reliance on revenue from crude oil stood at 95%. Crude oil prices, which had peaked at 
49 USD in 1980, nosedived dramatically and in three years fell to a record low of less 
than 20 USD per barrel. By 1986, the price of a barrel of crude oil stood at a depressingly 
low level of 8 USD.55 This led to a depression in the world production ratios, as also in 
Nigeria. The downward fluctuations in the price of oil, the high rate of inflation, 
unemployment and mounting external debt obligations coupled with political 
instability made the Nigerian economy very unsteady.56  
 
                                                     
53Nwoye M.I., Privatization of Public Enterprises in Nigeria: The Views and Counterviews. Globalizacija : Journal  
for Political Theory and Research in Globalization, Development and Gender Issues, Women Center for 
Democracy and Human Rights, Serbia and Montemegro, 2005 at 3;  Obadan and Ayodele, note 41 at 11 – 12. 
54 Ibid at 3. 
55 Obadan and Ayodele, note 47 at 11. 
56 Falola and Heaton, note 2 at 11. 
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The rentier state of the economy fuelled rampant corruption,57 accompanied for 
most of the period, by autocratic military regimes with scant regard for the rule of law. 
(The military has ruled Nigeria for more than 30 years of its 53 years of independence). 
Subversion of basic human rights and the enthronement of the “rule of men” 
(government officials and their cronies) over the rule of law became the norm.58 
Legislative and executive functions were fused into one arm of government, the ruling 
military junta. The judiciary was in a comatose state, unable to assert its independence 
due to the skewed methods of appointment to the bench, a funding structure that was 
tied to the whims and caprices of the military and above all the arbitrary powers of hire 
and fire residing in the ruling junta.59  
Reforming the economy was no longer just an option but a necessity due to a 
combination of factors including the spike in international oil prices, the downgrade of 
the Keynesian to a market-driven model of economic governance following the fall of 
the Soviet Union60, rampant corruption and the near failed state of political and 
economic institutions. In addition, it was clear that Nigeria was suffering from an 
economic malaise known as “Dutch Disease”61, an ailment that bedevils mono - 
commodity dependent economies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
57 Ibid  at 9. 
58 Ibid  at 186 
59 Falola and Heaton, note 2 at 189. 
60 Haque, note 42 at 217-238. 
61 Dutch disease is prevalent in countries with large endowments of natural resources, that often 
performs worse in terms of economic development and good governance than do countries with fewer 
resources. Such endowments too often impede rather than advance sustainable development of subject 
countries. The trend was first observed in the Netherlands in the 1950s when abundant natural gas 
production brought rapid foreign revenue but declining local productive sector.  See Omorogbe, note 52. 
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1.4.3 Advent of Reforms 
In reaction to the economic crisis, the government undertook a Structural Adjustment 
Programme (SAP)62 that was patterned along guidelines developed by the World Bank, 
the International Monetary Fund, other international financial institutions, donor 
agencies, investment banks, and financial advisers (referred to as “intermediating 
agencies63) in 1986.  Market-centred policies such as deregulation, privatisation, 
regulation, liberalisation, and rationalisation were adopted or imposed.64  
In doing this, Nigeria was merely taking a familiar road, trodden by other 
African nations in similar economic situations. During the same period, thirty-six other 
countries in sub- Saharan Africa entered into structural adjustment agreements with the 
intermediating agencies in the process executing a total of 243 loan agreements.65 
  Riding on the wave of these reforms, the government instituted economic 
changes premised on the fundamental objective of minimising state involvement in the 
economy through privatisation of the SOEs. This was done with the hope that it would 
promote private sector participation, reduce the financial burden on government to 
fund huge recurrent and capital budgets of SOEs, and provide for the much-needed 
economic development objectives of the nation and its infrastructural needs.  
The ensuing privatisation programme, touted to be one of the biggest in the 
world,66 witnessed the sale to the private sector of over 140 SOEs, spanning automobile 
assembly plants, bricks and clay factories, cement factories, industries, mines, banks, 
insurance companies, and aviation service providers. The sale included hotels, 
                                                     
62 Structural Adjustment refers to "a series of economic policies designed to reduce the role of government 
in an economy [by] replacing government control with market incentives.” In  Guseh, J.S.,  The Public 
Sector, Privatization, and Development in Sub-Saharan Africa, African Studies Quarterly | Volume 5, Issue 1 | 
Winter 2001;  Lewis, note 5 at 162-164. 
63Dubash, N., Regulation through the Back Door: Understanding the Implications of Institutional Transplant, 
Working Paper No. 42, Jerusalem Papers on Regulation and Governance, March 2012 at 4. 
64 Haque, note 42 at 217-238. 
65 Meredith, note 31 at 371. 
66 Dikki, B.E., Keynote Presentation to the Nigeria Investors’ Summit” held in New York, United States of 
America, October 2013. 
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newspapers, oil palms, sugar refineries, oil refineries, telecommunications, ports, 
national facilities, and power generation and distribution companies.67  
 
Encapsulated in these reforms therefore, were a receding role for the state and 
the ascendancy of the private sector and the market in the economic spheres. New legal 
and regulatory frameworks were developed and implemented in the 
telecommunications, financial, pensions, concessions and electric power sectors. In 
addition, at present there are executive Bills in the National Assembly geared towards 
instituting new legal and regulatory frameworks in the  oil and gas, transportation 
(road, rail, ports, harbours and waterways) and postal sectors, including a legal 
framework for competition and consumer protection law that could fundamentally 
reshape the economic direction of the country. 
 
1.5 Statement of the Problem  
Prior to the above reforms, government was owner/investor, operator/manager, and 
regulator of substantial institutional and infrastructural assets in the SOEs representing 
over 90% per cent of Nigeria’s infrastructure. All these roles were fused into one. As 
owner/investor, government appointed and controlled the boards and management of 
these SOEs and exercised property rights in them.  As operator/manager, it made 
investment, production, procurement, distribution and personnel decisions. As 
regulator, it determined the technical standards of products and services and their 
prices.  
           With privatisation, however, government withdrew substantially from the role of 
producing and delivering services and building infrastructure, and assumed the new 
dual role of enabling and regulating.68 Ownership of the SOEs shifted from the public to 
the private sector. Two fears arose as a result of this shift in ownership. There were 
                                                     
67 Bureau of Public Enterprises website, Concluded Transactions accessed on 19/03/15 at 1.32pm   
http://www.bpeng.org/sites/bpe/concluded%20transactions/Pages/default.aspx. 
68 Dikki, note 66. 
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concerns from government and consumers that these erstwhile public monopolies 
could transform themselves into private monopolies with the attendant monopolistic 
distortions in the economy. The private sector was also wary of making long term 
investment decisions as a result of past policy inconsistencies and commitment to 
reform by government arising from fears for the security of their investments. 
Designing a new regulatory framework to address the above fears and concerns became 
a priority. 
In order to address these concerns and fears, a new governance and “regulatory 
template”69 in the form of Independent Regulatory Agencies (IRAs) was introduced. Its 
purpose was to superintend over the differing and often conflicting roles and interests 
of the state, the investor, and the consumer in the value chain. This institutional 
innovation was an integral part of a package of reforms that tied loans, aid and grants 
to the fulfilment of “conditionalities” that were prescribed by intermediating agencies 
before a country could benefit from their financial aid. Nigeria being a candidate 
country that had applied for financial assistance from the Intermediating Agencies was 
obliged to implement these “conditionalities”. 
The introduction of the IRA model raises major legal tensions in the context of 
developing economies such as Nigeria. These relate to the appropriateness of the model 
in the light of institutional weakness prevalent in emerging democracies such as 
Nigeria, given the ingredients that have aided the success of IRAs in developed 
economies.70 A background study of political economies of the USA and other matured 
economies where the IRA model has taken root shows that certain basic ingredients are 
institutional prerequisites for a credible, legitimate and effective IRA regime. These 
include:  
                                                     
69 Kessides, I.N., Reforming Infrastructure: Privatization, Regulation and Competition, A World Bank Policy 
Research Report, 2004, A co-publication of the World Bank and Oxford University Press at 80. 
70 Eberhard, A., Infrastructure Regulation in Developing Countries: An Exploration of Hybrid and Transitional 
Models, 2007, No 4, PPIAF Working Paper at 2. 
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a) a rule of law regime that encapsulates the separation of powers, norms 
 and laws; property rights and contract laws that rely on an independent 
 judiciary to arbitrate, enforce and protect principles of fairness; 
b) functioning political, administrative and economic institutions; 
c) buoyant credit markets that sustain and support borrowing, raising 
 capital, and attracting foreign capital; 
d) the containment of corruption; and 
e) the employment of professional staff, trained in the relevant fields of 
 economics, accounting and law.71  
Juxtaposing the above prerequisites with the Nigerian situation, however, it is 
clear that there was no attempt to adapt the model of the IRA to her peculiarities. The 
institutional endowments of Nigeria fall far short of the basic ingredients listed above. 
Nigeria’s post - independence governance has been dominated military rule 
characterised by command and control structures that abridged the rule of law and 
separation of power concepts and did not allow democracy, due process and openness 
to thrive.72 The present democratic experiment is still nascent and weak. Key 
institutions that guard and promote the rule of law, accountability, and openness are in 
their infancy. Furthermore, the subversion of the Rule of Law and constitutionalism in 
most of Nigeria’s existence has encouraged an insidious culture of impunity and 
corruption that has corroded and undermined virtually all the structures whose 
existence is critical to the thriving of IRAs.  
The pertinent question therefore, is whether these fragile institutions that have 
been weakened and undermined through decades of authoritarianism and corruption 
have the capacity to nurture and sustain the IRA model in Nigeria. 
To put it another way, is the adoption of the IRA model into Nigeria without 
regard to her cultural, legal, institutional and political endowments not simply a case of 
                                                     
71 Kessides, note 69 at 80; Brown, A.C., Infrastructure: The Regulatory and Institutional Dimension, 
www.hks.harvard.edu/hepg/.../ABrown_UNCTAD60110%20, 2) at 22. 
72 Ibid at 22.  
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“plug and play”?73 Considering the presumptuous manner in which the IRA model was 
pushed through by the intermediating agencies, is there any room for a consideration of 
the very likely occurrence of “organ rejection” by the patient?  
1.6 Objectives of Research 
Several legal issues are raised about the IRA model that demand an objective 
evaluation. It must be objective because this regulatory template was hastily adopted 
from developed economies, without first interrogating its essential attributes and 
outcomes.  Neither was any thought given to adapting it to the political and 
institutional characteristics of a developing country such as Nigeria. 74 
1. A consideration whether or not the IRA model is the best framework for 
addressing the challenge of the transition from public to private ownership of 
utilities in Nigeria, and indeed in similar developing economies, is needed. A 
legal interrogation is desirable as to whether the IRA model is a case of “one size 
fits all” or whether there may be other models, be they substantive or hybrid, 
which seeks to address the unique contextual circumstances of developing 
economies such as Nigeria. 
2.  The IRA model has been instituted in other developing countries including 
Nigeria in the past decade or so and the jury is still out on whether or not it can 
be considered “the best” answer in addressing the infrastructure deficits facing 
such countries. The record has been mixed with discouraging developments in 
many sectors and countries.75 A comparative inquiry as to its performance in 
places outside its natural habitat, the Western world, would be productive in 
determining its suitability or otherwise in the context of countries with weak 
institutions and immature economies.  
                                                     
73 Investment Climate Advisory Services of the World Bank Group, Regulatory Governance in Developing 
Countries, 2007, Better Regulation for Growth at 10. 
74 Dubash, note 63 at 4-5. 
75 Ibid at 3. 
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3. Nigeria caught the international bug of liberalization in the eighties and has since 
then engaged in a spirited divestiture of erstwhile state monopolies spanning all 
the sectors of the economy.76  As a direct consequence of this, government has in 
the past ten years established two IRAs. One is a telecommunications regulator 
(Nigerian Communications Commission) and the other, an electric power 
regulator (Nigerian Electricity Regulatory Commission). There are ongoing 
arrangements to set up IRAs in the oil, gas, postal, transport (to regulate road, 
rail, inland waterways, ports and harbours), and competition and consumer 
protection sectors.  This study aims to investigate the performance of the IRAs 
instituted so far, in the light of the weak institutions and immature economic 
indices and indicate their appropriateness or suitability in Nigeria’s cultural, 
constitutional, social and legal contexts.  
4. Moreover, in view of the size of Nigeria’s population of over 160 million, and its 
new status as the largest economy in sub-Saharan Africa, with a GDP of $510 
billion in 2013, displacing South Africa to second place with $384 billion, this 
study would have far reaching beneficial consequences for other emerging 
economies in Africa.77 
5. Presently such an investigation in scholarly form has not been undertaken in the 
Nigerian context and it is the expectation that its findings and outcome would 
provide a veritable window to inform and guide policy makers in Nigeria and 
other developing economies, especially in sub-Saharan Africa, as to “good fits”, 
rather than simply transplanting “international best practices” into their 
economies. It is also hoped that this study will fill the yawning gap in the 
literature in this emerging but long neglected and understudied field and 
hopefully help to “find and regain the ‘lost decade’ of Africa of the 1980s.”78 
                                                     
76 Bureau of Public Enterprises, note 68. 
77 Revised and Final GDP Rebasing Results,  National Bureau of Statistics, www.nigerianstat.gov.ng. 
78 Eberhard, A., Regulation of Electricity Services in Africa: an Assessment of Current Challenges and an 
Exploration of New Regulatory Models, A paper prepared for the World Bank Conference towards Growth 
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These are some of the issues that this research will examine, with a comparative 
consideration of models existing and emerging in like jurisdictions and economies 
around the world.  
1.7 Scope of Research 
The research will trace the origin and rationale for the emergence of infrastructure 
regulation globally as an economic tool, and its introduction and diffusion in 
developing economies including Nigeria. The study will identify the substantial legal 
issues that are emerging as a result of the new regulatory regime. A tabulation and 
consideration of the institutional fragility of Nigeria will be undertaken and juxtaposed 
against prerequisites for credible, legitimate and effective regulation of infrastructure 
using the IRA model. A comparative voyage will be taken to two countries with 
cultures, economies and legal systems similar to Nigeria with a view to identifying the 
path of development, pitfalls and lessons to be learnt. This comparative research will 
focus on Brazil and Ghana, considering the similarities of the two nations' political 
economies to Nigeria and the lessons such comparisons portend. Finally the study will 
lead to informed extrapolations, conclusions and suggestions as to the way forward 
based on international best practices gleaned from the comparative work. 
1.8 Disclosure of Personal Background That Motivated Research Interest 
I consider myself modestly well placed to conduct this research. I have, in the past eight 
years, served as the Head of Infrastructure Regulation within the Nigerian Bureau of 
Public Enterprises, the government reform agency charged with the direct 
responsibility of developing new policy directions and preparing draft legislations in all 
aspects of the commercialization and privatization program of government. In the 
process I have been a part of the team that has prepared draft legislative initiatives in 
the oil and gas, post, telecommunications, electric power, transportation, roads and 
                                                                                                                                                                           
and Poverty Reduction: Lessons from Private Participation in Infrastructure in Sub-Saharan Africa, June 
6-7, 2005, Cape Town, South Africa. See also Meredith, note 31 at 368. 
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competition/consumer protection sectors; all tailored after the economic prescriptions 
of intermediating agencies.  
My interest to interrogate the IRA model and its underpinnings has essentially 
arisen from sustained exposure to the conceptualisation, design, and setting up of IRAs 
in the telecommunications and electric power sectors and the mounting unease over its 
suitability for Nigeria, given the huge institutional fragility and hostile soil in which the 
model is expected to germinate, grow and thrive.  
 
1.9 Methodology 
This research will focus on doctrinal and non-doctrinal imperatives. A consideration of 
the theoretical state and development of the concept of regulation will be explored. On 
a non-doctrinal platform, however, a systematic exposition of the responses to 
regulation by emerging economies and its impact thereon will be attempted. Both 
primary and secondary sources of materials will be used. The non-doctrinal 
investigation will draw on my personal experiences and exposure in the course of the 
past eight years in infrastructure regulation management and the challenges and 
insights encountered and gained. Intimate knowledge and competencies gained in the 
course of work will serve as a research source and tool. In addition, copious reference 
will be made to constitutions, legislative enactments, rules and conventions and 
protocols, textbooks, journals, magazines and articles. 
1.10 Conclusion  
With the above background of the economic path of Nigeria since the colonial era to 
the present, and considering the changes in ownership of infrastructure and services in 
the past three decades that gave rise to the need for regulation and the institution of 
IRAs, Chapter 2 will trace the origin and rationale for the emergence of IRAs as a mode 
of governance in the United States of America (USA) and the reasons for its subsequent 
spread to Europe and then the developing world, including Nigeria, in the past three 
decades. 
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Chapter 3 will dwell on the institutional fragility and weaknesses in the 
structure of the political, judicial, legislative and electoral institutions and the entities 
that support them.  
Chapter 4 will analyse the state of economic, financial, law enforcement and 
capacity building institutions in Nigeria and their impact on the IRA model of 
regulatory governance.  
Chapter 5 articulates the challenges facing Nigeria in the quest to surmount the 
rule of law requirements for the entrenchment of the IRA model.  
 Chapter 6 will undertake a review of the performance of the IRAs in two 
countries, Brazil and Ghana, which share similar political economies and 
developmental features with Nigeria, weighing their scorecard against the record of 
IRAs in Nigeria.  
Chapter 7 will revisit the major challenges facing the IRA model in Nigeria, 
articulate the major findings and propose hybrid models of regulatory governance that 
draws from the ideas and principles of the IRA model; moderating them with local 
peculiarities whilst ensuring that legitimate and credible regulation is not 
compromised.  
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CHAPTER 2 
ORIGIN AND RATIONALE FOR THE GLOBAL SPREAD OF INDEPENDENT 
REGULATORY AGENCIES 
2. 1 Introduction 
This chapter traces the origin and rationale for the emergence of Independent 
Regulatory Agencies (IRAs) as a mode of governance in the provision of 
infrastructures and services in the United States of America (USA) and the reasons for 
its subsequent spread to Europe, the developing world and then Nigeria in the past 
three decades.  
 
 This thesis noted in Chapter 1 that until the past three decades, the state was the 
predominant provider of infrastructures, goods and services especially in developing 
countries. This was justified for a number of reasons including the lack of a private 
sector willing to commit to long term investments in infrastructure whose return on 
investments were slow; the need to correct economic imbalances that private 
monopolies attract; and the desire to stimulate rapid economic growth. Furthermore for 
most of the newly independent nations like Nigeria, there was the compelling argument 
of fostering “industrial democracy” among disadvantaged groups on the fringes of 
society.1 The underlying reason for this overarching role of the state was the 
assumption that state ownership would enhance government’s ability to regulate the 
economy in a manner to protect the public interest. As a result governments became 
major actors in economic activities utilising State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) as a vehicle 
to achieve these aims.  
                                                     
1 Majone, G., The Transformation of the Regulatory State, Osservatorio sull’Analisi di Impatto della 
Regolazione, www.osservatorioair.it, settembre 2010; Ajakaiye, D.O., Impact of Public Policy on Public 
Enterprises Performance in Nigeria, Nigerian Journal of Economic and Social Studies, Vol.26, No. 3 in 
Obadan, M.I and Ayodele, A.S, Commercialization and Privatisation Policy in Nigeria, National Center for 
Economic Management and Administration, Ibadan, 1988;  Guseh,J.S.,  The Public Sector, Privatization, and 
Development in Sub-Saharan Africa, African Studies Quarterly | Volume 5, Issue 1 | Winter 2001. 
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However the SOEs were unable to attain the goals for which they were 
established. Their poor performance impacted negatively on the provision of 
infrastructures, goods, and services. They also constituted a major drain on the national 
treasury.2 The failure of public ownership favoured the evolution of a different model 
of governance in which government would cede ownership of the infrastructures, 
utilities and services to the private sector under a new legal and regulatory regime. This 
new regime would be enforced by specialised agencies on the basis of a specific 
legislative mandate. Such agencies would be created by legislation, thus making the 
legislature their principals, and be made independent to operate outside the 
hierarchical control or oversight by the line ministries or departments of the Executive.3  
 
2. 2 Entry of the IRA Model of Regulatory Governance onto the Global Stage 
The IRA model was born in the United States of America (USA) in 18874 with the 
enactment of the Interstate Commerce Act. With it, the USA Congress relinquished, 
through delegation, its power to regulate interstate railway traffic (a core state function 
undertaken by Congress since inception), to the Interstate Commerce Commission 
(ICC) referring to it as an Independent Regulatory Agency. The essence of this 
delegation was to create a referee-like agency to balance the conflicting interests of 
investors and consumers in the economic value chain.  
This institutional innovation of IRAs in the USA case was also to moderate and 
balance the interests of investors and consumers of services by ensuring the provision 
of quality-based services and cost-reflective prices; thus creating a win-win situation for 
every party in the value chain.”  The ICC was vested with significant legislative, 
                                                     
2 Ajakaiye, note 1; Nwoye M.I., Privatization of Public Enterprises in Nigeria: The Views and Counterviews. 
Globalizacija : Journal  for Political Theory and Research in Globalization, Development and Gender 
Issues, Women Center for Democracy and Human Rights, Serbia and Montemegro, 2005 at 3. 
3 Thatcher, M., Delegation to Independent Regulatory Agencies: Pressures, Functions and Contextual Mediation, 
West European Politics, Vol. 25, No. 1 (January 2002) 125 – 147 at 125; Majone, note 1. 
4 Ibid at 6. 
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executive and adjudicative powers in addition to possessing financial and 
administrative independence. It was at liberty to determine how to conduct their 
business, and to decide the processes to utilise in fulfilling its mandate.  In addition, the 
ICC was generally not required to get the consent of another government agency before 
taking its decisions. Its funding streams were derived from the fees and charges on 
regulated industries operating within its regulatory space.5  
This development strained the constitutional theory of separation of powers and 
created major legal and constitutional tensions in the USA.6 It was strenuously argued 
that the delegation of powers by Congress to the ICC subverted the entrenched doctrine 
of separation of powers that was intrinsic in the USA model of political governance. 
Congress was accused of undermining the Constitution by creating a “fourth branch of 
government”, a novelty not envisaged by the framers of the Constitution.7  
These challenges were linked to Article 1 of the USA Constitution which 
provides that “All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the 
United States…” For most of USA political history, the three arms of government - the 
legislature, the executive and the judiciary - have each had a distinct and defined field 
of coverage. Congress has powers to make laws, subject to a veto from the President 
which could be overridden by Congress. The President is vested with powers of 
implementing those laws while the third arm, the Judiciary, is charged with the 
responsibility of interpreting the laws.8 This constitutional arrangement, encapsulated 
under the separation of powers concept, ensures that no arm overreaches the other and 
in turn this inhibits arbitrariness and tyranny while at the same time securing the liberty 
                                                     
5 Brown, A.C., Infrastructure: The Regulatory and Institutional Dimension, visited on November 1, 2013 at 
http://www.hks.harvard.edu/hepg/Papers/2010/ABrown_UNCTAD60110%20(2).pdf. 
6 Schoenbrod,D., Power Without Responsibility, How Congress Abuses the People Through Delegation, Yale 
University Press, 1993 at 30-31; Strossen, N., Delegation as a Danger to Liberty, Cardozo Law 
Review)Vol.20:861 1999); Winthrop v. Larkin 421 U.S. 35 (1975 ) 1532. 
7 Majone, note 1 at 6; Vasconcellos, R.A.L.,  Brazilian Regulatory Agencies: Future Perspectives and The 
Challenges of Balancing Autonomy and Control, School of Business and Public Management, The Institute of 
Brazilian Business & Public Management Issues, The George Washington University, December, 2009 
8 Article 2, Section 1 vests the executive powers in the President while Article 3, Section 1 vests the 
judiciary powers in the Supreme Court and other courts to be so designated by Congress.  
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of the citizenry. This position had been maintained for well over a hundred years after 
the adoption of the Constitution, with the Supreme Court holding stoically to the 
position that the Constitution denied Congress the right to delegate to others their 
constitutionally-vested power of enacting laws.9   
In time, however, the pendulum began to swing in favour of delegation of 
legislative powers to IRAs. Geradin10 notes that the new direction of the courts was 
informed by the persuasiveness of the argument that the legislative powers of Congress 
under Article 1 were not held exclusively and could be shared with others and that 
delegation of such powers to federal agencies did not amount to an infringement of the 
constitutional doctrine of Separation of Powers.11 The only caveat was that the 
delegation must be accompanied by clear- cut policy objectives and directives from the 
Legislature embodied in a basic law, which the independent agencies would  be 
required to implement.12 In Wayman Vs Southard13, Chief Justice John Marshall in 
distinguishing between “important subjects” and “mere details” held that “a general 
provision may be made, and the power given to those who are to act under such 
general provision, to fill up the details.” Furthermore in Mistretta Vs United States14, the 
U.S. Supreme Court applied the “intelligible principle“test. The Court deemed it 
                                                     
9 Schoenbrod, note 6 at 30-31; See, Washington v. W.C. Dawson, 264 U.S. 219 (1924) (affirming the 
decision of Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149 (1920), which held that Congress could not 
delegate to states the application of state worker compensation laws in admiralty cases); United States v. 
L. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81 (1921) (striking down a statute that made it a crime to charge “unjust or 
unreasonable” prices for “any necessaries” as unconstitutional because it delegated legislative power to 
courts and juries); Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149 (1920) (striking down a statute that 
instructed federal courts to apply state worker compensation law in resolving admiralty cases). See also  
A.L.A Schechter Poultry Corp. v. Unites States, 295, U.S. 495 (1935) and Panama Refining Co.v. Ryan, 293 
U.S. 388 (1935). 
10 Geradin, D., The Development of European Regulatory Agencies: Lessons from the American Experience, In 
Geradin, D., R. Mun oz and N. Petit (eds.) Regulation through Agencies in the EU. A new paradigm of 
European governance, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, at 220. 
11 Ibid.  
12 Ibid at 220. 
13 23 U.S. 10 Wheat. 1 1 (1825) (USA). 
14 488 U.S. 361 (1989) (USA). 
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“constitutionally sufficient if Congress clearly delineates the general policy, the public 
agency which is to apply it, and the boundaries of this delegated authority.”15 
 
The softening of the above position by the courts allowed for a widening of the 
scope of delegation of powers from the legislature to IRAs.  In 1914 the Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) was established soon to be followed by the Agricultural Adjustment 
Act in 1933.16  These developments served to legitimize, entrench and further situate 
law-making; executive and adjudicative powers into IRAs created by Congress but 
located within the executive arm of government. This change in legal direction was 
reinforced by the Supreme Court in Winthrop v. Larkin.17  In that matter, the court held 
that situating all the powers of law-making, implementation and adjudication in one 
agency (IRAs) was not unconstitutional unless the presumption of honesty and 
integrity of officers exercising the functions is overcome by evidence of actual bias or 
prejudice in a given case.  
 
2.3 Delegation  
To have a proper understanding of the tensions the delegated authority by the 
legislature to the IRAs generated at the intersection of administrative and constitutional 
law in the USA, it is appropriate to expand the contending positions of its proponents 
and opponents. This elucidation is desirable, given the adoption of the IRA model in 
Nigeria without any legal and constitutional interrogation. More importantly the 
constitutional democracy in practice in Nigeria is similar to that of the USA. The 
language of the Nigerian Constitution on the powers of the three arms of the 
                                                     
15 Batista, T.C., Control of the normative power of the regulatory agencies by the Judicial Branch, George 
Washington University - School of Business, Center for Latin American Issues, The Institute of Brazilian 
Issues, The Minerva Program, Washington – DC, Spring 2014 at 13. 
16 The Agricultural Adjustment Act, Pub.L.No, 48 Sat. 31(1933) gave the Secretary of Agriculture the 
powers to regulate crop quality or other aspects of agriculture but the essential intent was to restrict 
supply.  The “agricultural marketing orders” the Act empowered the Secretary to issue were in a 1935 
amendment to the Act re-designated as “licences”. 
17 Winthrop v. Larkin 421 U.S. 35 (1975 ) 1532. 
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government18 is similar to that of the USA Constitution. Hence, a discourse on the 
challenges of the delegation of legislative powers faced in the USA will illuminate the 
way forward for Nigeria. 
 
2.3.1 Proponents of Delegation  
Proponents of the delegation of legislative powers to IRAs argue that it is not a blank 
cheque for them to do as they please. Rather, in delegating, the legislature first makes 
the “fundamental policy choices” in the legislation setting up the IRA and then goes 
ahead to delegate the power to implement the nitty-gritty of the policy thrusts to the 
IRA.19 This enables the lawmakers to remove themselves from political and other vested 
interests in order to situate the powers of specifying the more detailed aspects (usually 
referred to as regulations) into the hands of experts within the IRAs who would base 
their decisions, not on any vested interests, but “upon a cool appraisal of the public 
interest.”20 Even in the event that the experts succumb to any vested interests, processes 
enshrined in the legislation setting up the IRA stipulate that all parties must be heard 
and decisions arrived at in a transparent manner after a sombre consideration of all 
representations.  
Another guarantee to forestall abuse of the delegated power by IRAs is the 
subjection of all their decisions to judicial appeal and review.21  Where a party is 
aggrieved by the exercise of the powers by IRAs, courts of law are empowered to 
                                                     
   18 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria: Section 4. (1) The legislative powers of the Federal 
Republic of Nigeria shall be vested in a National Assembly for the Federation, which shall consist of a 
Senate and a House of Representatives.; S. 5 (1) The executive powers of the Federation shall be vested in 
the President; S. 6 (1) The judicial powers of the Federation shall be vested in the courts.  
19 Schoenbrod, note 6 at 12-18. 
20 Ibid.  
21 Ibid at 9. 
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intervene in order to determine the legitimacy and lawfulness of the processes leading 
up to the decision and the legality and validity of the decision itself.22  
In a further justification for delegation, political scientists have relied on the 
Principal –Agency relationship to explain the reasons why the legislature is usually 
inclined towards delegating its powers to IRAs, whereas ordinarily it should be 
jealously guarding them.23  
a. Delegating powers of law-making to an agent can address concerns of the 
 credibility of commitments. Legislators always work under the continued 
 consciousness of electoral cycles and their decision-making processes always 
 have a bearing to their fortunes at the polls. This does not augur well for credible 
 commitments in the decision-making process but rather encourages short-
 termism. Delegating powers to an agency that does not have an eye on the 
 electoral cycle helps to mitigate the lack of credible commitments.  
b. Delegation to expert teams or agencies allows government to optimize 
 efficiency and the evolution of cost-effective policy options in the decision 
 making processes, most especially in cases where the field concerned is highly 
 technical in nature; and 
c. Sharing and shifting of blame for wrong or unpopular decisions is one of  the 
 cushioning effects of delegation as the legislators will have another  convenient 
 agency to point to as being responsible for an unpopular decision in order to 
 appear popular to the electorate. 
2.3.2 Opponents of Delegation  
Opponents of delegation, on the other hand, argue that allowing Congress to delegate 
its law-making powers to IRAs spells death to the concept of a constitutional democracy 
                                                     
22 Geradin, note 10. 
23 Thatcher, note 3 at 125. 
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as conceived by its founding fathers.24 They assert that personal liberty, a key 
foundation upon which constitutional democracy is founded, would be subverted. This 
in turn would invalidate key democratic concepts such as separation of powers and rule 
of law upon which democracy rests.25 Three reasons are furnished for this conclusion.26  
Firstly, they argue that delegation undercuts liberty in a number of ways 
including shifting power from Congress to another arm of government, the executive, 
thus undermining the core concept of non-delegation. Delegation also allows Congress 
to parry blame for unpopular decisions made in the form of laws by experts running the 
IRAs, when in actual fact the blame ought to be that of Congress, as they were the ones 
elected by the people to make laws and not the experts within the IRAs. Further, as 
delegation makes the process of law-making easier and faster, it abridges public 
participation at hearings before laws are made by the legislature. The point has also 
been made that delegation concentrates law-making, enforcement and adjudication 
powers in the same hands, a development that runs contrary to the famous words of 
Madison that the “accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive and judiciary, in 
the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-
appointed, or elective, may justify to be pronounced the very definition of tyranny”27 
Secondly, it has been argued that by the nature of its evolution in the power 
architecture, IRAs lack democratic political legitimacy. Notwithstanding this, the 
powers they wield go to roots of the political economy of a nation and thus are of a 
political nature. The argument goes therefore that these political decisions are better left 
to be taken by public officials who have been chosen by the electorate and are 
                                                     
24 Lawson, G., The Rise and rise of the Administrative State, 107 Harv. L.Rev. 1231 1993-1994 at 1233 – 1249. 
25 Schoenbrod note 6 at 13-19. 
26 Strossen, N., Delegation as a Danger to Liberty, Cardozo Law Review)Vol.20:861 1999). 
27 The Federalist No 47, at 301 (James Madison) Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961 in Lawson, G., The Rise    and 
rise of the Administrative State, 107 Harv. L.Rev. 1231 1993-1994 at 1248. 
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answerable to the latter unlike the experts within the IRAs who are independent of 
everyone.28 
Thirdly, it has been contended29 that business incorporates galvanising, 
generating, producing and distributing resources and should be consigned to the hands 
of private persons working under and within the promptings of competitive markets. 
Any government role, both as owner, manager or regulator, is interventionist and 
should be avoided. The state should confine itself to the rudimentary role of assuring 
and protecting property rights.30 This argument derives its strength from the rationale 
for the emergence of regulation in the first place; government’s desire to develop and 
maintain arm’s length relationships with all participants in the market place.  
Notwithstanding the legal, administrative and constitutional mistrust of 
delegation to IRAs, it has come to be recognized and accepted in constitutional and 
administrative law realms.31  
 What has emerged from the above is that the role of the state in contemporary 
life has been completely transformed. Its erstwhile role as the owner and manager of 
heavy industries and infrastructure and the provider of economic and social goods and 
services has been traded in for a more sublime one of a rule-maker and regulator. Even 
with that, the performance of these roles has been consigned to a multiplicity of IRAs 
cutting across different sectors, and functioning independently of its principals, the 
legislature and the executive. This state of affairs has been rightly called the “regulatory 
                                                     
28 Yeung, K., The Regulatory State in The Oxford Handbook of Regulation, eds. Baldwin, et al, Oxford 
University Press, 2010.  
29Barton, B., The Theoretical Context of Regulation, in Regulating Energy and Natural resources, eds., Barton, 
et al Academic Advisory Group, Section on Energy, Environment, Natural Resources and Infrastructure 
Law, International Bar Association, 2006, Oxford University Press at 17.   
30 Ibid at 18. 
31 Ibid.  
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state” with several scholars32 holding the view that we all live in the “golden age” of the 
regulatory state. 
Having explored the rationale for the emergence of the concept of independent 
regulation and IRAs in the land of their birth, the USA, an exploration of the reasons for 
its “'homecoming and enthusiastic reception in Europe and the rest of the world”33 will 
be undertaken.  The rapidity of its spread, on a much larger scale than even in the 
USA,34 calls for an intellectual inquiry.  
 
2.4 Spread of the IRA Model to Europe 
Unlike the USA where the dynamics of the emergence and impact of regulation of 
utilities and the IRA model on the body politic was debated and situated firmly within 
the contours and peculiarities of American public policy, administration and 
constitutional democracy, this did not occur in Europe. The model did not gain traction 
until the 1970s, over a century after its creation in the USA. Majone35 maintains that 
before 1978, terms such as “deregulation” and “privatisation’” were hardly heard  in the 
UK, the then declining industrial powerhouse of Europe. The public sector continued to 
provide leadership in the provision of infrastructures and services.  
Thus the regulatory state dawned on Europe late but spread rapidly in the 
course of the last three decades. In France for example, there were only five entities 36 
                                                     
32 Majone G., From the Positive to the Regulatory State: Causes and Consequences of Changes in the Mode of 
Governance , 1997, Journal of Public Policy, 17(2), 139-167; Loughlin, M. and Scott, C. The regulatory state in 
Dunleavy, P., Gamble, A., and Holliday, I. (eds), 1997, Developments in British Politics (Basingstoke: 
Macmillan). 
33 Levi-Faur, D., The Odyssey of the Regulatory State. Episode One: The Rescue of the Welfare State, Jerusalem 
Papers on Regulation & Governance, Working Paper No. 39, November 2011 at 14. 
34 Brown, B., The Theoretical Context of Regulation, in Regulating Energy and Natural Resources, Barry 
Brown, et al, eds., Academic Advisory Group, Section on Energy, Environment, Natural Resources and 
Infrastructure Law, International bar Association, Oxford University Press, 2006 at 11. 
35 Majone, note 1. 
36 Commission Nationale de l'Informatique et des Libertes; the Commission de Controle des Banques 
created in 1941 and transformed into the Commission Bancaire by the law of 24 January 1984; the 
Commission des Operations de Bourse (1967), whose powers have been significantly extended by the law 
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that possessed independent regulatory features in 1978 but presently there are up to 
twenty IRAs in existence.37 In the United Kingdom, nine such entities came into 
existence between the 1970s and 1990s.38  
While the rise of IRAs in the USA was a reaction to the failure of the state-centred 
economic model, this was not the main reason for its emergence in Western Europe. 
Research by Thatcher identifies two broad themes that explain the acceptance of the 
IRA model in Europe.  
These are the functional and contextual themes39 and this categorisation has 
received scholastic acceptance.40  
Under the functional theme, the reasons given for the emergence of IRAs in 
Western Europe included the inclination of elected officials to use delegation to IRAs to  
shift blame in the event of a backlash that may occur as a result of implementing harsh 
but much needed reforms; the highly complex and technical nature of regulation arising 
from new technological developments that called for a high degree of expertise and 
knowledge that only expert teams can handle; and the huge volume of information that 
is needed to be assembled, dissected and filtered before an informed regulatory 
decision can occur, a task that cannot be easily done by a legislative committee. 
                                                                                                                                                                           
of 2 August 1984; the Commission des Infractions Fiscales (1977); the Commission des Sondages (1977); 
the Mediateur (1973), the only single-headed regulatory agency created so far in France. Culled from 
Marie-Jose Guedon, Les Autorites Administratives Independantes (Paris: Librairie Generale de Droit et 
de Jurisprudence, 1991) in Majone, note 1. 
37 Marie-Jose Guedon, Les Autorites Administratives Independantes (Paris: Librairie Generale de Droit et de 
Jurisprudence, 1991) in Majone,G., The Rise of the Regulatory State in Europe, West European Politics 17.3 
(1994):77, July 1994. World History in Context. Web. 26 Dec 2013. 
38 The Independent Broadcasting Authority (1972), the Civil Aviation Authority (1972), the Health and 
Safety Commission (1974), the Equal Opportunities Commission (1976), and the Commission for Racial 
Equality (1976) are only some of the regulatory bodies created in this period; Office of 
Telecommunications (1984), Office of Gas Supply (1986), Office of Water Services (1989), Office of 
Electricity Regulation (1990). Culled from Robert Baldwin and Christopher McCrudden, Regulation and 
Public Law (London: Weidenfeld, 1987) in Majone, note 1. 
39 Thatcher, note 3 at 125-147. 
40 Majone, G., Regulation and Its Modes: the European Experience, International Journal of Public 
Administration, Volume 19, Issue 9, 1996; Cetin, T. et al, Independent Regulatory Agencies in Turkey and 
Their Formal Independence Levels 
http://ecs.epoka.edu.al/index.php/icme/icme2008/paper/viewFile/11/6; Majone, note 1. 
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Other reasons for the rapid spread of IRAs in Europe included the desire to 
short-circuit “short-termism” that characterises decisions of elected legislators that 
typically lack enduring commitments given their constant eyes on electoral cycles;41 and 
the increased regulation by international/supranational agencies such as the European 
Union who required member-states to domesticate and implement the IRAs for 
uniformity and ease of cross-national regulation. 
 The contextual reasons identified for the spread of IRAs in Western Europe 
included “policy learning and institutional mimetism.” This is where a country sets up 
a model of an agency and it thrives, countries close to it watch and copy it into their 
domains. One example was the creation of the USA model of Federal Communications 
Commission in 1934 that gave impetus to the setting up of OFTEL in the UK, which in 
turn triggered the proliferation of regulators in the same mould within Europe under 
what has been termed the “snowball effect.”42 
 With particular reference to the spread of IRAs in Central and Eastern Europe 
some other reasons account for this. The first was that Central and Eastern European 
countries came under sustained pressure from intermediating agencies to institute IRAs 
as a condition for receiving the financial assistance they desperately required to stabilise 
their ailing economies.43 Secondly, the desire of these countries to join the European 
Union (EU) required them to become compliant with relevant EU directives on the IRA 
model of regulatory governance.  Thirdly, additional pressure came from USAID which 
was then handing out most of the development aid.44 This came in subtle and in some 
cases brazen form, with USAID working either alone or in collaboration with 
                                                     
41 Majone, note 1. 
42 Magnette, P., The Politics of Regulation in the European Union, in Regulation Through Agencies in the EU, A 
New Paradigm of European Governance, Geradin, D. et al, eds, 2006, Edward Elgar Publishing Limited.  
43 Stern, J., Styles of Regulation: The Choice of Approach to Utility Regulation in Central and Eastern Europe, 
Regulation Initiative Working Paper Series, 1999, Number 34, London Business School, London & NERA 
at 2. 
44 Ibid.  
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intermediating agencies, which engaged consultants and facilitated workshops and 
seminars in the region to pointedly advocate the USA style of regulation.45  
2.5 Emergence of IRAs in Nigeria 
As depicted in the first chapter, the spike in international oil prices, the downgrade of 
the Keynesian model of economic governance to one that is market-driven, the 
attendant fall of the Soviet Union, fiscal constraints, a debt overhang, inefficiency in the 
production and delivery of services by SOEs, corruption and the poor state of political 
and economic institutions are frequently cited as some of the reasons for the emergence 
of IRAs in Nigeria.46   
However, the immediate trigger that led to the reception of the IRA model in 
Nigeria was the desire to alleviate the economic problems the country was facing. To do 
this, the government applied to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for a three year 
extended facility loan of US$2.3billion.47  In order to benefit however, the IMF, 
consistent with its policies in other debt-ridden African countries,48 required Nigeria to 
institute a menu of economic reforms that included cost reflective tariffs for utilities, 
reducing government expenditure, privatising SOEs, removal of government subsidies 
and price controls, and devaluing the naira. 49 
Negotiations between government and the IMF dragged on and eventually 
stalled principally on account of the insistence by the government that the 17 
conditionalities given by IMF were too draconian.50 The new military government 
                                                     
45 Aliff, G, and Branko,T., Why U.S. public utility commission style ratemaking has become a hit overseas, in 
Global Regulation: Exporting America to the World, Public Utilities Fortnightly, February 2007. 
46 Falola, T and Heaton, M.M, A History of Nigeria, 2008, Cambridge University Press, at 203-204. 
47 Anyanwu, J. C., President Babangida’s Structural Adjustment Programme and Inflation in Nigeria 1992, 
Journal of Social Development in Africa, Vol.7 No.1 at 5-6. 
48 Meredith, M., The State of Africa, A History of Fifty years of Independence, The Free Press, London, 2005. 
49 Falola and Heaton, note 46 at 216. 
50 Anyanwu, note 47. 
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pandered to public opinion and subjected the debate and negotiations to a public 
referendum which returned a negative verdict.51  
Despite its rejection, government went ahead to institute wholesale fiscal and 
regulatory reforms in 1986. Though the reforms were home-grown, they were patterned 
after the intermediating agencies’ specifications. This included the implementation of a 
Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) which was aimed at restructuring the 
economy and making it more competitive and efficient.52 
 Encapsulated in the SAP53 was the deregulation and liberalisation of the 
economy through privatisation of SOEs and the delineation of regulation, policy and 
commercial roles. While government would continue to determine policy matters, 
regulatory and commercial roles were excised from government to IRAs and the private 
sector respectively. The requirement for the setting up of IRAs was meant to balance the 
conflicting and often contending interests of the new value chain of the state, the 
consumer and the investor.  
Thus the era of the regulatory state had dawned on Nigeria, irreversibly affecting 
the constitutional, legal, administrative and economic face of the nation. Within a short 
span of less than three decades, the Nigerian political and economic landscape had 
become overwhelmed with a range of foreign ideas, policies and institutional 
innovations, encapsulated in the IRA model of regulatory governance in a variety of 
industries and utilities, cutting across different sectors of the economy. Unlike the USA 
where there was a sustained process of legal and constitutional interrogation of the 
model, none took place in Nigeria. This could be explained by the fact the first waves of 
                                                     
51 Falola and Heaton, note 46. 
52 Adeyemo D.O,  Public Enterprises Reform in Nigeria: A Review; Kamla-Raj 2005 J. Soc. Sci., 10(3): 223-231 
(2005); The detailed undercurrents that led to the SAP program are covered by Thomas Callaghy in Lost 
Between State and market: The Politics of Economic Adjustment in Ghana, Zambia and Nigeria, in Joan Nelson, 
ed., Economic Crisis and Policy Choice, Princeton University Press, 1990 at 305 – 7.  
53 Olutayo, A and Omobowale,A., Capitalism, Globalisation and the Underdevelopment Process in Africa: 
History in Perpetuity, Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa, 2007 Africa 
Development, Vol. XXXII, No. 2, 2007, 97–112 at 105-106. 
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IRAs were during the military era, when the legislative and executive powers fused in 
one arm, and the military regime had a zero tolerance for opposing viewpoints.  
Table 1 contains a list of regulatory agencies in Nigeria and indicates how 
comprehensively the IRA model has taken root in Nigeria within a short time. The 
concept of “agencification” which is embedded in the IRA model of regulatory 
governance has been the guiding spirit behind the evolution and institutional structure 
of all these regulatory agencies. Table 1 contains three types of regulatory agencies.  
The first category is those agencies that meet the conceptual ideals of IRAs and 
function as such, within the context on an enabling law. These agencies are reflected as 
Table 1A. This thesis focus on the two IRAs reflected as Numbers 2 and 3 in Table 1A. 
The second category is made up of agencies that regulate aspects of the Nigeria’s 
social-economic life, but do not, by their institutional characteristics, meet the precise 
contours of an independent regulatory agency model. They are essentially extra-
government agencies that report to the line ministries in the course of carrying out their 
functions. Agencies reflected to in Table 1B belong to this group.  
 The third category is made up of proposed regulatory agencies that have been 
designed and presented to the National Assembly as executive bills for passage into 
law. These are reflected in Table 1C. When passed into law, these agencies will belong 
to the first category and they are fashioned to operate as IRAs. 
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TABLE 1A 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
S/N Sector Agency  Commencement Regulatory Space 
1 Financial Services  Central Bank of 
Nigeria – Enabling 
Law - Banks and 
Other Financial 
Institutions Act, 
1991 
1991 Banking – Commercial, 
Mortgage, Merchant, 
Micro & Medium, 
Bureau de Changes 
2 Telecommunications Nigerian 
Communications 
Commission -  
Enabling Law:  
Nigerian 
Communications 
Act, 2003 
2003 Regulation of 
Telecommunications 
3 Electric Power Nigerian 
Electricity 
Regulatory 
Commission- 
Enabling Law : 
Electric Power 
Sector Reform 
Act, 2005 
2005 Regulation of the 
Generation, 
Transmission, 
Distribution and Sale of 
electric power 
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TABLE 1B 
 
S/N Sector Agency Year of 
Establishment  
Regulatory Space 
1 Insurance  National Insurance 
Commission - 
Enabling Law: 
National Insurance 
Commission Act, 
1997 
1997 Regulates and supervises the 
Nigerian Insurance Sector 
2 Food & Drugs The National Agency 
for Food and Drug 
Administration and 
Control -  Enabling 
Act:  National Agency 
for Food and Drug 
Administration and 
Control Act,1993 
1993 Regulation of drugs, food and 
other regulated products are 
manufactured, imported, 
exported, advertised, 
distributed, sold and used. 
3 Environment 
Pollution  
The National 
Environmental 
Standards and 
Regulations 
Enforcement Agency -  
Enabling Act :  
National 
Environmental 
Standards and 
Regulations 
Enforcement Agency 
Act, 2007 
2007 Protection and development of 
the environment, biodiversity 
conservation and sustainable 
development of Nigeria's natural 
resources in general and 
environmental technology 
 
 
 
 
 
4 Infrastructure 
Concession 
Infrastructure 
Concession regulatory 
Commission -  
Enabling Law : 
Infrastructure 
Concession 
Regulatory 
Commission Act, 
2005 
2005 To take custody of concession 
agreements made under this Act 
and monitor compliance with 
the terms and conditions  
5 Stock, Securities and 
Exchange  
Securities and 
Exchange 
Commission -   
Enabling Law : 
Investment and 
Securities Act, 2007  
2007 Regulation of Investment and 
Securities business 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
39 
 
6 Broadcasting  National Broadcasting 
Commission -
Enabling Law : 
National 
Broadcasting 
Commission Act, 
1992 
1992 Regulation of Radio, Television 
and Satellite Communications  
 
 
7 Upstream 
Petroleum 
Department of 
Petroleum Resources- 
Set up as an extra-
Ministerial 
Department of the 
Federal Ministry of 
Petroleum Resources  
1988 Regulation of the Upstream 
Sector of the Petroleum Industry  
8 Downstream 
Petroleum 
Petroleum Products 
Pricing Regulatory 
Agency - Enabling 
Law : 
Petroleum Products 
Regulatory Agency 
(Establishment) Act, 
2003  
2003 Regulate pricing and 
distribution of refined petroleum 
products  
 
 
 
9 Air Transportation Nigerian Civil 
Aviation Authority- 
Enabling Act : 
Civil Aviation Act, 
2006 
2006 Regulation of air transportation 
and navigation 
10 Public Procurement  Bureau of Public 
Procurement -  
Enabling Law - Public 
Procurement Act, 
2007 
2007 Regulation of pricing standards 
and benchmarks for public 
procurement 
11 Entertainment – 
Films, Videos 
National Film and 
Video Censors Board - 
Enabling Law : 
National Film and 
Video Censors Board, 
1993  
1993 Regulation of Films and Videos 
12 Consumer 
Protection Council 
of Nigeria 
Consumer Protection 
Council of Nigeria - 
Enabling Law : 
Consumer Protection 
Council Act, 1999 
1999 Providing redress to consumers 
complaints  
 
 
 
 
 
 
13 Pensions National Pension 
Commission -  
Enabling Law : 
Pension Reform Act, 
2004 
2004 Regulation of contributory 
pension schemes 
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14 Copyright and 
Patents  
Nigerian Copyright 
Commission -  
Enabling Law : 
Nigerian Copyright 
Commission Act, 
1970 
1988 Regulating Copyright matters 
 
 
15 Maritime  National Maritime 
Administration and 
Safety Agency -  
Enabling Act 
:Nigerian Maritime 
Administration and 
Safety Agency Act, 
2007  
2007 Regulation maritime safety, 
security, marine pollution and 
maritime labour.  
 
16 Nuclear Safety Nigerian Nuclear 
Regulatory Authority-  
Enabling Law -  
Nuclear Safety and 
Radiation Protection 
Act, 1995 
1995 Regulation of nuclear safety and 
radiological protection  
 
Source: Generated by Author 
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TABLE 1C 
S/N Sector Agency Year Regulatory Space 
1 
 
Covers all sectors of 
the economy 
Competition & 
Consumer Protection 
Commission  
Undergoing 
legislative 
consideration 
Competition and Consumer 
Protection across all sectors  
2 Transportation  
(Land, Rail, 
Maritime and 
Waterways) 
National Transport 
Commission 
 Economic Regulation of the land, 
waterways and maritime 
transportation modes 
3 Postal  National Postal 
Commission  
 Regulation of the Postal sector 
 
Source: Generated by Author 
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Pertinent questions to be tackled are: what led to the rapid assimilation of the 
IRA model into Nigeria? How can it be understood? What have been the dynamics that 
underpinned its infiltration into different sectors in such a seamless manner? What led 
policy makers, who since political independence had been implementing a state-led 
economic model complete with monolithic monopolies, to suddenly switch over to the 
IRA model? The following seeks to provide answers to the questions. 
As is evident from the large body of literature, the spread of IRAs across the 
developed world has received much scholarly investigation since its debut, but similar 
studies relating to the developing world are lacking. Exceptions are some work on Latin 
American countries by Levi-Faur in 2003,54 Jordana and Levi-Faur in 200555, work 
relating to Egypt by Ahmed Badran56 which addressed only the telecommunications 
sector, and a paper by Sosay Gul and Unal Zenginobuz,57 dwelling on emerging 
economies in some Latin American countries, Asia and Central and Eastern Europe.  
There are also three articles authored by Aryeetey and Ahene, Kapika and Eberhard 
and Aryeetey58 that treat the legal and regulatory framework for infrastructure 
provision in Ghana, without addressing the question of institutional limitations of the 
                                                     
54 Levi-Faur, D., The Politics of Liberalisation: Privatisation and Regulation-for- Competition in Europe’s and 
Latin America’s Telecoms and Electricity Industries, 2003, European Journal of Political Research, 42, pp. 705-
740.  
55 Jordana, J.,  and Levi-Faur, D., The Diffusion of Regulatory Capitalism in Latin America: Sectoral and 
National Channels in the Making of a New Order, 2005,  The Annals of the American Academy of Political and 
Social Science, 598 (March), pp. 102-124.  
56 Badran, A., Steering the Regulatory State: The Rationale Behind the Creation and Diffusion of Independent 
Regulatory Agencies in Liberalised Utility Sectors in the Developing Countries: Initial Thoughts and Reflections on 
the Egyptian Case, A Paper submitted for the 3rd Biennial Conference “Regulation in the Age of Crisis”, 
European Consortium for Political Research, Standing Group on regulatory Governance, 17-19 June 2010, 
Dublin. 
57 Gul,S., and Zenginobuz,U., Independent Regulatory Agencies in Emerging Economies, 2005, A paper 
prepared for presentation at the 2005 Annual Conference of the European Consortium for Political 
Research, Budapest, Hungary, 8-10 September 2005, Online at http:// http://regulation.upf.edu/ecpr-
05-papers/gsosay.pdf. 
58 Aryeetey, E. and Ahene, A.S., Utilities Regulation in Ghana, Centre on Regulation and Competition 
Working Paper Series, Paper No. 111, June 2005; Kapika, J., and Eberhard, A., Power Sector Reform and 
regulation in Africa: Lessons from Kenya, Tanzania, Namibia and Ghana, 2013, Human Sciences Research 
Council Press, Cape Town, SA; Aryeetey, E, The Institutional and Policy Framework for Regulation and 
Competition in Ghana, Centre on Regulation and Competition, Working Paper Series, Paper No. 46, 
December 2002. 
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Ghanaian trajectory. Thus the field of the regulatory state in the developing world, 
especially Africa, has been left largely uncharted. There has been none on Nigeria.  This 
is an attempt at filling that void.  
A study of the assimilation of the IRA model into Nigeria indicates a distinct pattern 
dictated largely by domestic drivers with some few international factors being thrown 
into the mix. This research begins by exploring those domestic drivers responsible for 
the introduction of the IRA model, and will thereafter consider the international 
dimensions of this process. 
2.5.1 Domestic Reasons for the Spread of IRAs in Nigeria 
2.5.1.1  State of the Economy 
First, the deteriorating economic situation in Nigeria59left government with no 
viable option but to institute radical reforms which included separating the 
conflicting roles of government as owner, manager and regulator of services and 
public utilities.  
This inclination towards reforms during hard economic times is 
consistent with empirical studies,60 which have determined that a downward 
                                                     
59 National Centre for Economic Management & Administration, Structural Adjustment Programme in 
Nigeria: Causes, Processes and Outcomes; A Revised Technical Proposal Submitted to Global Development 
Network (GDN) at http://resourcedat.com/wp content/uploads/2013/04/Nigeria_proposal.pdf on 
29/06/15. 
60 Empirical support for this argument can also be found in sociological studies of how broad 
macroeconomic crises led to the adoption of market-oriented reform in Latin America: Armijo, L.E.,and 
Faucher,P., 2001. We Have a Consensus: Explaining Political Support for Market Reforms in Latin America in 
Henisz, et al, The Worldwide Diffusion of Market Oriented Infrastructure Reform, 1977-1999, American 
Sociological Review, 2005. Vol. 70, December: 871-897; Lora, Eduardo. What Makes Reforms Likely? Timing 
and Sequencing of Structural Reforms in Latin America, 2000, Inter-American Development Bank Research 
Department Working Paper 424; Remmer, Karen, L. 1998. The Politics of Neoliberal Reform in South America, 
1980-94. Studies in Comparative International Development 33:3-29; Banerjee, S.G., and Munger, M.C., 
Move to Markets? An Empirical Analysis of Privatization in Developing Countries, Fondazione Eni Enrico 
Mattei Note Di Lavoro, 2002). 
44 
 
trend in the economic conditions of a nation normally triggers major economic 
policy reforms.61  
The resort to market- driven reforms was made with the hope that it 
would avert the impending economic collapse. This response is consistent with 
the Latin American reaction to poor performance of the economy by instituting 
reforms in the telecommunications sector.62  
Empirical studies point to a body of evidence63 that shows that the 
adoption of market-driven reforms in ailing nation’s economies usually turns in 
a positive impact on sectoral performance thus pointing the way that 
government should take.  
2.5.1.2  Loss of Trust and Faith 
Second, the loss of trust and faith by both the military regimes and the civilian 
leadership in state institutions contributed in no small measure to the emergence of 
IRAs. Policy makers spanning both eras came to appreciate the futility of putting faith 
in the nation’s political and economic institutions for a way out of the economic 
quagmire given their structural weakness and apparent failure to arrest the economic 
drift from the outset.64 Hampered by the quick turnover of heads of government that in 
turn caused the replacement at will of chief executives of SOEs and the heads of critical 
institutions as well as the corrosive nature of corruption that undermined the 
foundations of critical institutions, undergirded by a largely inept and bureaucratic 
                                                     
61 Henisz, Witold J. and Bennet A. Zelner.,Legitimacy, Interest Group Pressures and Change in Emergent 
Institutions: The Case of Foreign Investors and Host Country Governments. 2004, Academy of Management 
Review 29. 
62 Petrazzini, Ben A.,The Political Economy of Telecommunications Reform in Developing Countries: 
Privatisation and Liberalisation in Comparative Perspective. 1995,Westport, CT: Praeger. 
63 D'Souza, Juliet and William L. Megginson, The Financial and Operating Performance of Privatized Firms 
During the 1990s, 1999, Journal of Finance 54:1397-1438; Megginson, William L and Jeffry M. Netter. From 
State to Market: A survey of empirical studies on privatization. 2001, Journal of Economic Literature 39:321-
389; Levy, Brian and Pablo T. Spiller. 1994. The Institutional Foundations of Regulatory Commitment: A 
Comparative Analysis of Telecommunications Regulation, 1994, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 
10:201-246. 
64 Lewis, P.M., Growing Apart, Oil, Politics, and Economic Change in Indonesia and Nigeria, The University of 
Michigan Press, 2007.  
45 
 
Public Service, there was no reason for any measure of trust nor confidence in 
institutions of government.  
IRAs emerged as the only plausible tool that could halt the trend of institutional 
weaknesses in government institutions. Empanelling an agency that, though set up by 
government, would yet be free and independent to make its own decisions based on 
verifiable data with a long term view to economic development, offered a very 
tempting proposition, one too attractive to resist.65 Selling off the ailing SOEs that had 
become a major drain on the nation’s finances to the private sector and committing their 
supervision into the hands of an independent arbiter (IRAs) seemed the only option left 
for government.  
2.5.1.3  Credible and Stable Commitments 
Third, the introduction of the IRAs was an avenue used to provide credible and stable 
commitments to would-be investors, of the government’s willingness to stick by its 
words and promises. It has been acknowledged that much of the blame for Nigeria’s 
faltering economic development is constant changes in policy that affected existing 
commitments upon which investments were made. A plethora of literature66 points to 
the fact that a key obstacle to infrastructure development was the lack of a system that 
delivers credible commitments that government will not “intervene arbitrarily or 
capriciously in the operating practices of private infrastructure service providers.”67   
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The necessity for credible commitments emanating from government becomes 
highlighted when it is noted that investments in utility sectors are long tenured and 
carry within them the seeds of “irreversible investments” that would be lost if 
commitments are tampered with.68 Credible commitments given under a legal and 
regulatory framework undergirded by IRAs appeared to be the way out, and 
government decided to take that route.  
2.5.1.4  Political Certainty  
Four, closely following the search for credible commitments was the vexing matter of 
political certainty. The reasoning behind the delegation of powers to the IRAs was to 
“tie the hands” of future governments from changing policies that might be painful in 
the short term but beneficial in the long term. This point is highlighted by frequent 
changes at the top echelon of the leadership in Nigeria since independence.69  
 Military regimes followed each other relatively quickly, each seeking to correct 
past wrongs, and there was no guarantee that repudiation of past commitments would 
not be one of the wrongs to be righted. Hence there was an inclination to insulate 
investment in infrastructures from policy somersaults through the IRA mechanism. 
Even within Nigeria’s democratic setting, the political system prescribes a four-year 
election cycle for political offices which is a short period in within which to guarantee 
long term investment in infrastructures. The IRA was thus seen as a tool to protect these 
investments by ensuring the continuity derived from regulatory commitments.  
One very apposite example of the havoc which sudden policy changes can cause 
to a nation’s development is seen in Nigeria’s power sector reforms. Obasanjo’s 
government in its first term in 1999 developed a National Electric Power Policy, and 
                                                                                                                                                                           
8; Majone, G., Non-majoritarian Institutions and the Limits of democratic Governance: A Political Transaction-
Cost Approach, 2001 in Badran, note 56. 
68 Badran, note 56. 
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went on to enact legislation in 2005, known as the Electric Power Sector Reform Act 
(EPSR Act) to reform the entire electric power sector. However, with the coming in of 
the the Yar’adua government, a policy change occurred and the reforms were shelved. 
The Commissioners of the regulator, Nigerian Electricity Regulatory Commission, were 
unlawfully removed and a Sole Administrator, an office unknown to the EPSR Act, was 
appointed. The reforms did not commence again until after another government, the 
Jonathan administration, came into power in 2011 and gave new impetus to the 
reforms. The National Electric Power Authority (NEPA) the state incumbent utility has 
now been unbundled and sold to private investors along power generation and 
distribution lines. It is only left to the imagination what investors that had been waiting 
over the years would have been thinking as successive governments flip-flopped. 
2.5.1.5  Shifting of Blame 
Fiftly, the attraction of shifting blame led the populist military government of 
Babangida and other successive governments to shift the responsibility for making the 
tough decisions that related to the cost of services and critical utilities to IRAs. This 
offered a window for the incumbent government to point accusing fingers at the IRAs if 
there were public backlashes and loss of political support. The plausible blame 
argument of government would be that IRAs are independent of government with 
independent funding streams and hiring processes, so government is not to blame.70  
 
2.5.1.6  Privatisation  
Sixthly, the government used the allure of the revenue inflow that would be realized 
with privatisation as a reason to fast-track the implementation of reforms and the 
setting up of IRAs. By the 1980s when Nigeria was beginning to implement economic 
reforms that included privatisation and the IRA model of regulatory governance, the 
poor financial state of the nation was glaring. The income revenue that accrued to 
government had shrunk significantly from N12.3 billion to N7.3 billion as a result of the 
                                                     
70 Thatcher, note 3. 
48 
 
international oil crisis.71 During the same period, foreign reserves dipped from N5.462 
billion to just N798.5 million while the external debt portfolio doubled from $9 billion in 
1980 to $18 billion in 1983! Government estimated that this quick cash injection into the 
economy would alleviate the fiscal challenges being encountered.  
Furthermore, the method of sale of public assets under privatisation , especially 
recently, follows a process whereby government conducts a valuation of the asset, 
keeps the valuation price secret and invites bidders to make bids.  A bid is not accepted 
unless it is above the valuation price. This invariably encourages government to sell and 
reap a windfall, and with the sale, the IRA comes on stream to regulate the market into 
which the new owners have entered.  There is, in addition a large body of literature72 
that clearly points to better performance of firms when sold to private capital than 
when in government hands, thus boosting the argument for privatisation in Nigeria.  
2.5.1.7  The Need for a New Regulatory Framework  
Seventhly, when privatisation occurs, SOEs are sold off to private investors and the 
emerging interests of all the players in the value chain become non-convergent. On the 
one hand, the new owners’ overriding aim is to seek a quick recovery of their 
investments and high profits, while the consumer or end user desires the best possible 
services at the lowest possible cost. The Government, the former owners, on the other 
hand are basically interested (especially in democratic settings) in maintaining harmony 
within the body polity and ensuring that nothing should be done by any of the parties 
to disturb or overturn the apple cart and affect their electoral fortunes.73 The IRA is thus 
called into play to balance these legitimate but conflicting expectations. 
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Also, experience worldwide shows that when SOEs are sold off, there is a high 
tendency for them to transmute from being public monopolies into private monopolies, 
except where they are hemmed in and controlled (regulated) by a third force (IRA) that 
would promote competition and fairness in pricing for goods and services.74  
 
2.5.1.8  Expeditious Resolution of Utility Issues  
Eighthly, services provided by utilities are critical to the survival and well-being of the 
citizenry and the quick resolution of issues relating to the availability, cost and quality 
of services such as electricity, telephony, water, transportation and petroleum requires 
prompt and round the clock attention. Idigbe argues that current international best 
practice justifies the decision of the legislature to delegate the monitoring of particular 
sectors to IRAs. IRAs operate on a full time to monitor, make rules and enforce the law 
in a particular sector. This is within the context of the fact that neither the legislature 
nor the courts sit every day and they do not possess the capacity to closely monitor the 
deregulated market comprising multiple participants.75 
The foregoing are some of the domestic drivers responsible for the emergence of 
the IRA model in Nigeria. However, it is to be noted that these drivers in themselves 
alone would have been unable to facilitate the spread of IRAs into Nigeria.  There were 
other undercurrents of international dimensions that provided the impetus needed for 
the domestic drivers to be triggered. 
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2.5.2 International Drivers in the Diffusion of IRAs in Nigeria 
 
2.5.2. 1  Learning- Drawing  
The first impetus for the introduction of the IRA model of regulatory governance into 
Nigeria was through lesson-drawing and emulation. Lesson-drawing when considered 
alongside policy diffusion, is a situation where “knowledge about policies, 
administrative arrangements or institutions is used across time or space in the 
development of policies, administrative arrangements and institutions elsewhere.”76 
The transporters, carriers, exporters or inducers of this transfer of policy through 
learning, extend to governments represented by legislators, bureaucrats and extra-
governmental agencies, individuals, organizations, 77 transnational corporations,78  and 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs), which are referred to in diffusion literature as 
the Third Sector.  
Drawing from the above, learning and emulation have been implicated in several 
ways as a vehicle for the spread of market oriented policies and the IRA model in 
Nigeria. 
Firstly, the World Bank led the pack of intermediating agencies, and other nation 
states in realising the efficacy of employing education as a vehicle to facilitate the 
spread of ideas. A World Bank report79 expressly acknowledged that “knowledge, not 
capital, is the key to sustained economic growth and improvements in human well-
being”.  Even though the intermediating agencies have different objectives and areas of 
specialization and expertise, in the Nigerian context they leveraged on each other’s 
strengths to deploy and utilise the mechanism of learning to spread economic ideas 
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within Nigeria .80  The generic word that was utilised to spread knowledge on and 
about the IRA model was “capacity building” through training, workshops and study 
tours by the intermediating agencies and other Western nations.  
                 These included the Global Development Network (GDN) initiative, Distance 
Learning programme, the Learning and Leadership Centre and the Training Institutes 
managed by the World Bank Institute (WBI) that created partnerships with the 
government, NGOs, training institutes and think tanks. Similar bodies were the Global 
Environment Facility, an initiative of the United Nations, a partnership for international 
cooperation where 183 countries work together with international institutions, civil 
society organizations and the private sector, to address global environmental issues;  
the Environmental and Natural Resources Group of The World Bank Institute (WBIEN) 
and the Environmental Economics and Policy Research Network that served as a 
common repository of ideas, experiences and knowledge to which independent 
regional networks contributed. 
 
Secondly, intermediating agencies devised an ingenious route through which 
polices and ideas were remotely diffused from them to Nigeria. The strategy usually 
began with an offer of grant in aid to a selected sector, with the proviso that all key 
technical personnel and consultants required to carry out the scope of the grant would 
come from the donor.81 It ended up that the grant funds never left the shores of the 
donor country as the entire consultancy fees were paid to law firms, banks and 
consultants hired by the donor agency within its shores.82 The basic brief of these 
consultants was to advise on the IRA model as the most suitable for facilitating private 
sector provision on infrastructure.  The rational for utilising the external consultants 
was premised on the argument that there was a lack of local capacity to provide such 
                                                     
80 Nsouli, S.M., Capacity Building in Africa: The Role of International Financial Institutions, Finance & 
Development, A quarterly magazine of the IMF, December 2000, Vol. 37, No. 4. 
81 Stone, note 76 at 26. 
82 Ibid at 24. 
52 
 
services that cover a range of advises on legal, regulatory, and institutional reforms in 
infrastructures and services. 
Thirdly, foundations and non-profit organizations were involved in the transfer 
of these policy ideas and concepts. These ranged from large well known foundations 
such as the Ford Foundation, MacArthur Foundation, and the Bill & Melinda Gates 
Foundation, to other global developmentally inclined foundations operating in Nigeria 
such as the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, the Soros Foundation operating under the 
acronym Open Society for West Africa (OSIWA), the Shell Foundation, and the Konrad 
Adenauer Foundation Nigeria, among others. These Foundations were set up to 
espouse principles and values of democracy and free market. This was actualised by 
getting actively involved in capacity building and in the dissemination of these ideas 
and concepts. They supported civic educational activities in the fields of human, social 
and political rights, gender democracy, conflict resolution, and good governance.  
One feature that connects all these foundations has been their clear identification 
with, and support for, the imbibing and development of knowledge-based capacities 
that promotes a market-based economy and the IRA model. From behind the scenes, 
these foundations and non-profit organizations supported activities, such as research 
and analysis, technical assistance, education, training, conferences, study tours, pilot 
and demonstration projects, in aid of Nigerian’s reform initiatives.  
Fourthly, the part played by universities, scholars and online colleges in 
disseminating market –oriented policies and programmes cannot be neglected in the 
context of Nigeria.83   Prior to their transplanting to Nigeria, market-driven reforms 
were an alien concept in Nigeria and there was no body of literature, knowledge base or 
information on its essentials. As a result, international schools and universities filled the 
gap in providing leadership in educating, teaching, instructing, tutoring and mentoring 
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students, technocrats, policy makers and legislators in Nigeria on the fundamentals of 
market-driven concepts.  
Eberhard notes that there has been an increase in regulatory training courses 
since market –driven reforms took off in the 1990s, most of them funded by donor 
agencies. The trend has been for the curriculum to be tailored along western “best 
practices” models and concepts espousing free market ideas lines with the instructors 
drawn from the west.84 One prominent example is the training programme of the Public 
Utility Research Centre at the University of Florida, USA. This has been a meeting point 
in the past for more than two decades for training politicians, legislators, policy makers 
and technocrats in the fundamentals of regulating utilities and the entrenchment of 
market-driven concepts in regulation. A sizeable number of participants at these annual 
training programmes have been drawn from Nigeria. 
2.5.2.2  Emulation 
Emulation as a concept has been defined as tendency that “actors that are strongly 
connected to one another tend to imitate each other’s behaviour patterns.”85 Theorists86 
have argued that states or entities in a particular setting may gravitate towards similar 
behavioural patterns in order to be seen to “belong.” As a vehicle of policy diffusion, 
emulation has also featured in the dynamics that created fertile soil for market-driven 
policies such as IRAs to thrive in Nigeria.  
 
2.5.2.3  Colonial Mentality  
Another reason that accounts for the adoption of market-driven policies including the 
IRA model without scrutiny was the concept of colonial mentality that has pervaded 
                                                     
84 Eberhard, A., Infrastructure Regulation in Developing Countries: An Exploration of Hybrid and Transitional 
Models, Public-Private Infrastructure, Advisory Facility (PPIAF) Working Paper  No. 4, 2007.  
85 Henisz, et al, The Worldwide Diffusion of Market Oriented Infrastructure Reform, 1977-1999, American 
Sociological Review, 2005. Vol. 70.    
86 DiMaggio, P.J. and Powell,W.W., The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective 
Rationality in Organizational Fields. 1983, American Sociological Review 48:147–60; Mizruchi, Mark S. and 
Joseph Galaskiewicz. Networks of Interorganizational Relations., 1993, Sociological Methods and Research 
22:46–70. 
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the Nigerian psyche since independence in 1960 and continues to stalk the nation. 
Colonial mentality refers to  
institutionalised or systemic feelings of inferiority within some societies  or 
peoples who have been subjected to colonialism, relative to the mores or values 
of the foreign powers which had previously subjugated them. The concept 
essentially refers to the acceptance, by the colonised, of the culture or doctrines of 
the coloniser as intrinsically more worthy or superior.87  
 
This mentality expresses the thinking that anything foreign, be it items, talents, 
products or ideas is always better was when compared to local ones.  This has been one 
of the hangovers of colonialism which instinctively impressed among the colonised the 
feeling that what they had was inferior, be it culture, language, clothing, religion, etc.88    
The spread of market –driven policies was implicated here because colonial 
mentality led to the reception of the IRA model without an informed interrogation of its 
appropriateness. It was considered as a product of the West, the erstwhile colonial 
masters and was for that reason better than local concepts.  
 
2.5.2.4  Coercion Isomorphism  
Another route through which IRAs spread in Nigeria was coercion isomorphism. This 
occurs “when powerful actors influence the policy choices of governments directly or 
when such actors change the outcome of a domestic policy struggle by favouring the 
domestic coalition supporting a given policy.”89 Embedded in this mechanism is direct 
and indirect or soft coercion. Most of the literature on the subject agrees on the 
overwhelming role of intermediating agencies, which control huge financial resources 
that countries with ailing economies need desperately.  As explained by Henisz et al90, 
these agencies deploy their financial authority to influence or to coerce countries in 
                                                     
87 BrownPride.com http://boards.brownpride.com/showthread.php/colonial-mentality-
103284.html?s=c664e0d851befaf56e25ed90c8d06075&amp. 
88 Nnam, N,M., Colonial Mentality in Africa, Hamilton Books USA, 2007. 
89 Henisz, note 85 at 874. 
90 Ibid.  
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need of financial aid to adopt economic reforms that the latter would in normal 
circumstances not be willing to accept. The market reforms that included the IRA model 
were promoted and enforced in the form of “conditionality terms” that were embodied 
in the loan terms, and aimed, in the words of two IMF economists91, to provide the 
lender with safeguards that the receiving country would take the stipulated measures in 
order to remedy its macroeconomic and structural imbalances, and be in a position to 
pay back the loan.   
There is also the indirect coercion that is relevant in the pattern of the spreading 
of IRAs in Nigeria. This was deployed through the instrumentality of technical 
assistance. The argument about indirect coercion is exemplified by an incident recorded 
in the book The Accidental Public Servant by El-Rufai, a former Minister in the 
government of Nigeria. As part of a Nigerian delegation, El-Rufai met with a visiting 
delegation of the IMF late into the night to negotiate terms of an IMF Monitored 
Programme.  On the resumption of the meeting the next morning, the officials of the 
Ministry of Finance on the Nigerian delegation had on the table a prepared draft Letter 
of Intent purportedly from Nigeria to the IMF. El-Rufai, being a newcomer in 
government, was surprised and impressed at the quick response level of the ministry 
officials who would normally take weeks to prepare such a document. The author 
however indicates his dismay when he discovered later that the draft was actually 
prepared and brought along to the meeting by the IMF delegation and quietly given to 
the Federal Ministry of Finance officials. What the Nigerian delegation was required to 
do was to produce the IMF prepared Letter of Intent on government letter-headed 
paper and hand it over to the IMF delegation as though it was the Nigerian delegation’s 
own. The author goes on to suggest that part of the reasons why most of the reform 
programmes agreed to by African countries failed was because the leaders signed the 
                                                     
91 Khan, M.S. and Sharma,S., IMF Conditionality and Country Ownership of Programs. 2001, International 
Monetary Fund Working Paper 01.  
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“pre-fabricated” agreements, took the money and then refused to implement the 
reforms.92   
Another form of indirect coercion that was evident in the Nigerian context was 
where outside institutions intervened in covert but targeted ways to influence and tilt 
the balance of argument in favour of reforms and the setting up of IRAs. This was done 
through empowering “targeted groups with resources, legitimacy, or rhetorical 
arguments or prompting other groups to join in the pro-reform coalition.”93 The main 
vehicles implicated in this method of diffusion were non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) that proliferated in unprecedented fashion in the developing world and in 
Nigeria between 1980 and 2000.94 
Given the potent force of NGOs in fostering awareness and galvanising public 
opinion,95 governments, intermediating agencies and other international agencies moved to 
leverage on this by seeking to influence public discourse and discussions on the reforms. 
Western governments’ active and direct support through donors who were working 
with local NGOs had been an open secret in Nigeria. Africa alone accounts for over 
8,000 NGOs 96, most of which work on developmental issues including economic 
reform; while Nigeria takes the lion’s share of that number with thousands of such 
bodies employing millions of workers and volunteers.97 
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2.5.2.5  Globalisation 
Globalisation accounts for the fifth external mechanism through which market reforms 
and the IRA model were introduced into Nigeria. The world rapidly became a global 
village through globalisation that took root in the 19th century98 and prevailing 
literature in the field implicates this avenue as one that positively influenced the spread 
of market reform ideas.99  
The way globalisation impacted on the spread of IRAs can be seen in the manner 
in which the model spread so uniformly across varied geographical divides within such 
a short time.  Almost globally, where market-oriented reforms took root, including 
Nigeria, there has been a triangular sequencing of the reforms: market-oriented 
liberalization, the regulation of all players on economic, environmental and social 
planes, and the privatisation of publicly owned and managed utilities, with some slight 
deviations. To this extent therefore, it can be conclusively stated that globalisation 
played an identifiable role in the emergence of IRAs in Nigeria as a vehicle that 
transported concepts and models across national boundaries. 
2.5 Conclusion  
This chapter has traced the rise of the regulatory state, its theoretical underpinnings and 
the tensions it generated, and the mutuality of the resolution of those contentions in the 
USA. It has identified the conditions that led to the spread of IRAs to Western and then 
later Eastern and Central Europe and finally into Nigeria.  
The rapidity and pervasiveness of its spread in Nigeria call for an inquiry into 
the fait accompli status IRAs have come to assume in Nigeria and whether this “taken 
for granted” status can be justified given Nigeria’s institutional deficits.  
                                                                                                                                                                           
D., Learning Lessons, Policy Transfer and the International Diffusion of Policy Ideas, CSGR Working Paper No. 
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99 Gilardi, F., et al., Regulation in the Age of Globalisation: The Diffusion of Regulatory Agencies across Europe 
and Latin America’, IBEI Working Papers, Barcelona, May 2006; Bulmer, S. and Humphreys, P., Of Phones 
and Planes: Policy Transfer in the Liberalization of EU Public Services, Paper for EUSA conference 2007, 
Montreal. 
58 
 
Chapter 3 will therefore consider the state and quality of institutions within 
Nigeria’s political economy that are required to support the IRA to succeed.  
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CHAPTER 3 
POLITICAL AND SUPPORTING INSTITUTIONS 
3.1 Introduction  
This chapter primarily seeks to examine the concept, importance, and relevance of 
political and related institutions to economic development and the IRA model. 
Secondly, it identifies and delineates the contours of the different institutions that are 
relevant to the present research endeavour. Thirdly, it discusses the identified 
institutions and the overarching role of political leadership in the Nigerian context, 
highlighting its overshadowing antecedents in and over institutions and the outcomes. 
The last part of the chapter undertakes an evaluation of the adequacy or otherwise of 
the identified institutions in undergirding the IRA model. 
The rapid spread of Independent Regulatory Agencies (IRAs) in developing 
countries and Nigeria particularly calls for an evaluation of its institutional fabric to 
ascertain whether the fabric can support the model and provide it the fertile soil in 
which to grow and endure. This evaluation is necessary for three major reasons. 
 One is the critical nature of infrastructure to Nigeria's socio-economic 
development and its dearth across the many sectors of the nation's life. The second is 
the manner in which these IRAs sprouted without a careful interrogation of its 
outcomes. Third, is the "hegemonic"1 pressure that was directed towards governments 
to implement economic policies and set up institutions such as IRAs during the 
economic reforms era of the I980s and 1990s. Such reforms did not permit a 
consideration of possible alternatives that could fit their contextual peculiarities. In a 
large part, foreign governments in developed nations, through multi-national 
corporations and intermediating agencies with budgets far in excess of the GDP of 
                                                     
1 Davis, D., and Corder, H., Globalisation, National Democratic Institutions and the Impact of Global Regulatory 
Governance on Developing Countries, 2009, Acta Juridica 68 2009 at 81. 
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many nations exerted these pressures2, and the recipient nations were left with no 
alternatives.   
Historically in developing countries, most of the basic infrastructures, such as 
water supply, transportation, the postal service, electricity, health, education, and 
financial services were for most of the 19th and 20th centuries owned, operated, and 
provided for, by the public sector.3 The reasons for this were many. They included the 
long-term nature of the investments that only the state could provide then, due to the 
embryonic nature of the indigenous private sector and the urge by the state to control 
the major aspects of the economy to propel economic development. In addition, the 
state utilised the State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) as employers of last resort to satisfy 
its political yearnings. 
 However, by the 1980s the role of the state began to wane. This was because of 
the global economic meltdown and the accompanying economic reforms as it became 
evident that the state alone lacked the financial resources to provide the robust 
infrastructural backbone needed to propel economic growth. The reforms, encapsulated 
under policy frameworks of deregulation, privatisation, regulation, and liberalisation, 
were geared towards increased private sector participation in the ownership and 
provision of infrastructure and services.4 Thus by 2004, 60% of developing countries 
had significant private sector ownership and participation in telecoms industry with 
almost 40% having substantial private participation in the provision of electricity and 
water. In addition, two-thirds of developing countries had introduced some form of 
IRA model in the telecoms sector, 54% in electricity, and 23% in water.5 The role of IRAs 
was regulatory and interventionist in nature to balance the different interests of all the 
players in the value chain.  
                                                     
2Ibid 
3Farzin, H., in Regulation and Development  by Jean-Jacques Laffont, Cambridge University Press, 2005 at 
xv. 
4Laffont, J.J., Regulation and Development, Cambridge University Press, 2005 at xix. 
5Estache, Antonio and Ana Goicoechea., A Research Database on Infrastructure Economic Performance, 2005, 
World Bank Policy Research Working Paper: No. 3643. 
61 
 
Given the role infrastructures play in the socio-economic development of a 
nation,6 there has been an appreciation of the need to have viable institutions that 
underpin its provision. These institutions provide the supporting structures, incentives 
and trade-offs that allow for the ownership and deployment of these infrastructures and 
services. Thus, on the global and national stages, the role of the state did not wane but 
rather metamorphosed into one of regulation. Through this new role, the state evolves 
different sets of rules that shape the conduct of enterprises, states, and individuals 
through institutions.7. 
 Global agreement has emerged in the past three decades asserting the premise 
that institutions matter for economic growth and development.8 However, this has not 
always been the case. Prior to and until the 1980s, emphasis was on the implementation 
of good economic policies as a path to economic development.9  
 
 The “Washington consensus”10 concluded that the only viable way out of poor 
economic performances was for countries to get the policies right. The intervening 
                                                     
6Voice of America Editorial; Infrastructure Crucial to Development, 10/10/2012, 
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9Lal, D., Institutional Development and Economic Growth, Working Papers Number 782, Department of 
Economics, University of California, Los Angeles, February 1998; Carlin, W, et. al, Institutions matter for 
growth, but which ones and how much?,  www.voxeu.org, February 17, 2010 at 1. 
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Intermediating Agencies. The reform principles included fiscal discipline (reduction of budget deficits), 
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exchange rates (currency devaluation), trade liberalization, removing barriers on foreign direct 
investment, privatization of state enterprises, deregulation of competitive markets and security of private 
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global financial crisis of 1997-98 shook economists' confidence in the theory of the 
primacy of the right policies. By the late 1990s, the theory of the poor quality of 
institutions being at the root of economic challenges of developing countries became 
widespread.  Intermediating agencies led by the IMF and the World Bank began to 
stipulate “governance related conditionalities” which made it incumbent for a 
borrowing country to adopt “better” institutions that improve “governance”.11 The 
emerging consensus was that the existence of good policies per se, without the existence 
and effective functioning of good institutions would undoubtedly attract disastrous 
economic results.12 
This thinking, encapsulated under the New Institutional Economics (NIE), an 
intersection of economics, 13 law, sociology, political science, and anthropology, sought 
to understand how institutional frameworks in the social, political, and commercial 
spheres combined with economic agents interacted to shape economic outcomes.14 As 
the studies took root globally, a clear thread emerged, one that recognised good 
institutions as an essential variable that determines the outcome of interactions between 
economic agents leading to either sustainable development or economic failure.15 The 
major proponents of this primacy of institutions theory have been Douglas North, Dani 
Rodrik and Daron Acemoglu,  Simon Johnson and James Robinson.  
                                                                                                                                                                           
Development Challenges in the 1990s: Leading Policymakers Speak from Experience, edited by Timothy Besley 
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Economics, Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar,2000, Vol. I, at 456-489.  
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 The idea that institutions matter for development has both theoretical and 
empirical foundations.16 On the theoretical platform, the genesis of the idea that 
institutions were critical to development arose from a basic assumption developed by 
the NEI school of thought that “people are rational actors who respond to incentives, 
and these incentives are influenced, if not determined, by institutions that induce 
individuals and organisations to engage in productive activities – or the converse.”17 
The empirical foundation for the support of the institutional theories of development 
draws its strength from cross-country studies and trends that show a persuasive 
correlation between the quality of institutions and development. 
      In the Nigerian context, Focu18and Osabuohien et al,19 in a report on Nigeria’s 
economic path, both concluded that poor institutional frameworks were to blame for 
the poor outcomes of the country’s economic indices.  
 Since sustainable economic development rides on the back of viable and good 
institutions, it is desirable to ascertain what these are and the impact, if any, they have 
in providing a platform for the IRA model of regulatory governance to thrive in 
Nigeria.  
3.2 What are Institutions? 
What then are institutions? Which institutions matter for economic growth and the 
entrenchment of the IRA model? How exactly are they important in aiding economic 
development?  
North broadly defines institutions as  
 rules of the game of a society, or, more formally, are the humanly   
  devised constraints that structure human interactions. They are  
                                                     
16 Trebilcock M.J., and Prado, M.M., An Advanced Introduction to Law and Development, Elgar Advanced 
Introductions, 2014, Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, INC, USA.  
17 Ibid at 32. 
18Fosu, A.K., and Gyapong, A., Terms of Trade and Growth of Resource Economies: A Tale of Two Countries, 
Presentation at the IMF Institute High Level Seminar on ‘Natural Resources, Finance, and Development: 
Confronting Old and New Challenges’, in Algiers, Algeria, 4-5 November 2010.  
19Osabuohien, note 15 at 6.  
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 composed of formal rules (statute law, common law, regulation),  
 informal constraints (conventions, norms of behaviour, and self- 
 imposed codes of conduct), and the enforcement characteristics of  
 both”.20 
 Lin and Nugent see institutions as a “a set of humanly devised behavioural rules 
that govern and shape the interaction of human beings, in part by helping them to form 
expectations of what other people do.”21 
 On a functional note, however, institutions encompass a variety of legal entities 
such as parliaments, courts of law and central banks and extend to "any generally 
accepted procedure that governs the process of interaction between members of a 
society.”22 Apart from these substantive institutions, other sets of institutions support, 
safeguard, and give legitimacy to the main institutions. This latter group encompasses 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs), political parties, electoral bodies, the media, 
and law enforcement institutions. The specificity of these institutions does not however 
derogate from or limit the broadness of the concept to cover “any generally accepted 
procedure that governs the process of interaction between members of a society.”23 
What are good institutions as distinct from mere institutions? Although several 
writers24 have researched the concept, there is a shortage of clear definitions. 
 In seeking to delineate the exact contours of good institutions, Chang25 notes that 
they are referred to as Global Standard Institutions (GSIs) and are typically found in 
                                                     
20 North, D., The New Institutional Economics and Third World Development in J. Harris, et al, (eds), 
Economics and Third World Development (London: Routledge, 1995) at 17 
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Anglo- American countries. They are essentially seen as “maximizing market freedom 
and protecting private property rights most strongly.” He goes on to enumerate seven 
categories of institutions commonly dubbed good institutions. They include a common 
law legal system, an industrial system based on private ownership, and a ﬁnancial 
system based on a developed stock market with easy mergers and acquisitions. Others 
include, an efficient ﬁnancial regulation regime that embeds a politically independent 
central bank, a shareholder-oriented corporate governance system, and a ﬂexible labour 
market that allows quick re-allocation of labour in response to price changes. In 
addition, institutions include a political system that restricts arbitrary actions of political 
rulers and their agents.26   
 
 In underlining the primacy of good institutions to economic development and 
the efficient functioning of the IRAs, it is necessary to state that developed Western 
nations did not utilise the aforementioned sets of good institutions as a ladder to 
economic prosperity. It is therefore ironic for them to be making a case for the adoption 
of these institutions by developing countries as a prerequisite for development.27 This 
thesis does not downplay the importance of institutions to economic growth by the 
above statement, however, it is posited that developing countries ought to situate these 
institutional models within the contextual limitations of their economies, allowing them 
space and time to evolve in order to attain good fits suitable for the particular stage of a 
specific developing country. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                           
25 Chang, H,J.,  Institutions and Economic Development: theory, policy and history, The Journal of Institutional 
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26 Ibid. 
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3.3 Classification of Institutions 
Diagram 1, developed by Jutting28 along with other streams of literature arising from 
the NIE School of Thought on institutions,29 classifies them into three broad categories. 
This thesis finds this classification robust enough to cover its essence and adopts it. The 
classification uses three approaches contingent upon the degree of formality, different 
levels of hierarchy, and the area of analysis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
28 Jutting, J., Institutions And Development: A Critical Review, OECD Development Centre Working Paper, 
2003,  No. 210 (Formerly Technical Paper No. 210). 
29 North, et al note 8 at 97-112. 
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DIAGRAM 1 
 
This thesis however relies primarily on the last classification of the Area of 
Analysis as it adequately makes a consideration of the issues amenable to a concise 
interrogation. This classification interfaces and overlaps with the first two 
classifications, and includes institutions of a political, legal, social, and economic nature.  
Classification of Institutions 
    
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Institutions 
 
Areas 
 
Formality 
 
Hierarchy 
 
 Formal 
 Informal 
 
 Level 1 
 Level 2 
 Level 3 
 Level 4 
 
4 
 Economic 
 Political 
 Law 
 Social
4 
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While economic institutions specify rules that define the production, allocation 
and distribution process of goods and services including markets30, property rights31 
and contracts enforcement32; political institutions usually detail the rules governing the 
political structure of a society. The latter typically spells out the political governance 
structure, and the constraints thereon through checks and balances. 33 This encompasses 
electioneering processes, electoral rules, types of political systems, party composition of 
the opposition and the government. Law and legal institutions are an amalgamation of 
the type of legal system, and the definition and enforcement of property rights and legal 
origin.34 Social institutions on the other hand, extends to rules that have to do with the 
social needs35 of the citizenry, to wit, access to health, education, human capital36, and 
social security. 
 
3.4 Relevance of Institutions to Economic Growth and Functioning of IRAs 
Seeking to justify the relevance of institutions to economic growth and the functioning 
of IRAs is akin to validating the desirability of tracks and rails where there are trains. 
Institutional structures accompanied by the rules of behaviour are the life-blood of 
markets for the simple reason that policies and reforms are not “self-creating; self-
regulating; self-stabilizing, or self-legitimizing."37They need vehicles in the form of 
                                                     
30 Jutting, note 28 at 14; Bowles, S., Endogenous Preferences: The Cultural Consequences of Markets and Other 
Economic Institutions, The Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. XXXVI, No. 1, March 1998, at 75-111. 
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36 Grier, R., Colonial Legacy and Economic Growth, 1997, Public Choice 98 at 317-335. 
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institutions and structures to set them in motion and operationalise the processes, 
guiding and oiling their wheels towards sustainability. Institutions through their 
interactions stimulate private investment, ensuring security of those investments and 
the return thereof, in addition to guaranteeing against expropriation.38 On the other 
hand, their absence triggers the diversion of otherwise investable funds into self-help 
efforts aimed at securing the goods resulting from the investment.39 
The question as to whether institutions matter in development has taken centre 
stage in a number of studies and cross-country analyses beginning in the 1990s with the 
Governance Group at the World Bank that initiated the World Bank’s Worldwide 
Governance Indicators Project. These studies showed strong correlations and indeed 
strong causal relationships between institutional quality and the development of the 
nations reviewed.40 A recent study by Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi evaluated the 
contributions of institutions, geography and international trade as a yardstick in 
judging income levels around the world.  The outcome was that the quality of 
institutions determined the income levels between nations.41 
Within the Nigerian context, the relevance and centrality of institutions to 
development is clear when one undertakes a close look at her developmental path since 
Independence. It shows that Nigeria's present deplorable economic state is not due to 
lack of good plans as there have been several national development plans since 
independence.42 What has been wrong is the non-implementation of Development 
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Plans because of institutional fragility and incapacity. This evaluation has been 
validated by an African Development Bank commissioned study43 that concludes that 
the reason for Nigeria's low economic development outcomes is not essentially related 
to failing to plan or planning to fail, but as a result of weak institutional frameworks. 
The African Development Bank Study concludes that National Development plans were 
not backed up with institutional support and were therefore not implemented or done 
haphazardly.  
There is therefore an urgent need to evaluate the institutional fabric and 
strengths of the economic, political, and other supporting institutions implicated in 
Nigeria’s poor economic outcomes. 
Even though there is no one set of institutions that are prerequisites for the 
proper functioning of the IRA model in any nation, there has been a consensus among 
development economists and lawyers44 about five main types of such institutions. They 
act as enablers, giving foundational support for the economic progress of nations, and 
by necessary extrapolation, facilitate the proper functioning of IRAs. These include 
political and supporting institutions, property rights, and their supporting institutions. 
This chapter discusses the first set of institutions while Chapter 4 discusses the others. 
Before undertaking a discussion on the present institutional fabric of Nigeria’s political 
and other supporting institutions, it is necessary to have an overview of the nature of 
institutions that pre-dated independence. This evaluation will indicate how those 
erstwhile institutions shaped post-colonial political, economic and supporting 
institutions. 
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3.5 The State of Institutions in Nigeria – Before Independence  
The period Nigeria spent under colonial rule is a little less in time than the period since 
independence. However, the effects of colonial rule on her political economy are still 
strong. The institutions that existed at independence were of colonial pedigree or built 
upon the foundations of colonial rule. Thus, what exists today is a reflection of what 
predated independence. 
 Although by the 19th Century, democratic values including the rule of law, 
property rights, and a free press were blossoming in Europe, the colonial government in 
Nigeria made no effort to transplant them into Nigeria. The atmosphere did not 
encourage the existence of institutions that espoused rule of law principles such as court 
systems and equality before the law. This robbed the newly independent nation of 
knowledge and experience in basic rule of law concepts.45 
The institutional structures that survived the departing colonial government 
were at best inefficient, disorganised and weak.46 Mkapa argues that this was 
convenient for the departing colonial administrators, as they would look back and point 
to the inability of the “locals” to govern themselves. It also created a “perfect 
environment for the political and economic advantage of colonial powers to persist."47 
At independence therefore, there was a palpable lack of a trained work force to 
take over the leadership roles relinquished by the departing colonial administrators. 
Educating Nigerians beyond basic literacy levels during the colonial era was not the 
priority of the colonial government. The colonial government consigned the provision 
of basic education to Christian missionaries who produced clerks and messengers 
needed for the lower echelons of colonial administration. Where Nigerians had the 
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opportunity to pursue education past the basic literacy levels, the quality was not of the 
standard required to attain senior administrative roles. The perpetuation of the 
colonists' post-independence political and economic interests was the ultimate goal.48 
Where there were attempts made by the international community led by the United 
Nations to build capacity through scholarships for Nigerians to study abroad, these 
efforts were frustrated by the colonial government.49  
In addition, the nature of institutions set up by the colonial government was 
extractive in nature,50  and did not guarantee protection for property rights, neither 
were there governance structures that provided checks and balances against the 
government in favour of the people.51 The overriding aim of the colonialists in setting 
up institutions was for the extraction of raw materials and cash crops.52 
On another level, Acemoglu and Robinson53 have argued persuasively that a 
crucial determination as to whether institutional structures were a priority of the 
colonial government had much to do with the disease profile of the area. In high 
mortality regions that had tropical diseases, colonists tended to set up centralised state 
apparatus and other associated institutions (as opposed to elaborate decentralised 
systems) to facilitate the extraction of raw materials and cash crops. Nigeria was one of 
such regions, in that the occurrence of malaria posed a major disincentive for investing 
time and funds to spread out well-kitted institutions.  
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This was essentially the outlook of Nigeria’s institutional architecture before and 
at independence and may in fact have a bearing on the manner in which institutions 
evolved after Independence. 
This thesis will now undertake a discussion on political institutions and their 
viability to undergird IRAs. 
3.6 Political Institutions  
To provide a guide as to which institutions can be termed political, this thesis adopts a 
functional approach. Rather than say what they are, the thesis identifies them by their 
function or the outcome of their interactions in the nation’s polity. Drawing from the 
earlier definition of institutions,54 they are those institutions that constrain and shape 
human interactions in political matters and affairs within a body politic.   
 Political institutions permit the design of fair and efficient rules that ensure the 
even-handed, consistent enforcement and adjudication of those rules that in turn define 
the particular social economic, historical, and cultural peculiarities of a country.55 In 
addition, they determine both the “constraints and incentives faced by key players in a 
given society.”56 It is thus evident that the extent of a nation’s economic progress and by 
extension the establishment of the IRA model, hinges upon the presence and 
responsiveness of political institutions to the overall interests of the social, economic, 
and political actors.57 
Political institutions have the crucial role of igniting economic growth. The 
political process is essentially the manner by which a society chooses the rules that will 
govern it and thus political institutions are the agents that are utilised to constrain and 
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allocate these powers.58 These in turn have an overarching bearing on economic 
development and by extension the thriving of the IRA model of regulatory governance. 
It is instructive to note, in underlining the primacy of political institutions to 
development, the fact that most of the rich countries in the world are democracies and 
most of the poorest countries are not, or have not been for most part of their histories. 
Thus, what countries end up becoming is a product of their political system and the 
calibre of their leadership and institutions.59 There are at least seven reasons for this. 
 First, political institutions distribute power among different tiers of government 
and embed an apparatus of coercion and implementation. As a distinction, economic 
institutions do not have a life of their own – they derive their authority and very 
existence from “igniting” decisions from political institutions. In the reasoning of 
Rodrik,60one of the functions of political institutions is to initiate the process that brings 
into being economic institutions, and it is only afterwards that economic institutions get 
“born” to propel and sustain economic development.61 
Second, several economists have validated the important role of political 
institutions in economic growth and the viability of IRAs.62 They have linked the 
different incidents of political instability as an undermining factor to economic growth. 
Several variables such as revolutions, assassinations, deaths, coups (successful, abortive 
and officially reported), demonstrations, regime change, regular and irregular transfer 
of executive power, and war, among others, have been identified as proxies to political 
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instability that undermine political institutions. This in turn has a direct bearing on 
economic stability as political instability within institutions affects economic stability.63 
Third, the extent to which political institutions favour and work for production 
instead of the diversion of resources and rent- seeking determines a nation's vibrancy. 
When diversion occurs, fallouts ensue such as “corruption, theft, the payment of 
protection money, confiscatory taxation, the lobbying of government by special 
interests…. All these act like taxes on businesses, reducing their expected 
profitability.”64 This in turn has disastrous consequences on economic growth. 
Governments, through political institutions, are usually implicated in these acts as 
either active participants or one that acquiesces “through the structure of incentives it 
puts in place.”65 
Four, instability in the political environment typically heightens uncertainty and 
hinders investment.66 It is a given that governments exist to provide an environment 
conducive for economic activities to take root and thrive. Where this is lacking, political 
institutions are implicated as the culprit, hence their centrality to economic 
development. 
 Five, with particular relevance to Africa and Nigeria, the AERC Africa Growth 
Project survey of 30 countries indicated that politics and political institutions overrode 
all other kinds of institutions in outcomes.67 This further validates the importance of 
political institutions to economic growth and the viability of IRAs. 
Six, an exploration of the relationship between political institutions and 
economic performance, at both the macro- and micro-levels, has shown that changes in 
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national political institutions towards greater democracy in Africa are strongly 
associated with economic well-being.68 
Seven, it is historically acknowledged that almost all of Africa’s economic 
problems have roots in or are a direct fallout from political disputes69 and it is in cases 
where political institutions fail to resolve disputes that crisis erupts. In the words of 
Adebayo Adedeji, former Secretary- General of United Nations Economic Commission 
for Africa, “people will never comprehend Africa’s crisis so long as they continue to 
assume that it is an economic one. What we confront in Africa is primarily a political 
crisis, albeit with devastating economic consequences."70  
The fact that politics and political institutions account for developing countries’ 
and particularly Nigeria’s economic woes had until recently been lost on the 
intermediating agencies that had so forcefully argued for the wholesale implementation 
of market reforms. The pattern has been that as a build up to the reform prescriptions 
from these agencies, emphasis was placed on economic aspects of the nation and little 
on political institutions. It was only in 1999 that the World Bank, through its then 
President, Mr. Wolfenson, admitted that it erred in paying too much attention to 
economic sectors and ignoring other institutional problems.71  
All this shows the primacy of political institutions in and over other institutions 
in securing economic prosperity of any nation. As Acemoglu and Robinson have 
shown,72  political institutions in a nation determine the types and extent of authority of 
economic institutions. While economic institutions regulate the market place (business 
environment) determining the rules for entry and exit, it is the political institutions that 
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first determine if they (economic institutions) will exist at all and the extent of their 
powers. As a result of their critical importance to a nation’s development all the 
political institutions were designed by the 1999 Constitution to be independent of73 and 
operate at arm’s-length from one another, with their boundaries spelt out, each 
providing checks and balances on the other.  
Having established the relevance of political institutions to economic growth and 
the proper functioning of IRAs, we shall now discuss their interplay within the 
Nigerian context. The political institutions for discussion include the Executive, 
Legislature, Judiciary, and the Electoral Agency.  
 
3.6.1 The Executive  
Under section 5(1) (a) of the 1999 Constitution, the  executive powers of the Federation 
are vested in the President who may exercise them directly or indirectly through his 
Vice President and ministers of the government of the federation or through other 
officers in the public service of the federation. These powers, by virtue of clause (b) of 
the same section include the execution and maintenance of the Constitution of Nigeria 
and all the valid laws made by the National Assembly. From the wordings of the 
Constitution, the presidential powers are essentially delegated responsibilities from the 
National Assembly to the President and this underlines the stewardship nature of the 
duties of the President.  
Notwithstanding the custodial nature of the presidential powers and the explicit 
adoption of the age-long concept of Separation of Powers by the 1999 Constitution, the 
Executive arm has, since the return to democratic rule, had a domineering presence 
over the other arms of government. This dominance has extended to the arms of 
government and other critical democratic supporting institutions.74 This invalidates the 
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reasoning behind the concept of a presidential democracy analysed in writings by early 
democratic theorists,75 particularly Montesquieu, who cautioned against the 
accumulation of executive, legislative and judicial powers in one hand (whether of an 
individual or institution, majority or minority) as it leads to tyranny.76 
Tensions have repeatedly sprouted in the power inter-play between the different 
arms of government and supporting institutions with one recurring dramatis personae : 
the Executive has always been at the one end seeking to control the others. Since the 
return to democratic rule, the most frequent source of disagreement between the 
Executive and the Legislature has been the attempt by the former to dictate to the latter 
who emerges as its Presiding Officers.77 Unlike in mature democracies where disputes 
that often arise between the Executive and other branches of government, particularly 
the legislature, border on policy issues, in Nigeria almost all the disagreements hinge on 
personal contestations.78 These tensions have undermined the institutionalisation of a 
democratic ethos in Nigeria. Several reasons account for this cat-and-mouse 
relationship by the Executive with the other political actors. 
  First, legislative experience, which is an invaluable strength in enabling 
legislative bodies in other democracies to assert their independence, is lacking in 
Nigeria due to the long period of military rule. All military regimes on assumption of 
power suspend the Constitution and disband the Legislature. Thus, the experience the 
legislature accumulated from the First Republic in 1960 to 1966 was wiped off by the 
1966 coup and was not restored until 1979. Again, it was interrupted from 1984 until the 
last return to civilian rule in 1999. These interruptions led to the underdevelopment of 
the capacity of members and their supporting bureaucracies.79 On resumption, each 
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legislative session always began on a new slate, drawing staff from the Executive 
bureaucracy, unschooled in legislative nuances and matters. 
Second, while the legislative experience was truncated, that of the Executive 
bureaucracy remained intact, except for a change of personalities in the top echelons. 
With that, the Executive arm continued to garner uninterrupted experience over a long 
period of time that places it in a better position than that of the legislative arm. 
Third, the lack of capacity amongst members of the Legislative arm is glaring. 
The minimum constitutional requirement for elections into the legislative arm is the 
possession of a Secondary School Certificate.80 With the present crisis in the educational 
sector and the churning out of ill-prepared school leavers because of incessant strikes 
and school closures, the quality of the School Certificate does not offer the promise81 of 
sufficiently qualified legislators. Legislative functions are multifaceted, multi-
disciplinary, and technical, placing weighty demands on legislators to be conversant 
with different areas and fields of human endeavour. A level of education higher than 
secondary school is certainly required to discharge the law-making responsibility 
effectively.  
Fourth, the frequent turnover of legislative members during elections, mostly 
under the politically crafted policy of Federal Character82 in the Constitution, while 
having its merits, has the major drawback of robbing the legislature of the experience 
garnered by members in the preceding Assembly. This high turnover of Legislators in 
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Nigeria, said to be the highest in the world, has a negative impact on “its institutional 
capacity, thus, affecting the development and deepening of democracy."83 
Fifth, the lack of financial independence of the legislative and judicial arms of 
government has played a large part in their poor performance. Where the Executive 
controls the purse strings and releases money when it chooses to and in what quantity, 
the other arms of government are pushed to play to the 'piper’s tune'. 
Sixth, the skewed method of appointment, promotion, and discipline in the 
judicial arm tilts the balance in favour of the Executive, which utilises it as a veritable 
bargaining chip to control the other arms of government.  
 Numerous scholars have situated the dominance and over-bearing tendencies of 
the Executive within the background of military dictatorships that thrive on a culture of 
arbitrariness, coercion and impunity.84 The domination of the other arms of government 
by the Executive arm is however a global trend and not peculiar to Nigeria.85 What calls 
for apprehension in the Nigerian context is the extent to which the Executive goes in 
overreaching and dominating the other arms. In the process, illegal means are 
employed such as force, threats and abuse of state security apparatus to harass and beat 
opponents into line.86 Coincidentally, these actions by the Executive, along with the 
increasing irrelevance of the Parliament by their actions and inactions as a watchdog, 
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highlight the real potential of the judiciary being the only source to provide a check on 
the seeming Executive lawlessness.87 
 
3.6.2 The Legislature 
The role of the Legislature in the Nigerian political setting is unique as it has the 
responsibility of making laws upon which the country's direction will be determined. 
The totality of all laws that ensure good governance, economic well-being, social justice, 
equity, security, the provision of critical infrastructures, and social services are within 
its purview. In addition, the Constitution grants to them the power to ensure the 
implementation of laws, a function also referred to as oversight powers.88 This 
watchdog function according to Verney89 is perhaps more important for a legislative 
assembly than that of law making as it ensures accountability and holds the 
implementation organ, the Executive, to good governance.  
Furthermore, the power of appropriation, which entails approval of budgetary 
estimates submitted by the Executive, offers a valuable window through which the 
Legislature can shape, influence, direct and sustain reforms of a fundamental nature. 90 
This power, also referred to as the "power of the purse"91 has a definite role, if applied 
judiciously, in exerting administrative control over the dispensers of the purse, the 
Executive to attain the developmental needs of society.92  
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There is agreement that the legislative arm has been unable to rise to the occasion 
in Nigeria's political climate and its performance since the return to democratic rule in 
1979 has been lacklustre. 93 Several instances lend credence to this consensus. 
The legislative arm has used the power to make the laws on appropriation as a 
tool for the furthering of private interests and not for the public good. There have been 
allegations that most Committees of the National Assembly negotiate and “build in” 
commissions, bribes and pay offs for themselves in amounts appropriated for 
government agencies.94 The legislators thereafter, on passage of the appropriation bill, 
embark on oversight visits to those concerned agencies to demand and receive the 
padded portion of the budget. The motivation to serve has therefore not been the 
driving force for legislation but that of personal interests. 95 
Secondly, even as it relates to the core function of appropriation, its performance 
has been below expectations. The pattern has been the same: year after year, 
appropriation budgets that contain the details of expenditure by government are passed 
into law well into the year in question rather than at the end of the preceding year.  This 
has inevitably led to the absence of, or at best haphazard implementation of budgets. 
This dovetails into non-provision of critical infrastructure as witnessed by the presence 
of thousands of governments projects abandoned around the country.  
Thirdly, the power of oversight given to the Legislature by the Constitution to 
enhance accountability and transparency in the conduct of public affairs and in the 
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management of public resources has been betrayed. This function is akin to the 
supervision and control of other government agencies.96 Sadly, the exercise of the 
power has been used to achieve personal aims and agendas of members of the 
legislature. 
Thus, notwithstanding the institutional powers the Constitution has bestowed on 
the Legislature, it has been unable to utilize them to enact laws for the well-being, 
economic prosperity and security of the citizenry, or to monitor, under the power of the 
purse rule, Executive spending to ensure probity and accountability.97 It is thus 
unsurprising that the legislative arm of government is derogatorily referred to as mere 
“rubber stamps” of the Executive, a badge that would make the founders of the 
presidential democratic model turn in their graves!98 
 
3.6.3 The Judiciary 
Throughout the evolution of the modern state, there has been an acknowledgement of a 
strong linkage between economic growth and law. Adam Smith, the father of 
capitalism, not only believed in but argued that economic growth and development are 
only achieved where there are firm roots in norms and laws to undergird the process 
and further associated economic stagnation and underdevelopment with the 
“imperfection of the law and uncertainty in its application."99  
 
 An overview of the various theories of economic development, from the 
modernist or dependency theory to the neo-liberal market theory, have all pointed out 
the legal system as a vital component critical to economic development.100 
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Following from this, economists, historians, sociologists, and legal scholars have 
underscored the centrality of the legal system to economic development. Ann and Bob 
Seidman,101 in commenting on the truncation of economic development in Africa, note 
that African leaders and legislators have failed to utilize the instrument of law to 
reorder and transform colonially tainted institutions and reposition them. Hernando 
Desoto in his classic, The Mystery of Capital102, placed underdevelopment squarely at the 
doorsteps of the inability of Third World nations to use legal systems and institutions to 
unlock the abundant “dead capital” that abounds in their territories. Several recent 
studies and reports agree on the correlation between effective legal systems and 
economic growth103, while surveys have indicated the “deleterious effects of weak 
judiciaries on economic expansion."104 
What then, is the role of the judiciary and the law, its systems, processes, and 
institutions in economic development? Why deem them necessary for economic growth 
and development? How are they relevant to the thriving of the IRA model? 
While to Amadi105 law “undergirds the economy”, Arewa opines that law and its 
institutions control human conduct towards productive channels, without which there 
will be no sustainable development.106 Law and justice have in fact been considered the 
“life blood of every society” and a threshold by which economic development is 
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measured. Where it is in short supply, the society will “inevitably witness strife, 
anarchy, fear, discord, social and economic disharmony107” 
On a functional note however, law and its institutions play a central role in 
economic development. In the normal interaction of economic agents in the market 
place, there are bound to be disputes, and the primary purpose of the law and its 
institutions is to provide an impartial and reliable dispute resolution avenue. This 
accentuates economic progress by enforcing and securing contracts and property rights, 
108guaranteeing creditors the repayment of loans,109 and protecting corporate 
shareholders,110 which in turn encourages investments and confidence in the 
predictability of investments and transactions.  Furthermore, the role of the Judiciary 
extends to providing assurance for both a nation’s citizens and foreign investors against 
unlawful appropriation of investments.111 In addition, judicial systems help shore up 
economic performance by correcting various market failures and imposing constraints 
on actors within the market space.   
 In summary therefore, the law and its institutions perform four central functions 
from the point of view of economic development: they protect the rights to private 
property; they establish rules for negotiating and selling these rights among private 
parties themselves and the State; they define rules for market access and departure; and 
they promote competition and regulate conduct in the sectors where there is a 
monopoly or little competition.112 
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 Conversely, an inefficient judicial system has major negative consequences for a 
nation’s economic performance in a number of ways. Apart from increasing the cost of 
doing business by forcing players to resort to alternative avenues to enforce contract 
rights, it makes players ultimately opt out of the market place as a result of the 
disincentives; while at the same time promoting corruption.113 
3.6.3.1  The Judiciary in the Nigerian Context  
The Constitution underscores the importance of law to economic development and its 
centrality in determining State Policy. The Fundamental Objectives and Directive 
Principles of State Policy in Chapter 2114 list the legal imperatives the State must follow 
in conducting and regulating economic activities.  
Secondly, Section 6 vests judicial powers in the courts, which encompasses the 
judicial systems and institutions. It specifies the judiciary as the avenue for the 
determination and resolution of disputes between parties and the State and extends to 
ensuring that all affairs of the State are conducted in accordance with the law.  
Although independence of the judiciary is enshrined in the 1999 Constitution, 
the practice in Nigeria has been different. The performance of the judiciary since 
independence has followed a downward trend leading to the “grievous erosion of 
fundamental rights, particularly, socio-economic rights; stultification of growth, 
development and sustainable human development.”115 It has so far unwittingly 
delivered itself into the hands of politicians and political parties as a tool in the pursuit 
of personal interests. This has manifested in a number of ways including delays in the 
administration of justice, corruption, a lack of independence, and the under-funding of 
the judiciary.  A consideration of the factors that have been responsible for the sub-
optimal performance of the Judiciary will now be undertaken. 
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3.6.3.2  Delay 
The enduring words that “justice delayed is justice denied” 116 have not been heeded in 
Nigeria’s judicial system where inordinate delay has become the norm. The road to 
justice, in the words of Arewa, has become “tortuous, frustrating, slow and inefficient, 
resulting in high transaction cost and general disenchantment with the justice 
system.”117 Arewa further indicates, relying on a graphic presentation by 
NationMaster118 shown in Figures 1 and 2 below, that the typical period it takes a 
matter from time of filing to final judgment is about ten and a half years. When 
interlocutory appeals are included, an average duration of 13 – 16 years is the 
minimum, with most trials spanning about 20 years. The resultant lack of certainty in 
the settlement of commercial disputes has led to capital flight and a disincentive for 
Foreign Direct Investment. Furthermore, it has resulted in high transaction costs that 
have negatively affected productivity, sustainable economic growth, and development 
negatively.119 
This culture of delay serves as a disincentive for the private sector when 
considering the important role the quick settlement of commercial disputes plays in 
giving comfort to investors in the enforcement of property rights. It has also 
engendered a culture of self- help that promotes the sense that “might is right” in the 
market place.  
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FIGURE 1 
 
Source: NationMaster.com 
 
FIGURE 2 
 
 
 
Source:  NationMaster.com 
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3.6.3.3  Corruption  
In the very recent past, three successive Chief Justices of Nigeria and others have 
confirmed the existence of corruption in the Nigerian judiciary and its undermining 
effect in the dispensing of justice.120According to the Global Corruption Barometer 2013, 
the judiciary was perceived to be among the most corrupt institutions in Nigeria while 
the Investment Climate Statement 2013 reports that citizens face long delays and 
frequent requests for bribes from judicial officials to expedite cases or to obtain a 
favourable ruling.121 
 Corruption within the judiciary stems in large part from the structure of the 
judicial system that allows for a high degree of legal discretion that is vested in judges, 
which can be uncertain sometimes, capricious and open to abuse.  Coupled with the 
multiplicity and complexity of steps required in the resolution of commercial disputes, 
a lack of certainty as to the extant laws, regulations and doctrines, and the haphazard 
and inconsistent application and interpretation of them by courts, a fertile ground has 
existed for corruption to thrive.122 Where there is no reasonable certainty as to how 
disputes will be resolved, as a result of high levels of discretion, commercial disputants 
tend either to take the law into their hands through self-help measures or migrate their 
investments to environments where there is certainty and predictability.  
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 These extensive levels of discretion have led to varying and inconsistent 
decisions by different courts on matters in pari materia fuelled by corrupt 
inducements.123 The tendency towards corrupt practices in the judiciary was recently 
showcased before the international community in a corruption trial involving a former 
governor.  Against the tide of evidence, he was discharged by a court in Nigeria. 
However, a United Kingdom court, relying on the same body of evidence, tried, 
convicted and sentenced him to a 14-year jail term.124   
 Given this weakened state of the Judiciary by corruption, sanctity of contracts 
and its enforcement has been compromised which has had collateral effect on the 
integrity and legitimacy of IRAs. Where contracts validly entered into and 
commitments freely made into are unenforceable because of a weak judicial system, it 
undermines commitments made by IRAs and their credibility. 
 
3.6.3.4  Independence  
The judiciary in a democracy has the ultimate responsibility for decisions involving 
freedoms, rights, and obligations of persons. To do this, judges are required to be 
independent. This independence safeguards a party’s right to have their case decided 
solely on the law, the evidence, and facts before the court devoid of any externalities or 
improper influence. A well-functioning, efficient, and independent judiciary is an 
essential requirement for a fair and just administration of justice. Consequently, judicial 
independence is an indispensable component of the Rule of Law and democracy. 
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 Independence has two forms: de jure and de facto. It means essentially that the 
judges deciding matters must be independent of and not under the direction or 
guidance of any external body or authority; and secondly, that they must not undertake 
the function under the likely influence of personal gain or partisanship. Thirdly, that the 
matter is decided on its merits taking into cognisance the general principles of law 
applicable. Linking all these together is the necessity that the judiciary must not just be 
independent but must be seen by others to be independent. 125 
Encapsulated in the concept of judicial independence are certain universally 
acknowledged minimum prerequisites that insulate judicial officers: mode of 
appointment, security of tenure, discipline, conditions of service, immunity, retirement 
benefits, and pension packages.126 
Even though the 1999 Constitution provides for the independence of the 
judiciary, the reality has rendered nugatory the essence of the independence. The 
Government has developed a culture of disobeying court decisions or choosing which 
of the orders to obey. Recently the National Judicial Council resolved to recall the 
suspended President of the Court of Appeal, Justice Isa Ayo Salami, but the Executive 
refused, hiding behind untenable excuses.127 Under President Obasanjo, court decisions 
were the subject of subjective “Executive interpretations,” and the government became 
notorious for choosing which court decision to be bound by.  Some of those included 
the voiding of the purported impeachment of former Oyo State Governor Rashidi 
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Ladoja and the Supreme Court decision in the seizure of Lagos State’s council funds by 
the Presidency.128 
3.6.3.5  Funding of the Judiciary 
One of the several ways to measure the independence of the Judiciary is the nature of its 
funding streams.129 Where the judiciary draws its funding from a first line charge 
without having to seek approvals from another arm of government, it is deemed more 
independent. However, where appropriations are subject to the control and approval of 
another arm of government, the tendency will be to adopt a quid pro quo approach in 
approving and releasing funds.  
It would appear that the intention of the framers of the 1999 Constitution was for 
the sanctity of the Separation of Powers doctrine when they inserted independent 
funding streams in the Constitution. There are copious provisions specifying the 
appropriation and release of funds meant for the judicial arm, and ring fencing its 
control of the other arms of government.130  
Notwithstanding the constitutional provisions on funding, the Executive has 
been reluctant to recognise, respect, and implement the provisions. Since the restoration 
of democratic rule in May 1999, the provisions have been observed more in the breach 
by both the federal and state governments. In addition, the budgetary allocations to the 
Judiciary has recorded a steady decline with each passing year from N95 billion in 2010 
to N85 billion in 2011, further to N75 billion in 2012 and only N65 billion in 2013.131 In 
the circumstances, heads of the various courts go cap in hand entreating the Executive 
arm of government to release funds appropriated for the Judiciary. Naturally, since he 
who pays the piper dictates the tune, it is then unsurprising that the Judiciary has found 
it difficult to play its critical role in a functioning democracy. 
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Disturbed by the foregoing, a former President of the Nigerian Bar Association, 
Olisa Agbakoba recently approached the Federal High Court for a judicial 
interpretation of the relevant provisions of the Constitution on financial independence 
for the Judiciary. In a reasoned judgment, Justice Mohammed declared illegal, 
unconstitutional and invalid, the control and disbursement of funds earmarked for the 
Judiciary by the Executive, holding it to be in violation of Sections 81(2)(3)(c) and 
84(2)(7) of the Constitution. In consequence, the court ordered that money belonging to 
the Judiciary in the Consolidated Revenue Fund be paid fully and directly to the 
National Judicial Council.132 Given the apparent  impunity with which the Executive 
views court orders, it is yet to be seen if this order will be obeyed paving the way for the 
financial independence of the judicial arm of government. 
 
3.6.4 The Electoral Body 
Even though different variants of the theory and concept of democracy abound,133 the 
Nigerian variant, which mirrors the liberal democracy that has taken root in the West, 
emphasises four of its attributes. These include firstly, free and fair elections based on 
one person, one vote; and entrenched fundamental human rights through which 
citizens can participate in the political system. In addition, there must be adherence to 
the principles of Rule of Law, and an independent electoral body that is free from the 
influence of governmental officials and which is viewed as credible by competing 
parties.134 The above underlines the importance of a credible electoral process, without 
which legitimacy questions will haunt whatever leadership emerges.  
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Secondly, elections help define the freedom that is inherent in a democratic 
process wherein the people choose who will represent them. Thirdly, they seek to 
underline and restate the democratic ideal: the independence of the electoral umpire 
from the Judicial, Legislative and Executive arms of government.135 
As the body that is by law required to be impartial and independent136 of all 
parties in the electoral chain, the legal framework setting up the electoral umpire, the 
Independent Electoral Commission of Nigeria (INEC) is weak. The appointment of the 
Chairman and Commissioners of INEC is the prerogative of the President137 (unlike 
other more transparent and impartial processes),138 subject to the confirmation of the 
Senate. On face value, this makes the appointees beholden to the dictates of the 
appointing authority! The Executive has effectively used this to populate the 
Commission with persons amendable to their influence and control.  
INEC funding is limited to budgetary limitations of “estimates” determined by 
the Executive.139 In addition, there is presently no parliamentary oversight of INEC. By 
ordinary rules of interpretation, its reporting channel is to the appointing authority, the 
President, thus further emasculating it.140 Events in the democratic experiment so far 
show that the electoral body has not been able to rise above this perception. 
One other element that has undermined the role of INEC as an impartial arbiter 
is the “incumbency factor” in the Nigerian political system. There are no clear 
stipulations on the utilisation of state apparatus by an incumbent to prosecute 
electioneering campaigns. This has led to incumbents having clear disadvantage of 
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other contestants who do not have the same access to state funds and resources.141 The 
Executive arm has capitalised on the above weaknesses by influencing the preparations 
and conduct of elections thus leading to serious legitimacy questions on the outcome of 
each of the elections since 1999.  
The perception has always been that INEC, by acts of commission or omission, 
works to favour the party in power.142 Some of the incidents include poor planning and 
handing over the security of electoral materials to security agencies controlled by the 
government (party) in power. Others include excluding electorates in places perceived 
to be strongholds of the opposition by either the inadequate, non- supply or late supply 
of voting materials and the absence or late arrival of polling officials at those polling 
stations.143The poor performance has led to judicial annulments of elections because of 
electoral fraud in several states144 and when re-runs are held, the party in power loses. 
Yagbyaju indicates clear cases of ballot box snatching/confiscation, falsification of 
results and several other types of electoral malpractices confirmed in Edo and Ondo 
States.145 
3.6.5  Conclusion on Political Institutions 
The 1999 return to democratic rule had a euphoric air to it. There were high 
expectations that the new democratic system and its institutions would witness a new 
lease of life and usher in a fresh start: a break from the past military regimes, typified by 
“intimidation, personalization, egoism, debauchery, sycophancy, and poverty.” 146 
Sadly, this has not been the case.147 Signs of “authoritarian reversals148” abound in the 
Nigerian landscape. With the military ruling for almost 30 years of Nigeria’s 
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independence149, a democratic culture is alien to Nigerians. The culture has been 
militarised, characterised by displays of authoritarian tendencies among the civilian 
ruling class as evidenced by intolerance, “insensitivity to and lack of accommodation of, 
differing perspectives and orientations, intolerance to dialogue as a means of avoiding 
or resolving conflict."150 The latest attempt at democratic governance has witnessed 
crass impunity, leadership by exclusion151all pointing to a “military hangover"152 has 
been the norm rather than the exception since the advent of civilian rule. 
From the foregoing, it is clear that critical political institutions central to the 
functioning of the state - the Executive, Legislature, Judiciary, and the electoral body, 
exist but function at a sub-optimal level, insufficient to support the IRA model of 
governance. IRAs derive their powers through delegation from the Legislature and the 
Executive and where these arms are weak and at loggerheads with each other, it 
impugns on the performance and effectiveness of the IRA.  An African proverb says, 
“When two elephants fight, it is the ground that suffers.” 
3.7 Supporting Institutions 
Aside from the political institutions, this research will consider another category of 
institutions that support political institutions. Their existence gives legitimacy to 
political institutions through a process of prodding and checking towards a path of 
legality, transparency, and good governance. For this category of institutions to be 
effective, they must operate at a level of independence that would allow them to 
discharge their mandate without fear.  These are also relevant to the functioning of 
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IRAs because firstly, they can serve as pressure points to ensure the independence of 
IRAs; and secondly they interact with and influence IRAs in everyday interactions 
within the body polity.  
This category includes the Public Service, Political Parties, Civil Society 
Organisations (CSOs), and the Media.  
3.7.1  Public Service 
According to Kofi Annan, “Good governance is perhaps the single most important 
factor in eradicating poverty and promoting development”153 as it is central to the 
advancement of sustainable development. The public service is the agent through 
which good governance is attained. If achieved, it “promotes accountability, 
transparency, efficiency and rule of law (and) allows for sound and efficient 
management of human resources for equitable and sustainable development.”154  
The public service is responsible for implementing the laws and policies of 
government, a necessary element, as no law or policy is self-implementing or self-
executing.  They all rely on human instrumentality through administrative mechanisms 
led by skilled bureaucrats working within the public service to bring them into reality. 
Nigeria’s long years of military rule affected the psyche of governance 
institutions in a fundamental way, including the public service. With the coming to 
power of each military regime, public servants were the continuity agents, bridging the 
old and the new, in the face of   the inexperience of the military rulers.155 This close 
relationship became a double-edged sword: it served to cement public servants’ role as 
indispensable implementing agents of government policies and programmes, but it also 
exposed them to the allure of power, leading to abuse of office, and making them  part 
of the military maladministration .   
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With the ushering in of democratic rule, the expectation was that the public 
service would align itself with the democratic ideal of implementing policies aimed at 
affecting positively the socio-economic well-being of the citizenry.156 Sadly, the 
provisional verdict has been a mixed bag of more bad than good apples. It has by its 
conduct tilted more to maintaining the status quo of crass corruption, nepotism, kick -
backs, the inflating of the wage bill and staff numbers, and the falsification of accounts, 
permeating all the ladders of the public service.157 In the words of Ayodele, et al “rather 
than abate, bureaucratic corruption has become elevated to the level of preventing the 
people from benefiting from the dividends of democracy.... All of these contributed 
tremendously to the failure of the public service contributing to democracy”158 
Given that the public service is the engine room for the realisation of government 
policies and programmes,159 its inherent institutional fragility has had a major impact 
on service delivery. This marks one addition to the litany of weaknesses that cloud the 
institutional landscape of the nation. 
3.7.2  Political Parties 
Political parties, according to the National Democratic Institute are bodies that allow for 
galvanising forces into a political bloc to seek a mandate to govern.  As has been noted, 
there can be political parties without democracy; but there can be no democracy 
without political parties.160  
 Democracy ensures that citizens participate in governance by freely choosing 
who would best represent them. This in turn opens up the space for popular 
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159Ipinlaye, O., The Nigerian Civil Service: An Insider’s View, in F. Omotoso (ed.), Contemporary Issues in 
Public Administration. 2001, Lagos: Bolabay. 
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participation, accountability, and delivery of policies and programmes through good 
governance that would meaningfully improve people’s lives.  
There are two fundamental purposes161 of political parties in a democracy: first, political 
parties define and express a group’s needs in a manner that the public can understand 
and respond to. Second, they develop common ideas among a significant group in 
order to apply pressure to the political system to attain set goals and objectives by 
moderating and channelling diverse opinions and dissent into common positions 
towards a common good. Thus, political parties are essential to the existence and 
thriving of the democratic process.162 
Beyond this theoretical postulation and on a functional level however, political 
parties nominate candidates; articulate policy preferences; sell the policies through 
campaigns to the public and act as breeding grounds for political leaders who will 
eventually assume leadership roles.163 They ought to be populated by like-minded 
persons who espouse a common ideology, and promote an agreed set of programmes 
encapsulated in a manifesto that is geared towards meeting the needs of the public it 
seeks to govern.164 
These ideals are manifestly lacking in the Nigerian political system. Several 
factors account for the weak state of political parties in Nigeria. Firstly, the domineering 
role of powerful individuals, known as godfathers and cabals,  who reserve the power 
to decide for the people, and manipulate the emergence of candidates of their choosing, 
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largely with the assistance of state institutions, such as the Police, EFCC, the Army, and 
INEC.165 
Secondly, the lack of internal party democracy in the nomination of candidates, 
which tends to be chaotic, corrupt and result in the imposition of candidates in the 
guise of party supremacy against the will of the electorate. 
Thirdly, because of a lack of institutionalised rules, processes and procedures, 
decision-making in political parties has become centralised thus shutting out the 
overwhelming grassroots majority.166  
Fourthly, there is clear absence of ideological underpinnings in the political 
parties that unifies members.  Faint attempts since the return to democratic rule to 
assign ideological tags to the different political parties has not succeeded.167 It would 
appear that the only appearance of an ideology, which all the parties share, is the desire 
to capture power. Violence, acrimony, and open warfare with personal interests are the 
hallmarks of electioneering processes and campaigns. 168 
Fifthly, the clear unwillingness or inability of political parties and their 
leadership to undertake greater citizen outreach and secure concerted public’s support 
for their programmes has led to a lack of grassroots popular support thus reducing 
them to elitist organisations.169 
 The nascent nature of this vital institution that regulates the manner candidates 
emerge to become leaders has affected the quality of the political process and the calibre 
of Nigerian leaders. This weakness points to the institutional fragility that has an 
overall effect of sustainable economic development and the success of the IRA mantra. 
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3.7.3  Civil Society Organisations 
Diamond offers a detailed conceptualisation of civil society organisations (CSOs) as 
belonging to the “the realm of organized social life that is open, voluntary, bound by a 
legal order or set of shared rules170” and sees them as an intermediary between the 
private sphere and the organized state. CSOs consist of non-state actors that congregate 
to pursue defined issues and goals, and include non- governmental organizations, think 
tanks, community based organizations, faith based organizations, ethnic associations, 
advocacy groups, social movements, professional groups, human and civil liberties 
groups, environmental activist groups, labour and trade unions, and values- 
preservation pressure groups.171 
CSOs worldwide and especially within the African context have had a vital role 
in shaping the political, social and economic development of their host states.172 From 
among the political supporting institutions, CSOs stand out in their role of sensitising 
the public where the state seeks to overreach and muzzle IRAs in performing their 
functions. They play a multiplicity of change agent roles including:173  
a) improving the quality of governance and its supporting institutions; 
b) prodding governments to endorse principles of transparency, 
accountability and openness in the political space; 
c) serving as watchdogs to check the excesses of government; 
d) exposing and restraining  violations of human rights; 
e) watching over the constitutional ethos and guarding against its abuse; 
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f) holding elected official and public servants to account in financial and 
budgetary matters; 
g) supporting the role of political parties and the citizenry in stimulating 
political participation and education, and a transparent electoral process 
increasing political efficacy and skills; and 
h) helping alienated groups to move to the mainstream. 
In the Nigerian context, CSOs have a chequered history that dates back to 
colonial rule where there were sustained engagements along regional and tribal lines to 
press for independence. After independence however, their development became 
fragmented and stunted, marked by intermittency, disappearing on the 
accomplishment of its immediate goal, only to re-emerge where new threats arose.174 In 
the recent past however, they have played an instrumental role in resisting the 
numerous military regimes that interspersed Nigeria’s history until the return to civil 
rule in 1999.175 
 CSOs have been unable to replicate their role as change agents since the 
transition to civil rule in order ensure good governance, accountability, the nurturing of 
democratic institutions and the resistance to and curtailment of autocratic tendencies in 
the state and its officials.  
 An Economic Community of Africa Report attested to the variable role of CSOs, 
rating their influence on public policies to be less than 20%.176 The reasons for this state 
of affairs include inadequate funding streams; lack of unity of purpose among players 
in the same CSOs space as the result of ego, tribal and regional, sectional or religious 
cleavages; and a disconnection between the CSOs and most of rural population due to 
urbanised nature of the CSOs.  Other reasons are the lack of internal democracy within 
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the groups; a gross lack of institutional capacity, and tendencies of corruption and 
personal enrichment among promoters of these groups.177 
Because of their ineffectiveness, CSOs in Nigeria have been unable to stand firm 
and take their rightful place in the building of valuable institutions and structures to 
support sustainable economic development including the emergence of strong IRAs.  
 
3.7.4  The Media  
Since the dawn of democracy in the 17th Century, the role of the media as the Fourth 
Estate and an avenue for public discussion and debate has been recognised.178 In 
addition, it is viewed as a “watchdog, guardians of the public interest, and as a conduit 
between governors and the governed ....”179 This role is recognised more in fledgling 
democracies, where the media can assist with the deepening of democracy.180 This role, 
justified by the Social Responsibility Theory,181 requires the press to inform and respond 
to the public’s needs for information by an objective presentation and dissemination of 
information with a view to promoting good governance and democratic values.182  
Within the context of Nigeria where there is an emerging democracy with weak 
supporting institutions, the role of the media becomes more pronounced. Coronel 
makes the point that:   
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 a fearless and effective watchdog is critical in fledgling democracies 
  where institutions are weak and pummelled by political pressure.  
  When legislatures,  judiciaries and other oversight bodies are  
  powerless against the mighty or are themselves corruptible, the  
  media are often left as the  only check against the abuse of power.  
  This requires that they play a heroic role, exposing the excesses  
  of presidents, prime ministers, legislators and magistrates despite  
  the risks.183 
 
 The media is often seen as the only institution left to provide checks against the 
abuse of power and expose corruption with a view to entrenching transparency, 
accountability and strengthening fledging institutions.184 Even within the framework of 
the 1999 Constitution, Sections 22 and 39 unequivocally stipulate their role to be that of 
upholding responsibility and accountability of the Government to the people of 
Nigeria. To allow for the effective discharge of its mandate, the Constitution further 
secures to every person the freedom of expression, including freedom to hold opinions, 
receive and impart ideas and information without interference. In performing its 
assigned roles however, the media has met challenges that have militated against the 
due discharge of its mandate. Some of these challenges are self -inflicted while some 
come from external sources seeking to control, subjugate, and dilute the impact of the 
media on the governance front. 
Externally, the media have come under major restraining challenges from the 
government. Successive military regimes enacted anti—media decrees185 in a bid to 
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muzzle the press, and this development saw reporters thrown into detention186 and 
prison187, while journalists were murdered in cold blood in the course of discharging 
their duties. 188 This anomaly continues under democratic rule.189 
The self-inflicted wound undermining a vibrant and responsive media is 
corruption. There have been numerous situations where media people seek favours and 
bribes to cover events or disseminate news or to write and disseminate materials 
against opponents of the payees. Although corruption in the media worldwide is multi-
facetted, in Nigeria the most popular corrupt practice is the acceptance of what is 
popularly called “brown envelop”190, which has been rampant and a widely known 
occurrence.191  
Considering the important role the media plays in other democracies in shaping 
and advancing democratic ideals, the weaknesses that trail the media in Nigeria has 
undermined its ability to discharge the mandate society thrusts upon them as the 
watchdog, thereby betraying itself as a fragile institution in the governance architecture 
of Nigeria. 
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Beyond the role and contributions of political and supporting institutions to the 
present state of Nigeria’s under-development, the nation’s political leadership has 
played a more important role that deserves dissection.  
3.8 Political Leadership: Theoretical Framework  
Leadership has been defined as “the art of motivating a group of people to act towards 
achieving a common goal,”192 and the "process of getting things done through 
people.”193 It is also the process of persuasion or example, by which an individual 
induces a group to pursue objectives held by the leader or shared by the leader and the 
followers.194 
Leadership is both a science and an art. Thus, although one may be born with 
natural leadership attributes and traits, there is a place for training, sharpening and 
deepening of those qualities for them to be relevant to the challenges of the 
environment.195 Shilgba argues that good leadership does not arise through luck and 
those who assume power through that route attract scepticism until they prove 
themselves adept at justifying the confidence luck reposed in them.196 The reference to 
luck within the leadership equation is important here as some leaders in Nigeria 
assumed power through good luck and that was deemed sufficient for them to govern 
with very costly consequences. 
Political leadership as a variant of leadership refers to a ruling group that bears 
the responsibility of managing the affairs and resources of a political entity by setting 
and influencing policy priorities through decision-making structures and institutions 
created for its orderly development. This definition encompasses all the people who 
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hold decision-making positions in government, and people who aspire to those 
positions, whether by means of election, appointment, coup d'état, a right of inheritance 
or otherwise.197  
Within the context of this research, however, political leadership refers to the 
titular head that represents, appropriates, or aggregates the mechanisms of power, one 
in whom the ultimate power of decision-making rests. This distinction between an 
identifiable individual as against a class or group of people is very important in our 
present endeavour. This research seeks to show that a class as an entity has rarely 
wielded power in Nigeria as all the leaders have been strong wielders of power with 
little or no deference to others within or without the political class. 
Political leadership is central to growth in all aspects of a nation's socio-economic 
development. Growth occurs when a nation's leadership is able to facilitate, entrench, 
and sustain good governance. Good governance on the other hand emerges from a 
committed and disciplined leadership. Even though this research acknowledges the 
importance to institutions for growth, political leadership ensures the emergence of the 
institutions.198 This is done through good governance. Effective political leadership is 
therefore an imperative for sustainable development. The task of articulating a policy 
direction and implementing policies and programmes that lead to sustainable 
development has never fallen on the masses in any society but on an identifiable 
leadership head.199 There is therefore a strong relationship between leadership, vision, 
and sustainable development. 
3.8.1 Political Leadership in the Nigerian Context 
In considering the role and importance of institutions to economic growth and 
development and by extension the viability of IRAs, extant literature assumes the 
existence of a governance structure that would nurture such institutions. As valid as the 
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above assumption is,   it does not take into consideration the cultural peculiarities of 
Nigeria.200  
There is an overall agreement among writers and commentators201 that the 
problem of Nigeria is one of leadership. This has in turn dovetailed into and affected 
the smooth establishment and operation of IRAs. The renowned novelist Chinua 
Achebe, in his book The trouble with Nigeria, argued that the problem of Nigeria  
is simply and squarely a failure of leadership. There is nothing basically wrong 
with the Nigerian character. There is nothing wrong with the Nigerian land, 
climate, water, air, or anything else. The Nigerian problem is the unwillingness 
or inability of its leaders to rise to their responsibility, to the challenge of 
personal example, which is the hallmark of true leadership.202 
 
Nigeria’s governance architecture since Independence has seen the emergence of 
leaders that have governed and exhibited similar leadership traits and nuances. 
Ironically, even though Nigeria has been governed by a military and civilian class, with 
one relying on the will of people to govern while the other foisting itself upon the 
governed by force, the outcomes have been the same.  These outcomes are grouped into 
five themes: accidental and ill prepared; corruption; a lack of respect for the Rule of 
Law; mismanagement of the economy; and a subjugation of institutions to political 
control. The thesis will now discuss these themes drawing out the linkages between 
them and governance and by extension the negative impact they have on the IRA 
model. 
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3.8.1.1 Accidental and ill preparedness 
As if on cue, all the political heads that have emerged since Independence were 
unprepared for leadership and lacked the essential governance tools necessary for 
effective governing such as knowledge, vision, imagination, transparency, motivation, 
and patriotism. Preparation here contemplates a mental anticipation of the office; the 
development of a coherent plan and programme of action for implementation; and the 
possession of a vision that can galvanise and energise the nation towards one common 
goal of sustainable development.  
 Under military leaderships, this lack of preparation was clearly demonstrated 
when the nature of military takeovers is dissected. Normally coup planning, being an 
act that is treasonable under all of Nigeria’s past and present Constitutions, is a 
secretive venture.203 Meetings usually held clandestinely in a hurried and hushed 
manner, within circles of army officers who trust themselves and maintain personal 
loyalties. It had nothing to do with qualifications or competencies for leadership but 
with one’s ability to keep secrets. There is therefore no room for a robust discourse of 
ideas in preparation for leadership in coup planning within the Nigerian context. 204 
 Secondly, the selection of who to lead the military junta usually had nothing to 
do with a strategic process that takes into consideration a person’s competencies and 
readiness for office, but rather has more to do with personal loyalties and interests.205 
This robs the nation of the services of the best brains on offer in the military. 
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 Under civilian regimes, the same situation replicated itself but a different culprit 
was to blame for the accidental emergence of Nigeria’s political leadership.  Civilian 
democratic rule is founded on democratic ethos, which envisages a “government of the 
people, by the people, for the people” universally.206  In Nigeria, however, the system 
has unwittingly undergone some whitewash with a version more akin to a government 
of the people, by the godfathers, for the people. Godfathers have since Independence 
determined who emerges as the political head of the country. 
  
 The dominance of “godfatherism”207 within Nigeria’s political space has 
overshadowed the concept of participation and representation that is central to 
democracy.208  Omotola209 has posited that the rise of “godfatherism” is a result of the 
weak state of democratic institutions that have been unable to check its emergence. This 
has facilitated the monetisation and bastardisation of the nation’s political space, 
resulting in the subversion of core democratic institutions. This in turn has reduced the 
people who ought to be deciding their own fate politically through the ballot box to 
mere clients/consumers or spectators in the democratisation arena. The consequences 
have mostly been bad governance and rising conflict across the country.210 
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 Beginning with the first head of state after independence, “godfathers” have 
straddled Nigeria’s political landscape and determined who emerges as the nation’s 
leader. Balewa who emerged the Prime Minister was not positioned for that role. 
Rather, it was the leader of the NPC, the Sardauna of Sokoto, Ahmadu Bello who had 
won the majority of seats in parliament who was to emerge as the Prime Minister. The 
latter however, showed no interest in the position but rather propped up Balewa for the 
office, preferring to remain in his domain as the Sardauna of Sokoto; while continuing 
to pull the “strings” from behind.211 Thus, the first head of state did not aspire for 
leadership of the country, but it was merely thrust on him. On the level of personal 
preparedness for office, Belawa’s background, education and training was very 
rudimentary and did not equip him for the high office of head of state of a newly 
independent nation.212 
 The pattern of an ill-prepared leadership was the lot of all military heads of state 
(for the reasons earlier given on the nature of coup planning) and all the democratic 
leadership right up to the present. As Nigeria’s second democratically elected President, 
Shagari’s ambition was to be a Senator until political horse-trading and back room deals 
thrust him forward to become the President. This was to be replicated in the successive 
democratically elected Presidents (Olusegun Obasanjo and Musa Yaradua).213 The case 
of the immediate past President, Goodluck Jonathan further underscores this point.  
 Jonathan’s rise to power has indeed been attributed to good luck. As Deputy 
Governor in the Southern state of Bayelsa, he was recorded to be “aloof and 
disconnected to governance”214 until the sudden impeachment of the Governor on 
corruption charges threw him up as the Governor. Barely two years into his tenure as 
Governor of the state, he emerged as a consensus candidate for the office of Vice 
President under backroom political dealings on the night of the ruling party’s 
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convention to select a Presidential candidate to run for office.215 On winning elections as 
a Vice Presidential candidate for Yar’ardua, he was the Vice President for only a little 
over two years when the President died and he assumed the office of President. His 
meteoric rise has therefore been likened to good luck and chance but certainly cannot be 
attributed, by any stretch of argument, to preparation for the high office. Good luck, as 
earlier been argued by Shilgba, is not enough an ingredient for leadership and sterling 
performance, neither does it prepare or endue one to solve societal problems.216 
 
3.8.1.2 Corruption 
Steep corruption and unbridled "wild appetite for transient materialism"217 have been 
recorded as the signature tune of almost all the governments of Nigeria since 
independence. Corruption has eaten deep into the fabric of Nigerian society and of 
every regime since independence.  As the Chinese say a fish usually starts getting rotten 
from the head, so did corruption among the political leadership permeating the whole 
society. Starting from the first government at independence, there has been recorded 
cases of widespread corruption and looting of the public treasury with no attempts by 
the leadership to halt it.218 This trend was the hallmark of successive regimes, as 
                                                     
215 Ateb, S., Understanding the background of Nigerian president, why so much bad luck follows Goodluck 
Jonathan, accessed from http://simonateba.com/2014/03/03/understanding-background-nigerian-
president-much-bad-luck-follows-goodluck-jonathan/ on 10/10/14 at 10.50pm; Alabo Tonye Graham-
Douglas, Daily Independent Newspaper, Nigeria, Friday, October 10, 2014. 
216 Shilgba, note 196. 
217Ayodele  in Ebegbulem, J.C., Corruption and Leadership Crisis in Africa: Nigeria in Focus, 
International Journal of Business and Social Science Vol. 3 No. 11; June 2012, 221. 
218 Ogbeidi, note 194. Established cases of corruption against Dr Nnamdi Azikiwe regarding dealings in 
the defunct African Continental Bank; Chief Obafemi Awolowos’ corrupt dealings with Western Region 
Marketing Board were neither looked into nor the perpetrators charged to court. See Sklar, R. L. (2004). 
Nigerian Political Parties: Power in an Emergent African Nation, 1stEd. Trenton, New Jersey: African 
World Press Inc; Report of the Foster-Sutton Tribunal of Inquiry. (1956). Lagos: Federal Ministry of 
Information; Okonkwo, R. (2007), Corruption in Nigeria: A Historical Perspective (1947 –2002) in African 
Unchained. Retrieved from http://africaunchained.blogspot.com/2007/09/corruption-in-nigeria-
historical.html; Report of Coker Commission of Inquiry into the Affairs of Certain Statutory Corporations 
in Western Nigeria. (1962). Lagos: Federal Ministry of Information; Magid, A. (1976), Men in the Middle: 
Leadership and Role Conflict in a Nigerian Society. New York: Holmes & Meier. 
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military governments that purported to overthrow civilian governments because of 
corruption became themselves immersed in higher levels of corrupt practices.219 
  
3.8.1.3  Lack of Respect for the Rule of Law 
Underlining the tenures of both civilian and military regimes has been a culture of 
brazen impunity, crass authoritarianism, abuse of human rights, and the display of 
maximum powers devoid of an adherence to norms of due process and the Rule of Law. 
Rule of men prevailed over the Rule of Law as regime after regime sought to outdo one 
another along this downward path. The afterglow of military authoritarianism 
overshadowed democratic credentials of the emergent civilian governments. 220  
 
3.8.1.4  Mismanagement of the Economy 
Short-sightedness has characterised the management of the economy of the nation since 
independence during both the civilian and military regimes. The many beautifully 
crafted development plans and goals were implemented more in the breach after the 
discovery of oil in commercial quantities .221 
 A conclusion that Nigeria planned to fail in spite of numerous national 
development plans because of institutional weaknesses that allowed those plans to be 
routinely set aside whimsically best captures the history of Nigeria’s economic woes.222 
The oil boom that was accompanied by a surplus in national income of the 1970s rather 
than having been invested in national infrastructure and long term development, was 
                                                     
219 Ibid.  
220 Ogbonnaya et al, The Challenges of Democratic Governance in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic, Mediterranean 
Journal of Social Sciences, Vol. 1 (11) November 2012 at 690; Bankole D., The Role of the Legislature in the 
Consolidation of Democracy in Nigeria, in The Challenges of Democratic Governance in Nigeria’s Fourth 
Republic, Ogbonnaya et al, in Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences, Vol. 1 (11) November 2012 at 690. 
221 Falola, T and Heaton, M.M., A History of Nigeria, 2008, Cambridge University Press. 
222 Ibi-Ajayi, S.I., Institutions, the Missing Link in the Growth Process, 2002, Presidential Address, Ibadan: 
Nigerian Economic Society;  Obadan, note 42; Bertocchi, G., and Guerzoni, A., Growth, History or 
Institutions? What Explains State Fragility in Sub-Saharan Africa, 2010, IZA Discussion Paper, No. 4817; 
Fosu, A.K., Democracy and Growth in Africa: Implications of Increasing Electoral Competitiveness, 2008, 
Economics Letters, Vol.100: 442–444; Osabuohien note 15. 
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frittered away.223 Although with the global financial meltdown  most nations are 
developing cost saving measures, in the Nigerian context salaries of political office 
holders have continued to rise and are presently higher than their counterparts in 
wealthier countries and key developing nations, according to an analysis published by 
the Economist magazine.224 This symbolises the lack of financial prudence that is 
symptomatic of the recklessness that the political class has come to represent which is 
evident in the mismanagement of the economy.  
 
3.8.1.5 Subjugation of Institutions  
Since Independence, Nigeria has had governance architecture characterised by strong 
leaders backed by regional/tribal affiliations that operate a notch higher than 
institutions and institutional arrangements. This development that led to the elevation 
of leaders above institutions is a product of the manner in which powers and 
responsibilities were allocated in the tripod power sharing arrangement of the political 
system.  
The overreaching powers vested in the office of the head of state has made the 
functioning of other democratic supporting critical institutions almost impossible. It has 
been contended, and not without merit, that the President under Nigeria's current 
constitutional dispensation is the most powerful President in the world, vested with 
almost limitless powers that enable him to attempt to do the impossible.225 As evidence, 
                                                     
223Siollun, M., Oil Politics and Violence: Nigeria’s Military Coup Culture, Algora Publishing, New York, 2009.  
224 A Nigerian legislator receives an annual salary of about $189,000, equivalent of N30 million, which is 
116 times the country's gross domestic product (GDP). The figures put salaries collected by Nigerian 
senators and members of the House of Representatives way ahead of those received by fellow 
parliamentarians in the 29 countries whose data was analysed by the Economist. In terms of volume of 
cash earnings, the Nigerian legislators beat their counterparts in Britain who take $105,400 yearly, as well 
as those in the United States ($174,000), France ($85,900), South Africa ($104,000), Kenya ($74,500), Saudi 
Arabia ($64,000) and Brazil ($157,600).In terms of lawmakers' salaries as a ratio of GDP per capita, the gap 
is even much wider. While the salary of a Nigerian lawmaker is 116 times the country's GDP per person, 
that of a British member of parliament is just 2.7 times. Source: Daily Trust Newspaper, Nigeria, 22 July 
2013. 
225 Rev. Father Matthew Kukah, Catholic Bishop of Sokoto, in an address at the opening of the Nigerian 
Bar Association Annual General Conference in Abuja on the 27th of August 2012. 
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all the critical institutions supporting democratic governance are susceptible to 
influence, control and abuse by the political head. For example, the powers of 
appointment ( and by legal implication, dismissal) of the heads of the electoral body, 
the federal courts, security agencies, heads of government agencies, agencies in direct 
control of regulating the economic sphere (monetary and fiscal policies, stock markets 
and regulation of companies) all lie with the President. Accompanying this array of 
powers is an unrestrained measure of discretion with which these powers are exercised. 
Where unrestrained discretion reigns, there can be no predictability in the decision-
making processes. This gives room for unbridled corruption, as the exercise of 
discretion without boundaries can be arbitrary and capricious.226 
The above political landscape has distorted the power equilibrium, with the 
creation of strong leaders instead of strong institutions.  A broken electoral system 
ensures that political leaders emerge through a flawed process that does not equip them 
to lead, thus lending credence to the often-quoted statement by Lord Acton that “power 
tends to corrupt and absolute power corrupts absolutely.”227  It further validates the 
argument of this research that the nature of the power architecture within Nigeria’s 
power system does not lend itself easily to the thriving of IRAs, as there are no good 
institutions but strong leaders. The tabulation of the ill prepared leaders that have 
emerged since independence has, not surprisingly, led to a governance architecture that 
has lent itself to corruption, mismanagement of the economy, and a lack of respect for 
rule of law precepts, and has led to the subjugation of regulatory institutions including 
IRAs, to the rule of men instead of the men being under these institutions. 
 
 
 
                                                     
226 Oluba, M., The Rule of Law and Economic Development in Nigeria, Economic Reflections, 
www.martinoluba.com. 
227 Statement attributed to Lord Acton, 1834 – 1902 who wrote them in a letter to Bishop Mandell 
Creighton on April 5, 1887. 
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3.9 Conclusion  
 
Drawing from the foregoing plethora of literature underlining the primacy of 
institutions for economic growth and effective functioning of the IRA model of 
regulatory governance, this thesis seeks to establish that the IRA model has had a 
stormy reception within the Nigeria context because of the intemperate institutional 
fragilities that surround the political and supporting institutions dissected.  
The political institutions discussed lie at a critical intersection of Nigeria’s 
constitutional democracy. They originate and determine the direction the nation should 
go. They develop the framework under which the different arms of government would 
function and inter-relate. They delineate the contours of all institutions in a bid to 
achieve harmony and development. Thus, all the other supporting institutions draw 
their life and legality from political institutions without which they will exist in a 
vacuum and lack legitimacy. Given their importance therefore, their present fragile 
state does not augur well for the successful transplant of the IRA model. 
As a further exacerbating point, this thesis has established that all the supporting 
institutions that ought to encourage and pressure political institutions to be alive to 
their mandate and responsibilities are equally in a weakened state. 
Therefore, within the context of a political leadership that has always emerged 
unprepared to lead, corrupt, lacking in respect for the rule of law and basic human 
rights, it is not surprising that the outcome in economic terms has been dismal. The 
political leadership in a quest to consolidate power has always worked towards 
subjugating and dominating institutions and institutional frameworks that should have 
precedence over them. 
 
The identified weaknesses portend a grim future for the effective working of the 
IRA model since its emergence, survival and proper functioning depends wholly on 
these fragile political and supporting institutions. 
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Chapter Four will consider the state of economic, financial, law enforcement and 
capacity building institutions in Nigeria and their likely impact on the IRA model of 
regulatory governance.  
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CHAPTER 4 
ECONOMIC AND ENABLING INSTITUTIONS 
4.1 Introduction  
Chapter 3 undertook a discourse on institutions generally, and political 
institutions and other enabling institutions in particular, and their relevance to the 
effective functioning of the IRA model of governance. An analysis of their condition 
was carried out which turned in a verdict of fragility. In addition to those set of 
institutions discussed in Chapter 3, there is another set that are economic in nature and 
essential for IRAs to thrive. This thesis generically refers to them as economic 
institutions. This chapter discusses that second set of institutions and indicates their 
relevance to the IRA model. Further, an informed position is taken as to whether these 
set of institutions is viable enough to support the IRA model in Nigeria. In conclusion, 
the chapter considers the adequacy or otherwise of the facilitating role of capacity 
building institutions and the effect of insecurity on investments.  
Institutions generally encompass a variety of legal entities such as parliaments, 
the executive, judiciary, legislative houses, and central banks, and extend to any 
processes or systems that regulate the interaction between members of a given society 
in the different spheres of life.1  Economic institutions, as a subset of these institutions, 
have three primary functions. First, they determine and protect property rights; second, 
they facilitate transactions; and finally, they permit economic participants in the market 
place to cohabit and operate in a lawful manner.  
To aid in identifying which institutions are of an economic nature, following the 
lead of Wiggins and Davis,2 this thesis indicates that economic institutions are the 
                                                     
1 Brunt, L., Which Institutions matter for Economic Growth, in Property Rights and Economic Growth: Evidence 
from a Natural Experiment, CEPR DP 6404. September2007; Soysa, I.D, and Jutting, J., Informal Institutions 
and Development – Think Local, Act Global, 2006, OECG Development Centre and Development 
International Seminar on Informal Institutions and Development – What do we know and what can we 
do?. 
2Wiggins, S., and Davis, J., Economic Institutions, IPPG Briefing Paper No. Three, July 2006 at 3. 
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restraints on human interactions in the market place that seek to protect and preserve 
property rights and facilitate a favourable atmosphere for business activities. These 
generically include a property rights enforcement regime that encompasses both 
movable and immovable property and financial institutions.  
 Furthermore, property rights, which are at the heart of economic freedom under 
capitalism, have engaged the economic world for more than 200 years in a great 
intellectual debate. This debate has been driven mostly by philosophers and economists 
who advocate an economic system based on private property and free markets—or 
what one can refer to as economic freedom. The essentials of economic freedom are 
individual choice, voluntary exchange, freedom to compete in markets, and protection 
of person and property. Thus, institutions that promote economic freedom by allowing 
voluntary exchange and protection of individuals and their property are economic in 
nature.3 
 Several indices point to the direct correlation between economic freedom, which 
is defined as security of legally acquired property rights, freedom to transact business, 
freedom from governmental control on the specific terms in which an individual can 
transact and freedom from governmental expropriation of property rights, and 
economic prosperity.4 Particularly, Hanke and Walters illustrate clearly through five 
surveys5 measuring economic freedom that countries with a high level of economic 
freedom tend to achieve growth. Conversely, the surveys indicate that the 
overwhelming majority of countries with low levels of economic freedom experience 
decline in economic growth and per capita GDP.6 
 
                                                     
3 Lawson, R.A., Economic Freedom, The Concise Encyclopedia of Economics, 2nd Edition, 2008. 
4 Mills, G and Herbst, J., Africa’s Third Liberation: The new search for Prosperity and jobs, 2012, Penguin Books 
(South Africa)Ltd at 16. 
5 The Fraser Institute’s Economic Freedom of the World Index; Freedom House’s Economic Freedom 
Indicators; The Heritage Foundation’s Index of Economic Freedom; the International Institute for 
Management Development’s World Competitiveness Yearbook; and the World Economic Forum’s Global 
Competitiveness Report. 
6 Mills and Herbst, note 4. 
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4.2 Property Rights 
Recent studies indicate that a well-defined and applied property rights regime is 
the most important among economic institutions in tailoring sustainable economic 
growth and the accompanying prosperity in a nation.7 Securing private property rights 
in the United States in the early stages of its life as a nation and in Japan after World 
War 2 were what served as a springboard for wealth generation in the two nations.8  
 Prevailing literature in the property rights school of economic thought 
identifies three essential attributes embedded in property rights. 9 The first is 
the exclusive authority to determine how a resource is used, whether that 
resource is owned by government or by an individual, as the owner deems 
fit, as long as this does not infringe on another’s rights. Second is the 
exclusive right to the services of that resource to the exclusion of others. Third 
is the right and ability of an owner to deal with the resource as he deems fit, 
including delegation, renting, or selling any portion of the rights by exchange 
or gift, at whatever price the owner determines (provided someone is willing 
to pay that price).  
The relevance of private property rights is highlighted when 
considered in contradistinction with common property.  While private 
property rights ideally are “complete, secure and transferable” and provide 
the owner with the rights of “possession, transfer, use change and destruction 
                                                     
7Acemoglu D., and Johnson S., Unbundling institutions, 2005, Journal of Political Economy Vol. 113, No. 5, 
at 949–95;  Rodrik, D., et al, 2002, Institutions rule: the primacy of institutions over integration and geography in 
economic development, IMF Working Paper, WP/02/189, Washington DC, International Monetary Fund. 
8 Moghalu, C.K., Emerging Africa, How the Global Economy of the ‘Last Frontier’ can prosper and matter, 
Penguin Books, London, 2014 at 65. 
9 Coase, R.,  The Problem of Social Costs, Journal of Law and Economics (1960) at 1–5; Alchianm A.A., 
Economic Forces at Work, Liberty Press, 1977 at 130; O’Driscoll, Jr, and Hoskins L., Property Rights: The Key 
to Economic Development, Policy Analysis, No 482, August 7, 2003; Milton Friedman Commanding Heights 
interview conducted on 10/01/00 On Freedom and Free Markets, 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/commandingheights/shared/minitext/int_miltonfriedman.html. 
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of the asset”; common property on the other hand refers to assets under 
communal ownership; and rights thereto are defined by an individual’s 
membership of that community.10  
Thus, the confidence that comes from the knowledge that one can 
possess and enjoy, without arbitrary abridgment, the fruit of one’s labours, be 
it landed property or an invention, serves as a powerful incentive for 
innovation and wealth gathering. This control propels owners to seek the 
attainment of the highest benefits such a resource can accrue to them.11 
The importance of property rights to economic growth and 
development in the developing world was brought into sharp focus by the 
work of the Peruvian economist and developmental thinker, Hernando de 
Soto,12 whose thesis pointed out the benefits of property rights to owners. De 
Soto wrote on how developing countries could leverage on the otherwise 
“dead” but potentially very viable asset, private property, to raise their 
fortunes.  
Within the confines of this thesis, however, reiteration is made of the global 
opinion among political, legal and economic writers that an effective property rights 
regime is essential for the IRA model to succeed within a nation’s economy. Given this 
acknowledgement and considering the fact that property rights are actually the basis 
upon which the capitalist system exists, this research seeks to explore Nigeria’s attitude 
to it. 
4.2.1   Legal Protection of Property Rights in Nigeria 
Several legal instruments, both local and international, govern the protection of 
property rights regime in Nigeria. Section 44 of the 1999 Constitution provides that 
                                                     
10 Heltberg, R., Property Rights and Natural Resource Management in Developing Countries, Journal of 
Economic Surveys, Vol. 16, No. 2 at 193-194. 
11O’Driscoll and Hoskins, note 9.  
12 De Soto, H., The mystery of capital: Why capitalism succeeds in the West and fails everywhere else, 2000, New 
York: Basic Books. 
122 
 
“moveable property and any interest in an immoveable property” cannot be 
compulsorily taken unless done in accordance with a law while the person is 
compensated promptly, and allowed access to court. Section 25 of the Nigerian 
Investment Promotion Commission (NIPC) Act13 states that “no enterprise shall be 
nationalised or expropriated,” nor would any person who has capital in such an 
enterprise be forced to surrender it. It requires that any acquisition must be in the 
national interest or for a public purpose in accordance with a law which provides for 
fair and adequate compensation, without undue delay. Furthermore, Article 14 of the 
African Charter on Human & Peoples Rights (Ratification and Enforcement) Act 
(ACHPR)14 also states that “The right to property shall be guaranteed,” and can only be 
encroached upon in the interest of public need and in accordance with appropriate 
laws. 
   
In exploring whether the legal protection of private property in Nigeria is 
adequate or not, this research dwells majorly on property rights in moveable and 
immovable. These set of rights are the ones are relevant to and affect the functioning of 
IRAs.  
4.2.1.1  Immoveable Property  
Even though provisions in the 1999 Constitution, NIPC Act and the ACHPR Act all 
grant rights in and over immoveable property such as landed property, by the 
operation of the Land Use Act15 these rights have been weakened and their enforcement 
made difficult by local extenuating circumstances in a number of ways.  
Firstly, under the Land Use Act, no individual has absolute ownership of land16 
and all an individual can lay lawful claim to is a usufructuary right17 which is for a 
                                                     
13 Laws of the Federation 2004 Cap 117. 
14 African Charter of Human and Peoples Rights (Ratification and Enforcement) Act Laws of the 
Federation 2004 Cap A9 Land Use Act Cap 202, LFN 1990. 
15 Cap 202, LFN 1990. 
16 By virtue of Section 1 of the Act, all lands vests  in the Governor of a state and individuals only enjoy a 
Right of Occupancy, whether granted or deemed 
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fixed term after which it reverts to the state. This means that any private property right 
acquired is not absolute but time bound. Secondly, the Land Use Act abridges the 
essence of the rights granted by requiring the consent of the Governor before any title to 
land can be transferred.18 The requirement of consent has constituted a clog in the 
wheel of alienation of rights to land as Governors in practice hardly ever grant the 
consent and where the grant is approved, the process is laborious and costly.19 The 
essential character and usefulness of an acquired right as commodity in the market 
place diminishes where it cannot be easily assigned in the normal course of business. 
Thirdly, the time it takes for courts to resolve disputes arising from the abridgment of 
landed property rights ranges from 10 -12 years20  and is a major disincentive for the 
acquisition of the title in the first place. 
Fourthly, the legal protection of property rights of groups such as children, 
women, the disabled, elders, and minorities is weak and transient, dependent on age 
and the nature of marriage21 thus introducing much uncertainty. Most of the rights 
accruable to women and the girl child depend on the nature of marriage contracted. 
This is against the background in certain cultural settings where women, and by 
extension the girl child, are considered chattel, and therefore unable to own or enforce 
property rights.22 Even though women make up over 70% of Africa’s farmers,23 cultural 
                                                                                                                                                                           
17 Usufruct is a limited title derived in law that unites the two property interests of usage (enjoyment 
without altering its essential character) and derivation of profit from a thing possessed. It .it is usually 
granted for a terms after which it reverts to the grantor. 
18 Section 26, Land Use Act 
19 Lagos Chamber of Commerce and Industry Resolution at Third Business Environment Roundtable 
organised by Lagos Chamber of Commerce and Industry (LCCI), reported in Vanguard Newspaper, 
Nigeria, October 10, 2010 on the use of landed properties as collateral. 
20 Source: NationMaster.com. 
21Olubor J.J., The Legal Rights Of The Vulnerable Groups Vis-À-Vis Customary Practices, a paper presented at  
the Refresher Course for Judges and Kadis from 23 – 27 MARCH, 2009.  
22Suberu v. Sunmonu, Supreme Court of Nigeria Law Reports (SCNLR) reproduced in Olubor J.J., The 
Legal Rights Of The Vulnerable Groups Vis-À-Vis Customary Practices  a Paper presented at  the 
Refresher Course for Judges and Kadis from 23 – 27 March, 2009 at 15. 
23Byamugisha, F.F.K.,  Securing Africa’s Land for Shared Prosperity, The World Bank, 2013; Aluko, B.J., and 
Amidu A.R.,  Women and Land Rights Reforms in Nigeria, March, 2006.  
www.fig.net/pub/accra/papers/ts09/ts09_04_aluko_amidu.pdf. 
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restrictions preclude them from acquiring ownership rights over lands they cultivate 
because of societal impediments that disallow them from holding titles. 
Fifthly, the transfer of landed property rights by owners in business transactions 
has a major cultural barrier. The obsession the average Nigerian has for and the way he 
perceives land transcends the legal to a spiritual dimension, especially in cases of 
ancestral lands. Most landowners see land passed on from deceased parents as “family” 
property that cannot be alienated to non-family members in any form. This militates 
against the normal assignment of lands as private property in business transactions.24 
 A study regarding registration of titles to land undertaken by the World Bank on 
Doing Business in Nigeria in 2013 indicates that Nigeria ranks a lowly 185th position 
out of 189 countries surveyed in the ease of registering titles. There are a staggering 13 
stages of requirements, spanning a typical average period of 77 days before registration, 
attracting over 20% of the value of the property.25 This finding is corroborated by the 
International Property Markets Scorecard of 2013, which ranks Nigeria in a position of 
182 out of 185 countries surveyed, with the number of procedural steps required to be 
taken before title can pass being 13, and spanning 82 days.  
 Registering title to land is central to ascertaining and asserting rights accruable in 
landed property. It has many advantages including enabling the creation of a land 
market, for ease of transferability of lands for commercial transactions, among others.26 
Quite apart from the fact that the governing law for registration of titles predates 
Nigeria as a political entity, which makes it anachronistic and outdated, most of the 
                                                     
24Mkapa, B.W., Leadership for Growth, Development and Poverty Reduction: An African Viewpoint and 
Experience, in Brady, D., and Spence, M., eds, Leadership and Growth, Commission on Growth and 
Development, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 2010 at 51. 
25 World Bank Group, Doing Business in Nigeria, Measuring Business Regulations, 2013. 
26 FAO Agriculture paper in Elley, T.K, Why Africa Fails: The Case for Growth before Democracy, Tafelberg, 
NB Publishers, Cape Town, RSA at 119. 
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states within the Federation, with the exception of a very few like Lagos, have not 
domesticated and set up land registries to properly document land titles.27 
Thus, the fluidity and uncertainty that trails the enforceability of immoveable 
property rights, especially in financial transactions, constitutes a hindrance to raising 
capital and depresses investments, by making their convertibility cumbersome.  This in 
turn serves as a hindrance to private sector investments and makes untenable the case 
for the role and existence of IRAs, as there would be no infrastructure service providers 
for IRAs to regulate. 
 
4.2.1.2  Moveable and Intangible Property  
 This category of rights includes rights in Intellectual Property and Licences or any 
rights that, though they accrue to a person, are of an intangible nature.   
4.2.1.2.1 Intellectual Property 
The World Intellectual Property Organization defines Intellectual Property (IP) as 
creations of the mind: inventions, literary and artistic works, and symbols, names, 
images, and designs used in commerce.28 Property rights in IP therefore, refers to rights 
in those creations of the mind such as inventions, industrial designs, symbols, names, 
and images, among others. Of primary concern to IP rights is the inherent right of 
originators to own and control their creativity and innovations in the same manner as a 
physical property owner does. The IP regime promotes innovation while 
simultaneously offering to society the privilege and benefit to enjoy the fruits of such 
innovation, without derogating from the rights of the innovator and the benefits that 
accrue to that invention. 
                                                     
27Registration of Titles Act of 1935.  The law was introduced to correct the inadequacies in the registration 
of instrument Act of 1924. The basic principle of the Registration of Titles law is that ownership of title to 
land is based on the fact of registration, that is, it operates to register dealings and transactions over titles 
in land when such titles have been registered. 
28 The World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), http://www.wipo.int/about-ip/en/. 
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Recent trends point to the reality that the 21st century global economy is 
essentially a knowledge-driven one and for any nation to secure a foothold in it, 
technology, knowledge, and innovation must underpin its efforts. 29 IP is that engine 
driver of the knowledge economy upon which most of the world economy runs, and is 
in fact, particularly the bedrock upon which most of the developed and emerging (BRIC 
countries) economies were and are running. Where inventors have protection for their 
inventions, it incentivises them to excel and to commercialise their inventions for gain. 
It was the patenting and commercialisation of groundbreaking inventions of the 18th 
and 20th centuries that ignited economic development in Europe.30  
In the Nigerian context, four basic laws govern the IP regime. They are the 
Trademarks Act, 1965 for trademarks, the Design and Patent Act, 1970 for designs, the 
Design and Patent Act, 1970 for industrial design, and the Nigerian Copyright Act, 1999 
for copyright. In spite of the array of laws ostensibly meant to secure the protection of 
IP, one cannot but note that all these laws are of a colonial pedigree having been 
fashioned by the English legal system during the colonial era. It is instructive to note 
that even though the English laws have undergone several amendments to bring them 
in line with fast-paced technological advancements, the Nigerian versions remain 
frozen in time. For instance, the United Kingdom Trademarks Act, on which the 
Nigerian Trademarks Act is fashioned, has undergone several amendments with the 
most recent being the Trademarks Act 1994 while the Nigerian version retains its 
original provisions. 
 There has been a recent encouraging trend pointing to enforcement mechanisms 
by the Nigerian Copyright Commission, the government agency responsible for 
copyright matters. Between October 2011 and February 2012, the courts convicted 
copyright infringers in more than 18 cases and the Commission is currently prosecuting 
                                                     
29Moghalu, note 8 in Chapter 9. 
30 For example, it  was the invention of the steam engine by James Watt in 1775; the telegraph by Samuel 
Morse in 1835; the adaptation of the electric power for industrial and domestic use by Michael Faraday 
who invented the electric motor in 1821; and Thomas Edison who invented the light bulb in 1979 that 
propelled economic development and the accompanying industrial revolution. 
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over 70 criminal cases at the various divisions of the Federal High Court nationwide. 
Between January 2011 and February 2012, the Commission instituted 26 criminal cases 
covering the various categories of copyright infringement, namely books, CDs, 
software, and broadcast. So far, 18 of the cases have resulted in convictions of the 
accused persons with various levels of sentences imposed in accordance with the 
provisions of the Copyright Act.31 
Apart from the archaic laws, the legal protection of IP rights in Nigeria suffers 
from several limitations32 among which are lack of awareness of its potential; a lack of 
political will in enforcing IP Laws; and the non-registration of most innovations partly 
out of ignorance. An example of the challenges facing the IP regime in Nigeria is the 
entertainment industry, popularly called Nollywood. Rated as the second largest film 
industry in the world in number of annual film productions, ranking ahead of the 
United States and only behind India, with over 200 home videos produced every month 
attracting billions of dollars of investment and revenue, protection against copying and 
infringement is very weak, almost non-existent.33 
Under international investment law statute books, IP rights are in law given high 
protection in sub-Saharan Africa. This probably as a result of the countries’ 
membership, including Nigeria, in the World Trade Organisation which places an 
obligation on them to do so under its Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights 
framework (TRIPS).34 It is, however, an open question as to whether these rights can 
find actual protection in the law courts due to the absence of political will on the part of 
Government to enforce them. 
                                                     
31 Intellectual Property Watch, http://www.ip-watch.org/2012/03/21/nigerian-courts-step-up-against-
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34 Adaralegbe, B., Foreign Private Participation in the Electricity Sector of Developing Countries: What 
Works? An Examination of Nigeria’s Reformed Electricity Sector, Journal of World Investment & Trade 
(Vol. 10, no. 2, April 2009) at 11. 
128 
 
4.2.1.2.2 Licences  
From the wording of the extant laws cited above,35 it is clear that physical properties 
(both moveable and immovable) enjoy protection of the rights in them. It is however 
important to establish whether intangible property rights such as shares and licences 
are protected by the legislation, for two reasons. Firstly, the regulatory instruments 
utilised by IRAs to bring providers of infrastructures and services within their 
regulatory control include the issuing of licences, permits or authorisations. It is 
therefore important to ascertain whether these rights acquired by licensees (for example 
a license to generate power or to operate a rail line) are protected. Secondly, as 
Adaralegbe36 posits, the international trend of the 1970s where countries expropriated 
foreign investments, has now given way to a more “subtle, indirect form, known as 
creeping expropriation” where a tenured licence given for the provision of an 
infrastructure or service is terminated before its expiration, leaving the going concern 
and the ownership of physical assets intact. It is therefore apt to establish whether rights 
acquired that are on an intangible nature such as licences come under the protection of 
the legal framework aforesaid. 
 Kolo argues that the termination of licences in Nigeria without due cause is a 
breach of Section 44 of the 1999 Constitution, maintaining that  the  concept of property, 
being dynamic,  includes both tangible and intangible properties such as shares, 
intellectual property licences, and contractual rights.37 However, Popoola38 takes an 
opposing position, arguing that intangible rights such as shares and licences are not 
protected under the 1999 Constitution. Popoola’s argument appears to stand on a faulty 
foundation being one that has been overtaken by the law.  The prevailing argument in 
                                                     
35 1999 Constitution, African Charter of Human and Peoples Rights (Ratification and Enforcement) Act 
Laws of the Federation 2004 and Nigerian Investment Promotion Commission (NIPC) Act. 
36 Adaralegbe, note 34. 
37 Kolo, A, Legal Issues Arising from the Termination of Oil Prospecting Licenses by Nigerian 
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the past had been that licences merely contained regulatory prescriptions expressed in 
contract form and of an impersonal nature, and thus did not create property rights. That 
position has now been overtaken by the view that holds that licences do create property 
rights.  It is now settled law that settled that licences create property rights.39 
 
Having considered the legal framework for property rights protection in Nigeria, 
this thesis concludes that even though the framework exists in the statute books, it is 
characterised by weak enforcement and is thus ineffective in protecting property rights. 
Global rankings40 on the protection of property rights derived from three international 
databanks and surveys and a review of literature on the legal protection of property 
rights confirm the above conclusion.  
4.2.2 Enablers to the Enforcement of Property Rights 
 
With the conclusion that Nigeria offers legal protection for private property rights, a 
brief discussion is undertaken on certain key enablers to the enforcement of the rights. 
These include legal frameworks for competition, weights, measures and standards and 
corporate governance. 
4.2.2.1  Competition  
A competition law regime is a set of rules, disciplines and judicial decisions relating to 
agreements either between firms that restrict competition or to the concentration or 
abuse of market power on the part of private firms.41  Competition among different 
players in the market is the “lifeblood of strong and effective markets"42 and is an 
                                                     
39 Daintith, T, Petroleum Licenses: A Comparative Introduction in Daintith, T (ed.) The Legal 
Character of Petroleum Licenses, 1981 The University of Dundee, Centre for Petroleum and Mineral Law 
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40 International Property Markets Scorecard of 2013, an initiative of the Centre for International Private 
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42 See UK government White Paper Productivity and Enterprise (Cm. 5233, July 2001), cited in Mark 
Furse, supra.  A contrast is usually drawn with the collapse of East European planned economies, and  
the corresponding prosperity of Western market economies. 
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essential element in the efficient working of markets.  It promotes efficiency, encourages 
innovation, improves quality,43  and widens choice by enabling consumers to buy the 
goods and services they want at the best possible price, reduces costs, and leads to 
lower prices of goods and services, thus contributing to national competitiveness.44 
The relevance of a competition law framework to the viability of IRAs lies in the 
fact that where competition exists in the provision of infrastructures and services, the 
market is widened, allowing for innovation and quality among players with the 
consumer getting the ultimate benefit. These aggregate to an IRA that is considered a 
market-creating, sustaining and stimulating one. It deploys all the necessary regulatory 
tools to tailor the behaviour of regulated firms to secure the best products and services 
at the best possible prices for consumers. The service providers themselves are then also 
able to recover their investments. In that way, everyone in the value chain is a winner.  
Even though Nigeria commenced a liberalisation and privatisation programme 
in the 1980s that witnessed the emergence of the private sector as an engine room of 
economic growth with the public sector taking a back seat, no competition law 
framework was instituted. This has led to major distortions in the market place. 
Innovation has been stifled and cartel-like tendencies such as price fixing, collusion, and 
monopolies abound.45 Evidence of these unwholesome manifestations is all too glaring 
with single companies dominating, controlling and restricting market entry in several 
                                                     
43Lahouel,M., and  Maskus, K.,   
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sectors of the economy such as cement, international air travel, sugar and flour, among 
others.46 
The absence of an overarching competition law framework for Nigeria has left the 
field open for monopolists to prowl. Thus IRAs, though set up in some of the 
infrastructure sectors, are handicapped in addressing the distortions. A robust 
competition law and regulatory framework is the tonic that would unleash the full 
potential of IRAs to correct the current market dis-equilibrium. 
  
4.2.2.2  Weights, Measures and Standards 
Weights, measures and standards are enforcement mechanisms encapsulated under the 
term legal metrology, which is the science of measurement that provides regulations for 
the control of measurements and measuring instruments. Interactions in the market 
place involving consumers, traders, government regulators and the industrial sector 
require accurate measurements. Weights and measures are central to a sustainable 
trading economy and the concept of buying and selling cannot exist without pre-settled 
weights, measures, and standards. These mechanisms work to ensure that all players in 
the market place have confidence in the system that ensures correct measures, fair play, 
and fair dealings among each other.47  
In the Nigerian context, the legal framework is made up of the Weights and 
Measures Act CAP W3LFN, 2004 (Formally Weights & Measures Act CAP 467LFN 
1999); Pre-Shipment Inspection of Export Act CAP P25 LFN, 2004; Weights and 
Measures Standardization of Indigenous Measures Regulations, 1992; and the Weights 
and Measures Fees Regulations. The legal framework empowers the implementation 
organ (Department of Weights and Measurement of the Federal Ministry of Industry, 
Trade and Investment) to certify and check the compliance of all measuring and 
                                                     
46Dimgba note 41; ibid.  
47 Weights And Measures Department of the Federal Ministry of Industry, Trade and Investment website 
accesed at 24/9/14 at 8.37pm. 
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weighing equipment in all sectors of the nation’s economy at the Federal, State, and 
Local government levels.  
Even though this legal and regulatory regime is on the statute books, 
implementation and enforcement observance are more in the breach. The reasons for 
this include widespread illiteracy and ignorance about the regime among the populace 
and the bureaucratic structure of the implementation that makes response time and 
effectiveness difficult.  
In addition, IRAs that are by law required to enforce these standards on 
providers of infrastructures and services do not have any interface with the enabling 
legislation to carry out that function. The extant legislation48 does not recognise the role 
of IRAs in regulating measures, weights and standards. Given the nature of the 
legislation therefore, there will be resistance from the department of government 
presently enforcing these standards in the vent that IRAs attempt to enforce them. This 
has led to a lack of clarity in the enforcement regime. The lack of effective regulation 
has opened the doors to several variations in the weights and measures used in 
different localities. These often lead to chaotic situations in the market place making 
otherwise seamless day-to-day transactions laborious, with the associated high 
transaction costs, thus hindering the pace of growth of trade and commerce. 
4.2.2.3  Corporate Governance 
Corporate governance is about the effective, transparent, and accountable governance 
of affairs of an organisation by its management and board of directors. It hinges on a 
clearly delineated process of directing and controlling the management of business 
entities based on principles of integrity, honesty, transparency, and accountability in 
order to satisfy the interests of all stakeholders.49 The growing consensus that good 
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corporate governance has a positive link to national economic growth and development 
underpins its relevance.50 
Where infrastructure service providers fail because of corporate governance 
infractions, it invariably has a negative bearing on the regulatory effectiveness of IRAs. 
Regulation has an oversight function of ensuring that regulated entities carry on 
business ethically and in terms of the licence conditions. Where a corporate governance 
regime is ineffective, it diminishes the space and legitimacy of the IRA regulating that 
particular sector.  
A survey by Nigeria’s Securities and Exchange Commission in 2003 showed that 
corporate governance institutionalisation is at a rudimentary stage; as only about 40% 
of quoted companies in Nigeria have recognised codes of corporate governance in 
place.51  
  In the recent past, government agencies have sought to institute corporate 
governance codes within their organisations. Idornigie discloses that there is a 
multiplicity of codes of corporate governance in Nigeria thus creating confusion and a 
lack of clarity in the market place.52 They include the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) 
Code, 2014; Nigerian Communications Commission Governance Code, 2014, National 
Insurance Commission (NAICOM) Code 2009; Pension Commission (PENCOM) Code 
2008; and the Securities and Exchange Commission Code, 2003. There are doubts as to 
the effectiveness of the country’s regulatory institutions to tackle corporate corruption 
and safeguard against the loss of investors’ wealth (particularly that of minority 
shareholders), because of the multiplicity of codes and their haphazard enforcement. 
The 2004 World Bank’s Report on the Observance of Standards and Codes in Nigerian 
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accounting and auditing practice revealed enormous institutional weaknesses in 
regulation, compliance, and enforcement.  
The conclusion by the 2004 World Bank Report validates the argument about the 
weak institutional capacity in the corporate governance regime in Nigeria and further 
strengthens the position of this thesis that the IRA model faces major challenges where 
companies are unable or unwilling to run entities ethically and professionally.53 
As a follow up to the discussion on the legal regime of property rights in Nigeria, 
this thesis shifts attention to a consideration of other important economic institutions 
that operate under the nomenclature of financial institutions. 
4.2.3  Financial Institutions  
An efficient and well-crafted financial system that is responsive to the financial needs of 
infrastructure service providers is a crucial ingredient in the provision of infrastructures 
and services that advances economic development.54 The role of IRAs only emerges 
when infrastructure service providers are active within an economic setting and this is 
more attainable where there is an available pool of resources from financial institutions 
for lending. It was the responsiveness of the robust financial system that propelled 
infrastructure service providers to build critical infrastructure and provide services that 
laid the foundation for regulation of utilities by IRAs in several countries including the 
US, Britain, Canada, Norway and Sweden.55 Sanusi, a past Governor of Nigeria’s 
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Central Bank likened financial institutions to “the central nervous system of a market 
economy.”56 
The different components that make up Nigeria’s financial system include banks, 
the capital market, finance companies, insurance companies, specialised banks, 
discount houses, bureau de change, mortgage institutions, microfinance banks, and 
development finance institutions. 
 Because of the global economic crisis, Nigeria’s financial system underwent 
systemic changes beginning in the 1980s. It moved from a closed system that was statist 
in structure and ownership to being almost wholly led by the private sector; and this 
affected the operational status of the component parts of the system in a fundamental 
way. In reaction, government undertook major structural reforms in the sector. Three 
pillars underpinned the reforms: reinforcing the quality of the institutions; establishing 
financial stability; and enabling healthy financial sector development that contributes to 
the real economy.57 
 Positive outcomes resulting from these reforms included the shoring up of the 
nation’s foreign reserves, the stabilising of inflation, and an average annual GDP 
growth of about 7.5%, making her one of the strongest economies in Africa and one of 
the fastest-growing in the world.58 The reforms significantly improved financial services 
delivery. Long queues in banking halls that were the norm before have given way to 
electronically based transactions. Bank branch networks have increased from 2500 in 
2005 to more than 5000 in mid-2009.59  
 A major milestone indicating the growth of the financial system was the 
mobilisation of over $1.8billion as acquisition capital loaned to core investors in the 
recent sale of 18 successor companies in 2013, unbundled under the privatisation of the 
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electric power sector. This single transaction, with proceeds exceeding $3billion dollars 
and dubbed the biggest ever privatization transaction in global history, demonstrated 
the potential that the financial sector, if properly deployed, can unleash on the nation’s 
economic horizon. 60 
Another major benefit of the reforms has been the granting of autonomy to the 
Central Bank of Nigeria. This step has been responsible for the very positive 
macroeconomic indicators evidenced by the lower fiscal and GDP ratio; a single digit 
inflation rate; higher level of external reserves; and higher GDP growth rate, among 
others.61  
Notwithstanding the rosy picture presented above, a close survey of the financial 
system betrays certain traits. Nigeria’s financial system is still in a rudimentary state, 
characterised by poor or in most cases the non-delivery of financial services at 
affordable costs to sections of the disadvantaged and low-income segments of society. 
In addition, the system is characterised by inefficiency, illiquidity, and a lack of 
transparency and accountability,62 displaying a clear lack of innovation and largely rent 
- seeking 63 in approach to business. For example, even though lending to the private 
sector has expanded in the recent past, it is still below average when compared with 
other emerging markets in Africa.64 Most financial institutions concentrate on lending to 
corporate players and multinationals in the market place, pushing aside the middle 
class, whose participation is essential for economic growth. The lure of pursuing 
government accounts as opposed to small, middle class accounts, supports the theory of 
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rent seeking65 that is endemic in the country. Approximately 56.9 million Nigerians, 
constituting 67.2% of the adult population have never banked66while the overall figure 
of Nigeria’s unbanked population currently stands at 46.3%.67  
Some of the challenges confronting the viability of the financial system include a 
weak and inefficient system of registering titles to land that constrains the ability of 
customers, especially the small ones and small and medium scale enterprises (SMEs), to 
access credit; and the absence of a credit registry or bureaux that has led to a dearth of 
reliable credit information on customers and borrowers. Another major deficiency in 
the system is the absence of venture capital constituting the start-up capital needed for 
micro and medium scale businesses. Venture capital, sometimes called “patient 
capital",68 is critical to SMEs as it provides financing to firms that are promising but are 
either too small or possess an inadequate financial or operating record of 
accomplishment to access capital from the financial system which may consider the 
ventures too risky. 
Given the importance of capital from financial institutions for the emergence of 
infrastructure service providers and its link with the emergence of IRAs, Nigeria’s 
challenges listed above constitute a major limitation for the viability of IRAs. 
4.2.3.1 Capital Market 
Another component of the financial system that is relevant to the smooth functioning of 
IRAs is the capital market.  Its primary role is to channel long-term financing to firms 
with relatively high and increasing productivity in order to enhance economic 
expansion and growth.69 The main article of trade is medium and long-term financial 
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instruments usually referred to as securities.70 The rate of economic growth of any 
nation is often linked to the sophistication of its capital market efficiency, among 
others.71 The capital market has two segments: primary and secondary. Issuing firms 
(usually called Issuing Houses) issue new securities in the primary market and receive 
the proceeds of the sale, while the secondary market provides a platform for the sale of 
existing securities by one investor to another investor. This avenue of available lending 
capital for infrastructure service providers also provides impetus for the emergence of 
IRAs, and its weakness has a corresponding impact on their emergence and viability. 
In spite of the capital market’s potential for cheap long terms funds, Nigerian 
banks presently provide 90% of the financial needs of firms72 thus downgrading the 
potential benefits of the former. The major challenge facing the capital market is its lack 
of depth when measured by market capitalisation, the total number of listed companies 
and the volume and value of traded stock. Foreign investors still dominate the market, 
though there is a gradual but slow entry of indigenous companies.73 Domestic interest 
in the capital market steadily climbed and was at an all-time high in the 2000s when, as 
a result of the global crisis of 2008, over 70% of the value of Nigerian stock was wiped 
out due to the flight of foreign investors. The capital market then went from being the 
best performing one in the world in 2007 to the worst in 2008.74 
Presently the capital market lacks depth with less than 10% of the quoted shares 
actively traded.75 The inclusion levels are very low with most of the high performing 
multinationals remaining outside. Furthermore, the listings on the market represent 
only 18% of the nation’s GDP.  
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4.3 Law Enforcement Institutions 
Law enforcement is at the heart of any just and normal functioning society. Without law 
enforcement, there would be anarchy. Law enforcement in broad terms refers to a 
system by which some members of society act in an organised manner to enforce the 
law, in order to discover, deter, rehabilitate, or punish persons who violate the rules 
and norms governing that society.76 It is only within the framework of law and order 
that there can be meaningful development that will trigger growth and development in 
a society both in the physical and economic sense.77 As Lagarde, the Chairperson of the 
IMF recently argued, a functioning society needs not just laws that are underpinned by 
an unwavering respect for the rule of law, but most importantly, the existence of strong 
law institutions that are capable of implementing and enforcing the law in accordance 
with its terms.78  
The significance of law and order to the organised development and growth of a 
society, both in the physical and economic sense, cannot be overstated. It is only in the 
presence of a personal peace of mind that one can meaningfully give attention to other 
issues such as economic development and societal growth.79 Furthermore, the basic 
selfish and self-centred nature of humans80 requires the constraining intervention of 
state law enforcement institutions to tailor human conduct towards the path of right 
and just. The place of safety of lives and property is central to the prosperity of 
capitalism as it seeks to protect and preserve the rights of individuals and all that they 
have acquired through their hard work.  
To understand the relevance and relationship of IRAs to law enforcement 
institutions it is important to note that IRAs have an array of tools available to them to 
enforce regulatory compliance with specified rules and regulations that grant entry to 
infrastructure service providers. One of such tools is the enforcement of its rules, 
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regulations, orders and rulings. However, since IRAs are not law enforcement agencies 
simpliciter, they require the services of law enforcement agencies, both in the detailed 
investigations and enforcement of their mandate, especially when faced with 
recalcitrant players in the regulated industry. Enforcement typically requires coercion, a 
component of enforcement that only law enforcement possesses.  
However, a discussion on the state of law enforcement institutions in Nigeria 
would be premature without commenting on the looming image and influence of 
corruption on them. The effectiveness of law enforcement institutions hinges on their 
responsiveness to the corroding effect of corruption within Nigeria’s body politic.  As a 
pointer, a recent poll carried out by NOIPolls, in collaboration with the Gallup Poll of 
USA, revealed that the Nigerian Police is the most corrupt public institution in 
Nigeria.81 The Nigerian Police Force is the face of law enforcement institutions in the 
country and the above assessment is an indication of the state of law enforcement 
institutions. An inquiry into their state will therefore throw light on their capacity to 
fulfil their mandates and further complement the IRAs in the enforcement of their 
regulatory powers.   
4.3.1 Corruption  
Khan82 defines corruption as an act that deviates from formal rules of conduct 
governing the actions of someone in a position of public authority for private gain. 
Lipset and Lenz83 on the other hand, view corruption as an effort to secure wealth or 
power through illegal means as private gain at public expense, or as misuse of public 
power for private benefit. The World Bank also views corruption in the same fashion by 
defining it as the abuse of public office for private gains.84  
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The challenge with the above definitions is that they betray an essential 
deficiency: the non-incorporation of corruption in the private spheres of human 
endeavours, mostly in the private sector of the market place. Corruption exists both in 
the public and private sectors and this ought to occupy our consideration in the light of 
the fact that IRAs regulate infrastructure providers in both the private and public 
sectors. Furthermore, given the elevation of the private sector to an engine room of 
growth in the Nigerian context, a definition that covers all the sectors will better cover 
the field and be all embracing.85  
The definition of corruption by the Asian Development Bank cures this 
deficiency.  The Bank considers corruption to be the abuse of public or private office for 
personal gain. This includes any behaviour in which people in the public or private 
sectors improperly and unlawfully enrich themselves or those close to them, or induce 
others to do so, by misusing their position.86 
4.3.2 Nigeria’s Corruption Indices 
The landscape of corruption in Nigeria is a nightmare of unbelievable proportions. The 
statistics are glaringly dismal. Twenty per cent of Nigeria’s GDP or about $149 billion is 
lost to corruption annually.87 Between 1960 and 1999, public officials plundered over 
220 billion pounds sterling or $380 billion88 an amount is six times more than the total 
amount the USA provided for the reconstruction of post-World War II Europe under 
the Marshall Plan.89 Transparency International 90(TI) has consistently ranked Nigeria 
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1.57pm; Cleen Foundation Monograph Series No. 7, Corruption and Governance Challenges in Nigeria, 2010 
86 Asian Development Bank, Anticorruption Policy, Institutional Document, July 1998 accessed on 
3/12/14 at 7.51am. http://www.adb.org/documents/anticorruption-policy. 
87Recovering African Wealth: Deterring Corruption and Financing Development, 1, Africa Tax Spotlight, 4, 2010 
in Cleen Foundation Monograph Series note 379 at 10. 
88African Abroad (1999) 24 June 1999, Ribadu,N., Corruption drains Africa of $140 bn annually, Punch 
Nigeria, 2007, www.efccnigeria.org; Human Rights Watch (HRW) (2007). “Chop Fine”, www.hrw.org 
both reproduced in Obuah, E.,  Combating Corruption in a “Failed” State: The Nigerian Economic and 
Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), Journal of Sustainable Development in Africa (Volume 12, No.1, 
2010).  
89 Ibid. 
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very low in its annual global corruption indices: in 2006, Nigeria was ranked 146 out of 
163 with a 2.2 corruption perception index (CPI) score while in 2007, it was ranked 148 
with a 2.2 score. According to TI, the low scores in the CPI is an indication that public 
institutions are deeply compromised. 
 Furthermore, TI noted that more than 50% of bribes were directly asked for while 
60% were offered to avoid problems with authorities. The most recent Rankings 
(Corruption Perceptions Index 2013) places Nigeria at 144th position out of 177 countries 
monitored scoring a meagre 25% out of 100. In 2001 alone, TI documented that Nigeria 
lost more than N23 billion to corruption.91 More than 40% of Nigerians interviewed 
indicated that they had offered a bribe to obtain access to a service they were ordinarily 
entitled to free of charge. Significantly, all the global surveys in the past 18 years in 
which Nigeria featured had her at the lowest rank in corruption indices.92 
From the depth of its pervasiveness and its audacity, it would appear that 
corruption has been legalised in Nigeria.93 It is both endemic and systemic94 permeating 
all the nooks and crannies of the country, infecting, polluting and affecting the three 
arms of the democratic governance structure, corroding the institutions responsible for 
the implementation and enforcement of laws and regulations. Corruption has turned 
Nigeria into a paradox: with so many endowments yet very little to show for it by way 
of socio-economic development as more than 60% of its population live below the 
poverty level.95 
 
                                                                                                                                                                           
90 Transparency International (TI), a Berlin-based nonprofit, non-governmental organization established 
in 1993 with one vision: a world in which government, business, civil society and the daily lives of people 
are free of corruption. 
91Salul, H. A. and Aremu, F. A., A Critical Analysis of the Anti-Corruption Crusade in Nigeria, 2004, Political 
Review, 3, 5. 
92Ajie and Wokekoro, note 82 at 98. 
93Gire, J.T., A Psychological Analysis of Corruption in Nigeria, Journal of Sustainable Development in Africa 
Vol 1 No. 2, Summer 1999 in Ajie, H. A. and Wokekoro, note 82 at 98 – 99. 
94Ajie and Wokekoro, note 82  at 98. 
95Moghalu, note 8 at 77. 
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4.3.2.1 Consequences of Corruption  
How does corruption negatively affect the developmental process of a nation? Are there 
any linkages between it and economic development and the vitality of IRAs? 
 The misappropriation and corrupt handling of public funds for private or 
unintended uses has a clear and direct effect on the amount of finances available for 
government to channel for developmental projects and services. Secondly, corruption 
inhibits the ability of governments to regulate the market effectively thus giving room 
for distortions in the market place and further polluting the decision-making processes 
of government officials. Thirdly, its distributive effect is very negative as it is inherently 
disadvantageous to the poor, thus increasing inequality by limiting access to beneficial 
government activities to an already privileged group.96 
 On a contemporary level, another set of consequences have been receiving 
attention from the global anti-corruption watchdog – Transparency International (TI). 
TI states that  “in low-income countries, rampant corruption jeopardises the global fight 
against poverty, threatening to derail the United Nations Millennium Development 
Goals.”97 As an example, countries that are corruption-prone have higher levels of 
maternal mortality and lower levels of education.98 
Given its pervasiveness and impact on law enforcement and other institutions, 
that has in turn undermined their capacity to support the IRAs in their enforcement 
mandate, this thesis will focus on some of the key agencies established primarily to 
tackle the menace and how they have fared. They include the Economic and Financial 
Crimes Commission (EFCC), the Independent Corrupt Practises and Other related 
Offences Commission (ICPC), as well as the Police.   
 
                                                     
96You, J,S., and Khagram, S., A Comparative Study in Inequality and Corruption, 70:1 American Sociological 
Review, 2005,  136-57.  
97 Trebilcock M.J., and Prado, M.M., An Advanced Introduction to Law and Development, Elgar Advanced 
Introductions, 2014, Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, INC, USA at 154. 
98 Garson, P., Push to Tackle Corruption in Post-2015 Agenda, 4 October 2013 in Trebilcock  and Prado Ibid, 
at 154. 
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4.3.3 The Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) 
At its establishment in 2004, the EFCC took the hydra-headed monster of corruption 
ravaging the country head-on. The initial zeal achieved some measure of success in the 
investigation, arrest and obtaining of some convictions in corruption cases.99  
Sadly, the momentum did not last and four years down the line, TI rankings 
showed a very disappointing performance in spite of the work of the anti-corruption 
agencies.100 As a result, Nigeria began another downward slide in the international 
rankings on its prosecution of the war against corruption.101  
 The loss of momentum and the slide into under-performance by the EFCC was a 
result of several factors that to date continue to weigh down the effectiveness of the 
Commission. These include the willingness of the leadership of the Commission to lend 
itself as a tool in the hands of the incumbent government to persecute perceived 
opposition members, thus undermining its impartiality though selective investigations;   
a lack of independent funding streams; and  ill-trained and ill-motivated staff, among 
others.102 
4.3.4 The Independent Corrupt Practises Commission (ICPC) 
The rationale behind the setting up of the ICPC was not different from that of EFCC as 
it was to complement the latter. According to Akanbi, the ICPC emerged as a policy 
                                                     
99 The Commission between May 2003 and June 2004 recovered money and assets derived from crime 
worth over $700 million. It also recovered another £3 million from the British Government. It has curbed 
oil bunkering in the Niger Delta Region. The initial daily illegal bunkering of about 300,000 - 500,000 
barrels has now substantially reduced to less than 50 thousand barrels. In addition they have arrested 
over 500 Advance fee fraud kingpins: Source: Being a paper presented at the Adamawa Economic 
Conference and Financial Exhibition, December 9-10, 2004 by Nuhu Ribadu. 
100 Nwagwu, E.J., An Appraisal Of Economic And Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) And The War Against 
Corruption In Nigeria (1999 – 2007), International Journal of Research in Arts and Social Sciences (IJRASS), 
http://www.academicexcellencesociety.com; US annual Humans Rights reports indicated that the EFCC 
did not perform well: http://internationalreporter.com/News-5335/africa-corruption-rating-nigeria-s-
worsens.htmln  2009. In 2010, London Metropolitan Police severed its relationship with the EFCC on 
account of low performance;  British’s Serious Organized Crimes Agency (SOCA) has reviewed its 
partnership with EFCC on poor performance. 
101 In 2004 Nigeria ranked 144, 146 in 2006, 148 in 2007 and slide to 144 in 2013: Source – Transparency 
International, http://www.transparency.org. 
102 Nigeria Watch Newspaper, Monday 6 October 2014; Report on BenchMarking Ant Corruption 
Initiatives in Africa, The African Institute of Corporate Citizenship (AICC), 
http://www.baacafrica.org/m/files/fs/aicc_anticorruption_report_en.pdf; Nwagwu, note 100. 
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response from the government to fight and curb corruption that had assumed 
monstrous proportions, and permeating all levels of the society and corroding its moral 
economic fabric, thus threatening its stability.103 The Commission launched ground-
breaking initiatives meant to tackle corruption in the public service.104 Sadly, the 
euphoria and initial bravado evaporated within two years as virtually all of the cases it 
had brought to court became politicised and stalled. Thus, even though the ICPC 
displayed the intent to prosecute, it appears the “Nigerian factor”105 and the decay in 
the judiciary limited its progress.106 
In addition, the performance of the ICPC was hampered by the perception in the 
eyes of the public that it was set up to weaken and distract the earlier anti-corruption 
body (the EFCC) which appeared at the beginning of its life to be vigorously fighting 
corruption. ICPC's manner of operations did not help matters as the depth and 
professionalism of its investigations and the filing of charges were called into question 
amidst allegations of underhand dealings, extortion, a lack of transparency and probity 
among its officer corps.107  
 The dismal performance of the anti-corruption agencies108 in curtailing 
corruption has reinforced the deficiency that the IRA model suffers from as these law 
enforcement agencies are by design primed to assist the IRAs in their enforcement 
mandate.  
                                                     
103Akanbi, M., 2005 in Raimi, L., et al, Role of Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) and 
Independent Corrupt Practices & Other Related Offences Commission (ICPC) at Ensuring Accountability and 
Corporate Governance in Nigeria, Journal of Business Administration and Education, Volume 3, Number 
2, 2013, 105-122. 
104 ICPC’s official website, available at http://www.icpcnigeria.com; This Day, Lagos. March 28, 2003 at 
1. 
105 The Nigerian Factor is an infamous terminology that has bedevilled contemporary Nigeria. It is the 
notion that anything and everything can happen at any time in this Nigeria: The Sun Newspaper, 
Nigeria, April 20, 2014.  
106Enweremadu, D.U., The struggle against Corruption in Nigeria: the Role of the National Anti-Corruption 
Commission (ICPC) under the Fourth Republic, IFRA Special Research Issue Vol. 2 at 41-66; Raimi note 103.  
107Ibid ; News Watch. Lagos. March 3, 2003 at  28. 
108Raimi, note 103; Enweremadu, note 106; Nwagwu, note 100. 
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4.3.5 The Police  
The Police Act governs the establishment, control, and management of the Nigeria 
Police Force.109 Section 4 states the role of the Police is the prevention and detection of 
crime, the apprehension of offenders and  the  preservation of law and order, the 
protection of life and property and the enforcement of all laws and regulations.110  
The long years of military rule in Nigeria affected the psyche of the Police.  The 
culture of impunity that is a product of militarisation and the hallmark of military 
regimes became ingrained in the police as a result. In the above context, the police as an 
institution transmuted itself from being a body set up for the protection and 
preservation of the common good of society to one manifesting many negative 
attributes. The police became a law unto themselves, brutalising, and maiming, killing 
and detaining persons arbitrarily, thus institutionalising repression111, with corruption 
and extortion becoming their byword.112 The reputation of the Police took a major 
battering after emerging as the most corrupt institution in Nigeria in the nation's 
Corruption Index in 2007.113 To cap it all, the public, whose protection is the primary 
responsibility of the police, have come to have a complete lack of trust in them,114 as 
typified by the derogatory reference to the fact that the police are not your friend.115  
 No economy develops in the midst of insecurity and the breakdown of law and 
order. When all of these occur within the background of fragile institutions charged 
with the maintenance of law and order, it raises major concerns. The deficiencies 
enumerated above in the institutional frameworks of law enforcement institutions that 
                                                     
109 Cap 359, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 1990. 
110 Akuul, T., The Role of The Nigerian Police Force in Maintaining Peace and Security in Nigeria, Journal of 
Social Science and Public Policy, Vo.3, March 2011. 
111Dauda, M., Commenting on the Helpless State of Police when Confronted with Armed Robbers. Tell 
Magazine May, 2008; Cleen Foundation,  Analysis Of Police and Policing In Nigeria, Justice Sector 
Reform , www.cleen.org at 13. 
112Alemika, E. E. O. and Chukwuma I.C., Police-Community Violence in Nigeria (Centre for Law 
Enforcement Education, Lagos and the National Human Rights Commission, Abuja, Nigeria), 2000. 
113Ajie and Wokekoro, note 82 at 99. 
114Alemika E. E., Policing and Perceptions of Police in Nigeria, 1998, Police Studies 11(4): 161-176. 
115Ajie  and Wokekoro, note 82.  
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are complementary to IRAs in the fulfilment of their enforcement mandate further 
reinforce the deficiency that the IRA model suffers.  
4.4 Capacity Building Institutions 
Capacity building has been defined as the “development of knowledge, skills and 
attitudes in individuals and groups of people relevant in design, development, 
management and maintenance of institutional and operational infrastructures and 
processes that are locally meaningful.”116 It includes activities, approaches, strategies, 
and methodologies which help organisations, groups and individuals to improve their 
performance; generate development benefits and achieve their objectives over time.117  
The above definitions highlight the importance of education in providing a 
platform for the acquisition of the skills that propel innovation and technology, and lift 
the fortunes of institutions and nations.118 In addition, Moghalu119 argues in his book 
that the face of the global economy has changed from one that was driven in the past by 
labour, costs, resource endowments, and infrastructure, to one now propelled by 
patents, innovation, research and development (R&D), and the availability of 
knowledge workers.120  
For Nigeria to aspire to be a knowledge-driven economy that is competitive, 
especially as it relates to the economy and particularly with relevance to IRAs, an array 
of skills, disciplines, and competencies needs incubating and nurturing. The key is in 
laboratories (universities, higher institutions, and research institutes) that understand 
the peculiar complexities of the local environment. 
                                                     
116 Definition adopted at the workshop on Capacity Building in Land Administration for Developing 
Countries, held at ITC, The Netherlands, November 2000 (Groot and van der Molen 2000). 
117 The World Bank, Capacity Building in Africa, An OED Evaluation of World Bank Support, 
www.worldbank.org/oed at 6. 
118 Twinney-Kamugisha, E., Why Africa Fails: The Case for Growth Before Democracy, Fafelberg, NB 
Publishers, Cape Town, RSA, www.tafelberg.com at 93. 
119Moghalu, note 8 in Chapter 9. 
120 Ducker, P., Lecture at the Edwin L. Godkin Lecture at Harvard University’s Kennedy School of 
Government in 1994 titled “Knowledge Work and Knowledge Society: The Social Transformations of this 
Century”. 
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Furthermore, regulation as a discipline requires a congregation of set skills and 
competencies in several disciplines and professions to allow an IRA to exist and 
function optimally. Disciplines such as accounting, law, economics, finance, criminal 
justice, social sciences, and engineering have to populate an IRA for it to be worth its 
name. 
However, Nigeria’s educational system is presently at the crossroads at all levels; 
be it the primary, secondary, tertiary and university levels or research centres. The 
problems facing education include the structure of the education system, access, 
quality, curriculum and funding.121 Even though the 1999 Constitution provides free, 
compulsory and universal primary education, free university education and a free adult 
literacy programme, 122over 10 million children of primary school age are out of 
school.123 There is an acute shortage of qualified teaching staff in Nigerian universities 
and research institutions.124 This has led to a decline in the quality of graduates because 
of obsolete research facilities, especially in the public institutions. In a recent global 
ranking, no Nigerian university is listed among the world's best 6000 universities. Even 
among the first 100 universities in Africa, it was unflattering to learn that the leading 
Nigerian university could only manage the 44th position.125 
The lack of capacity-building institutions within Nigeria evidences itself in the 
limited capacity of regulatory IRAs in existence. The challenge of limited capacity 
occupied much of Lafont's later writings, where he advocated the need for a separate 
theory explicitly recognising this lack.126 This lack prevents IRAs from employing 
suitably qualified staff, a task made even harder by the absence of suitably qualified 
professionals in fields that strengthen regulatory capacity such as law, accounting, 
                                                     
121Moghalu, note 8. 
122Section 18 of 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. 
123Moghalu, note 8. 
124 Ibid; Olugbile, S., and Alechenu,J., More Universities Amidst Poor Facilities in Existing Institutions, The 
Punch Newspaper, Nigeria, January 15, 2013.  
125Oyebode, A., Positioning Nigeria For The Top 20 Economies - The Role Of Institutions, paper presented at 
the 13th Annual Nigerian Economic Summit (NES#13), held at Transcorp Hilton Hotel, Abuja, September 
5-7, 2007. 
126 Laffont , J.J., Regulation and Development , Cambridge University Press, 2005. 
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economics, and management. Even though most of the IRAs in existence127 in Nigeria 
have copious provisions detailing the intents of financial independence and 
independent funding streams that could enable them to employ and retain qualified 
work force, the objective has not been realised. In certain instances, government 
deliberately withholds funding as a means of undermining and dictating to the IRAs.128 
Pollitt and Stern provide strong evidence to show that there are human resource 
constraints in developing countries, which limit the scale, scope, and potential 
effectiveness of electricity and energy regulators. This could well apply to the regulators 
of other utilities across the board in developing countries.129  
4.5 Conclusion  
Chapters 3 and 4 have underlined the primacy of institutions to economic growth and 
their centrality in the effective functioning of the IRA model of regulatory governance. 
In addition, the chapters paint a picture of the state of these institutions. In the process, 
the thesis has established that the IRA model is in all probability doomed to fail within 
the Nigerian context because of intemperate institutional fragilities among its political, 
economic, law enforcement and supporting institutions. Ten basic considerations 
support this proposition. 
First, the unrelenting weakness and instability of institutional and governance 
arrangements are hostile to the successful establishment of IRAs.  Institutions, though in 
existence, are fragile and weak. Weak structures need fresh foundations or 
reinforcement in some cases to be effective. Attempts at forcing them to stand or 
                                                     
127 Section 17, Nigerian Communications Act, 2013 and Section 52, of the Electric Power Sector Reform 
Act, 2005 both have similar provisions detailing independent funding sources outside government 
sources in order to secure their independence. It is only NCC that has been able to utilize these streams 
robustly to make themselves independent of government financially.  
128 Wren-Lewis, L., Regulation of Utilities in Developing Countries, a Thesis submitted for the degree of 
D.Phil in Economics, Trinity Term, 2010. 
129 Pollitt, M.G., and Stern J., Human Resource Constraints for Electricity Regulation in Developing Countries: 
Has anything Changed?, EPRG Working Paper, EPRG 0910, Cambridge Working Paper in Economics, 
CWPE, 0914. 
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building floors on them or surrounding them with supposedly supporting structures 
would only weaken and ultimately collapse the main structure. 
Two, the nascent nature of these institutions calls for caution in propping them 
up to fulfil a mandate that they are either  inexperienced or too fragile to carry out. 
Administrative systems in institutions involve complex institutional technologies that 
require time to evolve. Nigeria is on the threshold of this process and time is required 
for these administrative mechanisms to take root and thrive. Thrusting the model upon 
her without mature institutions will not position the country to function effectively in 
an “adult” global village characterised by globalisation. 
Three, the overarching influence of corruption in, within and around the weak 
and nascent institutions sets them up for failure from the outset. The permeating role of 
corruption in each of the institutional frameworks corrodes and weakens an already 
weakened setup. Addressing this scourge in a fundamental way as a first step is the 
only way of dealing with it from the roots. 
Four, the active presence of strong men in power, over and above the place of 
strong institutions, is contrary to the admonition of President Obama 130 for strong 
institutions instead of strong men. A strongman straddles the environment in an 
arbitrary manner, trampling on rights of individuals and restricting them, thereby 
appropriating the powers of institutions. The long history of military rule raised a 
nation of strong men, ruling by force thus inadvertently validating an insidious culture 
of “might is right” in the psyche of the nation. Democratic, political, and economic 
institutions gave way to a concentration of power into the hands of strong men who 
rule over a weak state.  
Five, the litany of ill -prepared, opportunistic and accidental leaders in the 
nation's body politic makes a case for a leadership evaluation and adjustments before 
                                                     
130  President Barack Obama addressing the Ghanaian Parliament was quoted to state "Africa doesn't 
need strongmen, it needs strong institutions". BBC News, 11 July 2009 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8145762.stm. 
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the IRA model can thrive. Because of the accidental and ill-prepared nature of all of 
Nigeria’s leaders since independence, they have tended to be predatory in their 
attitudes to governance; riding rough shod over institutions and laws, having risen to 
power without any template or agenda for sustainable development.   
Six, the vesting of overwhelming and lopsided powers in the Presidency has led 
to a patrimonial society in which narrow considerations come into play outside the 
confines of organised systems and institutions in statecraft. It has worked to prevent 
institutions from growing to maturity. Since absolute power flows from one leader, the 
absolute power wielded by the President has become the hallmark of the Presidency, 
corrupting all the streams of the democratic tripod, riding over the legislature and 
polluting the streams of justice in the judicial arm of government. 
Seven, the reluctance or unwillingness of the political class to reform, even in the 
face of manifest distortions of the democratic ideal as contained in the 1999 
Constitution, calls for caution in transplanting the IRA just yet. Economic institutions 
that are necessary for economic growth draw their life, strength, and jurisdictional 
powers from the political class. No matter how willing the economic players are in 
reforming their acts, they could only do so within the ring-fenced powers given them 
by the political class. This incorrigibility of the political class does not leave room for 
reason to cheer and to expect the ascension of institutional agility. 
Eight, the high level of insecurity does not augur well for the existence and 
growth of institutions, especially given the structural weaknesses of law enforcement 
institutions. Sub-parts of the federation do not exist as a part of the writ of the union 
because of insurgency. This breeds uncertainty and private investment shies away from 
uncertain terrains. 
Nine, the abysmal nature of capacity-building institutions that would provide 
the feedstock of human capital for the institutions is glaringly lacking. Calibrating and 
galvanising human capital in critical areas and professions provides institutions with 
continuity, capacity, knowledge, and tools to nurture institutions towards excellence. 
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The state of education, learning, and research continues to dip with the attendant 
dearth of qualified professionals to drive institutional growth and innovation.  
Ten, the institutional weaknesses in Nigeria's economy and political space have 
led to one major downside with economic and political implications. The informal 
economic sector dwarfs the formal sector in Nigeria, standing at 59% of the overall 
economy. The dominance of informality in the country’s economic sphere has led to 
excessive transaction costs, corruption in areas such as business incorporation, granting 
of licences and permits, and titles to land. These weaknesses invariably squeeze the 
minor business people out of the informal economy to the informal sector thereby 
reducing the jurisdictional space that IRAs would have been regulating had there be 
formality in place. The result has therefore been that the existing IRAs in Nigeria 
regulate a depleted market owing to the high levels of informality. Most of the 
infrastructure sectors are dominated by players on the fringes or outside the regulatory 
control of IRAs because of this informality.  
In Nigeria, the state and quality of institutions critical to the socio-economic well-
being of the nation and the proper functioning of IRAs have been synonymous with the 
sad national experience. Even though there has been repeated talk of Nigeria as a nation 
of great potential, it has continued to remain a potential, without actually realising it.  
The road that the political, economic, legal, supporting, and capacity-building 
institutions in Nigeria have trodden since independence has been symbolic of the 
tortuous road the nation state itself has taken. Transplanting a new regulatory model in 
the form of IRAs into such hard soil calls for nothing short of a miracle for it to thrive 
and it would be more realistic to deconstruct the likely outcomes of such 
transplantation to one of certain failure.  
In a further bid to explore the viability of IRAs in the Nigerian context, Chapter 5 
will seek to counterbalance its essential attributes against the rule of law concept in 
theory and practice in Nigeria. This will allow for an inquiry into the presence and 
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effective functioning of a rule of law regime in Nigeria, the kind that would nurture and 
support the IRA model. 
 
154 
 
CHAPTER 5 
RULE OF LAW 
5.1  Introduction 
Chapters 3 and 4 analysed the state of Nigeria’s political, economic and other 
supporting institutions, their limitations, and how these impact negatively on the 
prospects for success of the IRA model in Nigeria.  In addition to the institutional 
deficits, IRAs require an environment where the rule of law prevails. Given the need for 
the enforcement of property and contract rights under the law before an arbiter that is 
independent of the other arms of government and other players in the value chain, the 
observance of the rule of law is essential. This chapter will weigh the conceptual 
attributes of rule of law concept against what is in practice in Nigeria. This will allow 
for an inquiry into whether the Nigerian state of affairs can nurture the IRA model.  
5.2  Theoretical Framework  
Professor A. V. Dicey is credited with the first attempt at a precise delineation of the 
contours of the rule of law concept in his lecture on English Law at the University of 
Oxford in 1885.1 Dicey framed the concept into three essential elements. First, the 
absolute supremacy of regular law as against the influence of arbitrary or discretional 
powers on the part of government: “Englishmen are ruled by the law and the law alone; 
a man may with us be punished for the breach of the law but he can be punished for 
nothing else.” Second, equality before the law, or the equal subjection of all classes of 
persons to the ordinary law of the land administered by the ordinary law courts: this 
means that any person irrespective of status in life or circumstances of birth is subject to 
the ordinary law of the land. Third, individual rights must be respected.2 
                                                     
1 Dicey, A.V., The Law of the Constitution, (10th Ed.), London: Macmillan Press at 186. 
2 Ibid. 
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Other scholars3 agree with Dicey’s formulation, summarising it to mean equality 
before the law, pronouncing the law to be no respecter of anyone or any institution and 
that governance must be in accordance with the law and not by the whims and caprices 
of any person. In the immortal words of Montesquieu, “law should be like death, which 
spares no one.”4 
 From these humble postulations, the rule of law concept became a universal 
concept; acknowledged, recommended and insisted upon by nations, international 
bodies, and organisations. The United Nations sees the promotion of the rule of law to 
be at the heart of its global mission. The concept is embedded in the Charter of the 
United Nations.5 In addition, the International Commission of Jurists along with the 
World Justice Project have, on at least three occasions, emphasised the importance of 
the concept, urging nations to follow its essential characteristics..6   
5.2.1  Linkages between the Rule of Law and Economic     
  Development  
The primary link between the rule of law and economic development is through 
its impact on the system of private property and its enforcement. The confidence that 
comes from the knowledge that one can possess and enjoy without hindrance, undue or 
arbitrary abridgment, the fruit of one’s labours  incentivises the owner towards 
innovation and wealth gathering. The rule of law ensures that this right exists and is 
secured. 
                                                     
3 Goodhart, A., The Rule of Law and Absolute Sovereignty, in Nwoke, F.C., The Rule of Law and 
Constitutionalism in Nigeria in Rule of Law and Good Governance, eds, Azinge, E. and Owasanoye,B., 
Nigerian Institute of Advanced Legal  Studies, 2009 at 4; De Smith; Constitutional and Administrative Law, 
3rd Edition, Penguin, London, 1978 at 35; Wade in Akanbi, M.M., Rule of Law in Nigeria, Journal of Law, 
Policy and Globalisation, Vol. 3, 2012; Ojo, A., Constitutional Law and Military Rule in Nigeria, Ibadan: 
Evans Publishers, 1987 at 241; The Proclamations, (1610) 77 ER 1352. 
4 Montesquieu, B., The Spirit of the Laws, 1748,ed., Anne M. Cohler, Basis Carolyn Miller and Harold 
Samuel Stone, Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought, Cambridge UP, 1989. 
5 Report of the Secretary-General on the  Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict 
Societies (S/2004/616) accessed on 7/11/14 at 8.45am from http://www.un.org/en/ruleoflaw/. 
6 Athens Conference of 1955; Lagos Conference of the Commission of 1965;  and Delhi Conference in 
Akanbi, note 3; World Justice Project, http://worldjusticeproject.org/what-rule-law. 
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The rule of law, even though an old legal concept, became a catch-phrase in the 
world of economics only recently. It became a major fascination for economists in the 
1980s because of the crumbling of the “Washington Consensus” theory which held that 
the best way for countries to grow their economies was to get the policies right. In a bid 
to identify the reasons for the invalidation of the earlier theory, economists concluded 
that getting the institutional frameworks right, with the rule of law at their centre, was 
the way out of the quagmire. They reasoned that if the rules of the game were not in 
order, no amount of tinkering with macroeconomic policy would produce the desired 
results.7 
Proponents of the view that the rule of law or law generally has a positive impact 
on development have in the recent past drowned out the voices of dissent through what 
Trebilcock and Prado refer to as “extremely bold claims about the potential impact of 
legal reforms.”8  As an example, De Soto, in his book, The Other Path opines that the 
nature of the legal system explains the disparities in development between 
industrialised nations and the others and considers the “law is the most useful and 
deliberate instrument of change available to man”.9 
 
Nobel Prize winning economist Stiglitz, in The Price of Inequality, explains the 
interface between the rule of law and economic prosperity.10 To him, in every society, 
what one person does may harm, or benefit, others. This is what economists refer to as 
the effect of externalities. When those who injure others do not have to bear the due 
consequences of their actions, they will have inadequate incentives not to injure them, 
and may not take precautions to avoid the attendant risks of injury, bearing in mind the 
lack of consequences. Thus, what the rule of law does is to have a series of laws and 
                                                     
7 The Economist, Order in the Jungle, Mar 13th 2008. 
8 Trebilcock M.J., and Prado, M.M., An Advanced Introduction to Law and Development, Elgar Advanced 
Introductions, 2014, Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, INC, USA at 47. 
9 De Soto, H.H., The Other Path: The invisible Revolution in the Third World, New York, NY:Basic Books, 
1989 at 185 and 187 in Trebilcock M.J., and Prado, M.M., An Advanced Introduction to Law and Development, 
Elgar Advanced Introductions, 2014, Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, INC, USA at 48. 
10 Stiglitz, J.E., The Price of Inequality, Penguin Books,2013, London at 235-236. 
157 
 
regulations to provide incentives for everyone to avoid injuries to others, be it to their 
person, property, health and the public goods that they enjoy. 
With the above background, the link between the rule of law and IRAs becomes 
clear and is brought to the fore in the following ways. 
 For regulation through IRAs to thrive, certainty in law and its enforcement in a 
given legal and regulatory framework is required. When absent, long term planning 
and the accompanying investments are inhibited. Where sole discretion rules, investors, 
rather than looking at the predetermined rules in place for investment, look to the 
mindset, likely thought processes and nuances of the leader as a barometer whether to 
invest or not. Pre-set rules, undergirded by a rule of law regime for governing people in 
such a way that their private property is adequately protected, invariably has a strong 
influence on peoples’ investment decisions and  promotes overall economic growth.  
Rule of law forms the bedrock of the capacity of a nation to enforce contracts. 
Without a virile contract enforcement regime, IRAs cannot exist or be effective. The 
ability to make and enforce contracts and resolve disputes is fundamentally linked to 
the optimal functioning of markets. All entrants into regulated infrastructures must be 
able to see the IRA as possessing a predictable arsenal to prescribe the rules and see to 
their enforcement without external interventions and influences. Good enforcement 
procedures enhance predictability in commercial transactions and reduce uncertainty 
by assuring investors that their contractual rights will be upheld. 
 When laws, rules and procedures, encapsulated under a nation's rule of law 
regime for enforcing commercial transactions, are bureaucratic and cumbersome or 
when contractual disputes cannot be resolved in a timely and cost-effective manner, 
economies rely on less efficient commercial practices. This in turn, weakens and 
undermines the legitimacy and effectiveness of IRAs. The combined effect then 
dampens economic growth. Traders turn to personal and family contacts; banks reduce 
the amount of lending because they cannot be assured of the ability to collect  debts or 
obtain control of property pledged as collateral to secure loans; and transactions tend to 
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be conducted on a cash-only basis. This limits the funding available for business 
expansion and slows down trade, investment, economic growth, and development.11 
The absence of the rule of law within an economic setting has a negative impact 
on the functioning of an economy as it shrinks instead of increasing it. IRAs serve as a 
stimulant to private sector entry and participation in infrastructure provision and 
services as a result of the assurances they offer by way of cost recovery with profits. 
Where there is a weak rule of law regime, it limits private sector participation as the 
assurance given by the existence of IRAs is missing.  
Furthermore, the existence of IRAs where the rule of law does exist serves as a 
regulator of state power12, arbitrating, balancing, checking and controlling the different 
manifestations of power within the political system. Law then serves as an umpire, 
working to ensure that every arm of government keeps within the limits of its 
jurisdiction and none over-reaches its role at the expense of the other. This role is 
undertaken by IRAs that already possess powers to act within their delegated legal and 
regulatory framework.  
 In conclusion, IRAs operating within the framework of a rule of law regime form 
perhaps, the most essential of the tools needed in achieving economic prosperity. Given 
that they two cohabit to secure and protect investments, and ensure the efficient 
workings of the market exchange system, thus ensuring productivity.13 In a sense 
therefore, they act as twins to deliver economic prosperity in a nation’s economic 
setting. 
 
                                                     
11 OECD Toolkit, Contract enforcement and dispute resolution, 
http://www.oecd.org/investment/toolkit/policyareas/investmentpolicy/contractenforcementanddispu
teresolution.htm. 
12 Corder, H., Prisoner, Partisan and Patriarch: Transforming the Law in South Africa, 1985- 2000, 118 S. 
African L.J. 772 2001 at 776. 
13 Ibid.  
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5.2.2  Rule of Law, Economic Development and China: A Case    
  Study in Contradictions which Proves the Point  
With the conclusion above that the presence and effective functioning of a rule of law 
regime is a prerequisite for economic growth, how and where can China be placed? 
China is the fastest growing economy in the world predicted to surpass the size of the 
U.S. economy in the second decade of this century, emerging as the largest in the 
world.14 It has already overtaken Japan as the second largest economy in 2011.  China 
has over $3.2 trillion in foreign reserves, making it the country with the highest levels of 
foreign reserves in the world.15In spite of this rosy economic picture, adherence to the 
rule of law very weak and mimics, at best, the globally established benchmarks for the 
concept.16  
 One group of scholars, Allen, Qian and Qian reached the conclusion that 
the economic growth indices of China is a counter-example to the findings in the 
literature on law, institutions, finance, and growth that institutions (including the rule 
of law) matter to development.17  
 On the opposite side of the table are scholars who caution against the trend of 
predicting that the Chinese economy is booming and on its way to developed country 
economic status. Leading this group is Kenneth Dam18 at the Law School and the 
University of Chicago. Others include the World Bank19, Cooper,20 Wolf,21 Young22 and 
                                                     
14 Dam, K., China As a Test Case: Is the Rule of Law Essential for Economic Growth? John M. Olim Law and 
Economics Working Paper No. 275, 2D Series, January 2006. 
15 Moghalu, C.K., Emerging Africa, How the Global Economy of the ‘Last Frontier’ can prosper and matter, 
Penguin Books, London, 2014 at 353. 
16 Peerenboom, R., China's Long March toward Rule of Law, Cambridge University Press, 2002; Trebilcock 
M.J., and Prado, M.M., An Advanced Introduction to Law and Development, Elgar Advanced Introductions, 
2014, Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, INC, USA.  
17 Allen, F., et al, Law, Finance and Economic Growth in China, Financial Institutions Centre Working Paper 
01-44. 
18 Dam, note 14. 
19 Statement of Albert Keidel. In Transcript of an IMF Economic Forum, China In The Global Economy: 
Prospects and Challenges. Washington D.C. October 19, 2004. Available at 
(http://www.imf.org/external/np/tr/2004/tr041019.htm). 
20 Statement of Richard N. Cooper, Mauritis C. Boas Professor of Economics, Harvard University. In 
Compilation of Hearings Held Before the U.S.-China Security Review Commission. 107th Congress, First 
and Second Sessions. p. 788 (2002). 
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the Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development. (OECD).23 The basis of 
the caution rests on two arguments: 
 
 Firstly, the scholars posit that an analysis of the data supplied by the Chinese 
government and sourced alternatively by the World Bank shows that the Chinese 
economy is not doing well in terms of per capita income. When compared with the 
economies of other developing countries that are considered behind China in 
developmental indices, such as Mexico, South Korea, Taiwan, China's per capita income 
performance is abysmally low.24 This invariably leads to the conclusion that the 
performance of the Chinese economy is exaggerated. 
 
 Secondly, the scholars point to a 1994 World Bank Report25 which indicates 
inherently unreliable data recording that China uses that tend to show a picture in 
favour of growth.26 
 
 On a close consideration of these two opposing viewpoints, this thesis argues 
that the central role played by the rule of law regime in a nation's economic fortunes 
cannot be downplayed as unimportant in the context of China. Three reasons support 
this position: 
 
 First, private capital abhors uncertainty in the market place.27 Unlike the public 
sector that invests without consideration of recovery of investments, the private sector 
                                                                                                                                                                           
21 Wolf, M., China Has Further to Grow to Catch Up with the World,  Financial Times. April 13, 2005 at 19. 
22 Young, A.,Gold into Base Metals: Productivity Growth in the People’s Republic of China during the Reform 
Period, 2003,  Journal of Political Economy 111(6): 1220–1261. 
23 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2005b,  Governance in China. Paris. 
OECD. 
24 Dam, note 14. 
25 World Bank, 1994. China: GNP per Capita. Report No. 13580-CHA. December 15, 1994 at v. 
26 World Bank, 1994. China: GNP per Capita. Report No. 13580-CHA. December 15, 1994 at v-vi; 
Statement of Richard N. Cooper, Mauritis C. Boas Professor of Economics, Harvard University in 
Compilation of Hearings Held Before the U.S.-China Security Review Commission. 107th Congress, First 
and Second Sessions at 788 (2002). 
161 
 
invests with the aim of recovering its investment in addition to a return thereon in 
profits. Thus, an investment climate like the Chinese one that does not offer credible 
commitments, guarantees, or assurances that investments will be recoverable through 
an effective rule of law regime, would not be sustainable from a private sector 
viewpoint.  
 
 Second, Dam posits that China recognises the importance of the rule of law to 
sustainable economic development. What the government has been doing is what Dam 
refers to as “feeling their way for stones on the way across the river to development”28 
noting that political, ideological, and especially bureaucratic obstacles had to be 
overcome, circumvented, or sometimes perhaps simply out-waited before reforms 
could take place.  
 
 Third, a recent work that reviewed the economic history of a number of 
developing countries revealed two relevant conclusions that affect the relevance of the 
rule of law regime in the case of China. While igniting economic growth does not 
necessarily require extensive institutional reform, sustaining growth after it is 
stimulated requires stronger institutions. This appears to be where China stands now in 
history.29 When China commenced economic reforms towards private sector 
participation, they did not need the faithful implementation of the rule of law tenets. 
However, now that there is the need for sustainability, China needs the rule of law.30 
Having concluded that rule of law is essential to the economic well-being of 
every nation; this thesis will now examine the application of the rule of law concept in 
Nigeria episodically between the military and civil administration eras.  
                                                                                                                                                                           
27 Bloomberg,  February 11, 2009, 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aqniLw1uyhDI&refer=home. 
28 Shirk, S.L. The Political Logic of Economic Reform in China, 1993, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of 
California Press; Baum, R., Burying Mao: Chinese Politics in the Age of Deng Xiaoping, 1994,  Princeton: 
Princeton University Press. 
29 Rodrik, D., Growth Strategies, Working Paper 10050, 2003, National Bureau of Economic Research 
30 Raulli, D., Why is the Rule of Law in China Unsuccessful?, The Holodomor, 
https://www.hamilton.edu/levitt/insights...journal/danielle-rauilli-article. 
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5.3  The Rule of Law under Military Regimes  
The military have ruled Nigeria for just over half of its life as an independent nation. 
How has the concept of the rule of law fared during these periods, in the light of its 
central role in the existence and functioning of the IRA model of regulatory 
governance?  
Even though there have been seven different military regimes headed by eight 
heads of state, our consideration of these regimes will be under one heading. This is 
because all the military regimes share commonalities. These include the mode of 
assumption of power, the method of acquiring legitimacy, the instruments employed to 
rule, and the outcomes of the regimes by way of their impact on governance and 
development.  
This thesis adopts as a guide the principles underlying the nine factors 
developed by the World Justice Project (WJP)31 out of the WJP Rule of Law Index, which 
measures how the rule of law is experienced by ordinary people in 99 countries around 
the globe. These principles are  Constraints on Government Powers, Absence of 
Corruption, Open Government, Fundamental Rights, Order and Security, Regulatory 
Enforcement, Civil Justice, Criminal Justice, and Informal Justice. 
5.3.1  Governance Modus Operandi 
All the military regimes assumed power through the instrument of force, or in the 
words of Akanbi “through the barrel of the gun as against the ballot box.”32 They took 
over the reins of power by virtue of the monopoly on legitimate violence 33 or 
superiority of the coercive instruments available to them. They did not seek the 
                                                     
31 World Justice Project, note 6. 
32 Akanbi, note 3 at 3. 
33 Weber,M, Politics as a Vocation,  1946,  in From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, translated and edited 
by H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, New York: Oxford University Press. The monopoly on legitimate 
violence theory is the definition of the state expounded by Max Weber in Politics as a Vocation, which has 
been predominant in philosophy of law and political philosophy in the twentieth century. It defines a 
single entity, the state, exercising authority on violence over a given territory, as territory was also 
deemed by Weber to be a characteristic of state. Importantly, such a monopoly must occur via a process 
of legitimating, wherein a claim is laid to legitimise the state's use of violence. 
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mandate of the governed before taking over power. That established, it could be said 
that they possessed no popular mandate, nor were they answerable to anyone but 
themselves. 
On assuming power, all the military regimes exhibited similar characteristics that 
lent themselves to the same legal and constitutional interrogation.  The architecture of 
the regimes all bore distinctive features that included usurpation of Constitutionalism 
and legality, abridgement of separation of powers doctrine, ouster clauses, fundamental 
human rights infringements, ouster clauses, creation of special courts and tribunals, 
reign of discretion; closed system of government, retroactivity of laws, and 
personification of law by the military rulers. 
5.3.2  Usurpation of Constitutionalism and Legality 
Even though the military regimes took over power through channels not recognized by 
law, each as a very first step sought to acquire legitimacy through legality. They did this 
by pledging at the altar of the rule of law that the affairs of government would be 
conducted within the confines of the law. They all proclaimed the rule of law as the 
cornerstone of their administrations.34 For example, the Buhari/Idiagbon military 
regime (1984 - 1985), thought to be the most brutal of military regimes Nigeria has 
known, gave a welcome embrace to the rule of law when it took over power. The 
regime's second in command was quoted to have said “… stable government is 
absolutely impossible anywhere in the world if the governed are denied their rights and 
they have nowhere else to seek redress.”35   
As if on cue, the next steps taken by each of the military regimes were the 
suspension, modification and the re-enacting of the Constitution as a military decree, 
thus supplanting it with a caricature that contained a set of “allowed” rights and 
subordinating the whole document to the whims and caprices of the military regime.36 
                                                     
34 Agbaje, F., The Rule of Law and the Third Republic, In Fundamental Legal Issues in Nigeria., 1995, 
N.L.R.ED. P Series No. 1), 45. 
35 Ibid.  
36 Mowoe, K.M., Constitutional Law in Nigeria, Malthouse Press Limited, 2008.  
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For example, in the first military intervention, the Constitution (Suspension and 
Modification) Decree No 1 of 1966 did three things in one fell swoop: it suspended the 
1963 Constitution, modified it, and then re-enacted it. All the subsequent military 
regimes took that route to gain legality and legitimacy.37 
The Republican Constitution of 1963 was the supreme law of the land prior to 
January 16th, 1966. It had the ultimate stamp of authority because it was superior to any 
other law and binding on all authorities and persons.38 In spite of this clear stamp of 
authority and finality, when the military took over power in 1966, some parts of the 
1963 Republican Constitution were either suspended or modified by the Constitution 
(Suspension and Modification) Decree No. 1 1966. The Decree became the supreme law 
of the land and overrode every piece of legislation which was inconsistent with it, 
including the Constitution. Decree No. 1 of 1966 had some important provisions, among 
which a provision that subordinated all the unsuspended parts of the Constitutions to 
the military decree:  “Provided that this Constitution (the Federal Constitution, 1963) 
shall not prevail over a Decree, and nothing in this Constitution shall render any 
provision of a Decree void to any extent whatsoever.”39 
 The above provision which was replicated in all the subsequent military regimes’ 
decrees was ironic: even though their assumption of power was through an illegitimate 
and unlawful path, they all sought to be on the right side of the rule of law. 
5.3.3  Abridgement of Separation of Powers Doctrine 
History has repeatedly shown that unlimited power in the hands of one person or 
group in most cases leads to the suppression or curtailment of the rights of others. The 
                                                     
37 Bello, A.A., Kelson  and the Theory of Revolutions: A Look at the Legality of Military Administrations in 
Nigeria, 2008,  Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1121322 or 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1121322.  
38 Section 1. 
39 Section 1(2). 
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separation of powers doctrine in a democracy aims to prevent abuse of power and to 
safeguard freedom for all.40  
The first casualty of military rule has always been the separation of powers 
concept, in the fusion of law making and execution powers into one arm of government.  
On assumption of power, each of the military regimes collapsed law making and 
executive functions into one entity which they superintended at both the Federal and 
State levels. At the Federal level, military ruling authorities appropriated to themselves 
the dual roles of legislation and execution. Unlike in a democratic setting, where laws 
go through a legislative process anchored by the legislative arm and culminate in the 
executive giving assent to it to become law, the process is truncated by fusing the two 
roles into one and  domiciling it in the military ruling body. With this, the robustness of 
a law-making process that ensures citizen participation, consultation, and input is short-
circuited and the separation of powers doctrine subverted.  
5.3.4  Infringement of Fundamental Human Rights 
The United Nations has described human rights as “those rights which are inherent in 
our nature and without which we cannot function as human beings.”41 All the past 
Constitutions since independence have embedded the array of rights contained in the 
present Constitution.42 These rights include the rights to life, dignity of human person, 
personal liberty, fair hearing, and private and family life. Others include the rights to 
freedom of thought, conscience and religion, freedom of expression and the press, right 
to peaceful assembly and association, freedom of movement, freedom from 
discrimination;  the right to acquire and own immovable property.  
Enforcement of human rights in the several military regimes indicates that while 
one category of rights was left intact and only marginally affected, the second category 
                                                     
40 Montesquieu, note 4 Chapter 6. 
41Atsenuwa, A., et al, Human Rights Made Easy, Third Edition, 1999, Legal Research and Resource 
Development Centre, Lagos at 6. 
42 Sections 33 to 44 of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. 
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were tampered with by the military regimes.43 Rights relating to life; human dignity; 
private and family life; freedom from discrimination and compensation for compulsory 
acquisition of property belong to the first category. The second category of rights was of 
necessity abridged by the military regimes considering the manner in which force was 
used to acquire power. These included rights to personal liberty; a fair hearing; freedom 
of expression; peaceful assembly; freedom of association and the right to free 
movement.44 
5.3.5  Ouster Clauses 
Even though throughout the duration of the military foray into political governance, the 
judiciary was retained as a separate arm of government, its jurisdiction was curtailed by 
ouster clauses that were inserted in all decrees. An ouster clause is a provision in a law 
that limits or takes away the jurisdiction of a competent court of law. It robs the court of 
the power to inquire into matters brought before it.45 An example of the wording of an 
ouster clause is contained in Section 5 of Decree No. 17 of 1985, which is in pari materia 
with other military decrees on ouster clauses: “No question as to the validity of this or 
any other Decree or any Edict shall be entertained in any court of law in Nigeria.”46 
                                                     
43 Ojo, E.O., Human Rights and Sustainable Democracy in Nigeria (1999 - 2003), J. Soc. Sci., 13(1): 15-29 (2006). 
44 Williams, F.R.A., Fundamental Human Rights under a Military Government, being the text of a lecture 
delivered at Ogun State University, Ago Iwoye under the auspices of the University’s Special Guest 
Lecture Series on July 11, 1985.  
45 Sambo, A.O, and Abdukadir, A.,  Ouster Clauses, Judicial Review and Good Governance: An Expository 
Study of the Experience in Nigeria and Malaysia, OIDA International Conference on Sustainable 
Development, 2012, Conference Centre, Montclair State University Montclair, New Jersey, USA, July 31 – 
August 02. 
46 Examples of some of the decrees made that had ouster clauses include Constitution (Suspension and 
Modification) Act, Cap 64, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria (LFN), 1990,  which was not abrogated  
before the promulgation of Decree No. 107 of 1997 of 1993 whose provisions are similar to it; Civil 
Disturbances (Special Tribunal) Act, Cap 53, LFN, 1990; Armed Forces (Disciplinary Proceedings) Act, 
Cap 22 LFN, 1990; The Civil Service Commission and other Statutory Bodies (Removal of Certain Persons 
from Office) Act, Cap 54, LFN, 1990; Currency Conversion (Freezing Orders) Act, Cap 82, LFN 1990; 
Forfeiture of Assets etc (Validation) Act, Cap 158, LFN, 1990; The Special Tribunal (Miscellaneous 
Offences) Act, Cap 410, LFN, 1990; The State Security (Detention of Persons) Act, Cap 414, LFN,1990; 
Public Officers(Forfeiture of Assets) Decree No 8 of 1991; The Association of Individuals (Dissolution and 
Proscription etc) Decree No 21 of 1992; The Federal Military Government (Supremacy and Enforcement 
of Powers) Decree No. 28 of 1994; The Federal Military Government (Supremacy and Enforcement of 
Powers) Decree No 28 of 1970 , among others. 
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 Even though a large section of the judiciary resigned itself to its fate on the mere 
mention of an ouster clause in a decree by being “executive minded”47, there were some 
judges who thought otherwise.  
 On several occasions, some courts48 rose stoutly to inquire into ouster clauses in 
decrees in order to maintain its sacred role under the separation of powers concept. One 
such occasion was the decision of the then Chief Justice of the Federation to strike down 
an ouster clause in a decree, by relying on the separation of powers concept: 
  We must here revert again to the Separation of Powers which   
  the learned Attorney General himself did not dispute is still the   
  structure of our system of government. In the absence of    
  anything to the contrary, it has to be admitted that the structure   
  of our  constitution is based on the structure of power, the    
  legislation, the executive and the judiciary. Our constitutions   
  clearly follow the model of the American Constitution.49 
Even though the Military Government responded by promulgating yet another 
decree that expressly nullified the decision of the court in that case, the point had been 
made that the judiciary would not sit by and allow the separation of power doctrine to 
go to waste without a fight. This point was further reinforced by Justice Acholonu’s 
insistence that treating ouster clauses as “though they were stipulation from God will 
not help in the development of jurisprudence.”50 The negative effects of ouster clauses 
included inhibiting the right of access to the court to procure justice. These clauses 
existed in virtually all the military decrees and went a long way to weaken the role of 
the judiciary as a distinct arm of government.51 
                                                     
47 Corder, note 12 at 776. 
48 Lakanmi and others v The A.G. (WEST) & 2 others, 6 Nigerian Supreme Court Cases, 1970: 143); 
Jackson V Gowon & ors (1967) 8 Nig Bar J.87; The Council of the University of Ibadan V Adamoleku 
(1967) 1 All N.L.R. 213; Lakanmi & Anor. V Attorney-General (West) & Ors (1971) 1 All N.L.R. (Part 11) 
201; Governor of Oyo State and Others v Oba Ololade Folayan (1995) 9SCNJ 50. 
at 80.  
49 Ademola, A. CJN, in Lakanmi and others v The A.G. (WEST) & 2 others((6 Nigerian Supreme Court 
Cases, 1970: 143). 
50 Acholonu, P., in Akanbi note 3 at 5. 
51 Ibid.  
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5.3.6  Creation of Special Courts and Tribunals 
One of the features of the rule of law is the subordination of all disputes to adjudication 
in normal or regular courts established for that purpose.52 This promotes impartiality 
and independence, a cardinal principle of the rule of law that likens justice to be blind 
to all and inclined to none except to facts and truth.  
 In the Nigerian context, military regimes set up special tribunals to try offences 
that were codified in existing laws and open for a normal court's consideration. Reasons 
cited for this included the slow pace of the justice system, technicalities in normal 
courts, and the need to mete out justice swiftly as deterrence, especially in cases of 
societal vices such as armed robbery, drugs and fraudulent practices.  
 Akanbi, however, notes that no sooner had these Tribunals been set up that they 
became instruments of oppression in the hands of the current military regime against 
perceived opponents. Secondly, in place of speedy adjudication, most of the Tribunals 
were characterized by snail-like speed in the determination of cases brought before 
them. In addition, their existence tended to undermine the fairness of the criminal 
justice system53 and further acted as a dilution of the judicial powers constitutionally 
vested in the courts.54  Also worthy of note is the fact that the decisions from these 
tribunals were not open for appeal to the regular courts; rather, in most cases, appeals 
were to another appellate tribunal or to the highest military ruling body. 55 
 The erosion of basic principles behind of the rule of law doctrine was the major 
concern that the setting up of these tribunals portended. They were not bound by the 
established rules and procedures of fair hearing and in some cases, the hurried and 
                                                     
52 Sagay, I.E., The Judiciary in a Modern Democracy in Nigeria: Issues in the 1999 Constitution in Ayua, I.A., et 
al (eds) 2000 NIALS at 78. 
53 Anyebe, P.A., Fair Hearing and Rule of Law, in in Rule of Law and Good Governance, eds, Azinge, E. 
and Owasanoye,B., Nigerian Institute of Advanced Legal  Studies, 2009 at 56. 
54Section 6(6) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria; Section 6(6) 1995 draft Constitution of 
Nigeria. Also see Decree No 9 of 1993 which invalidated all court decisions and orders over any matter 
before the Tribunal. This had the effect of making Tribunals superior to regular courts. 
55 Akanbi, note 3 at 5. 
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secretive nature of the trials led to the illegal meting out of punishment including 
hurried execution, which amounted to extra-judicial killing by the state.56 
5.3.7  Reign of Discretion 
The rule of law dictates that those who “govern us cannot wield the power of the state 
towards their personal ends either just because they want to . . . or because they have 
force on their side.”57 It ensures the restraint of government discretionary actions 
through a pre-set general rules, which are predictable in their application and 
susceptible to straightforward judicial enforcement notwithstanding who is involved.  
Oluba58 captures in succinct form, the effect which the rampant exercise of 
discretion in military regimes had on the rule of law and by extension sustainable 
economic development. The power to enunciate and vary policies resided with the 
leader and the exercise of that discretion either way was not predicated on any other 
verifiable parameters. Since the levels of consultation were limited only to those who 
were in the good books of the ruling dictator, alternative viewpoints did not find room 
for ventilation. This led to severe limitations in the robustness of formulated policies. 
The result, according to Oluba, was the formulation of barrages of inappropriate 
political and macroeconomic policies. 
5.3.8  Closed System of Government 
For the rule of law to prevail in a state, the affairs of government must be organised and 
run openly through channels that allow for robust engagement by and between the 
governed and the government through access, participation and ownership of policies 
and programmes.  
                                                     
56 One such tragic case is the Ogoni case involving the late playwright Mr. Ken Saro Wiwa and eight 
others, who were tried by the Ogoni civil disturbances tribunal. The convicts were sentenced to death by 
the tribunal in November 1995 and a few days to the expiration of their period of appeal to the Provincial 
Ruling Council, the highest military decision-making body, the men were executed to the chagrin of right 
thinking members of the society both local and international. Report contained in Akanbi, note 5 at 5. 
57 Shane, P.M., Madison’s Nightmare: How Executive Power Threatens American Democracy in  Shane, 
P.M., The Rule of Law and the Inevitability of Discretion, Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper Series, 
No. 212,  2013. 
58 Oluba, M., The Rule of Law and Economic Development in Nigeria, Economic Reflections, Volume B, No 22, 
August 2008. 
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Within the Nigerian context, the military ruled through a process that can be 
better referred to as a cabal system. Coup planning is an offence that is treasonable; the 
reasoning goes that those who take the risk of planning and executing coups, knowing 
the punishment that awaits them, should be allowed the benefit of enjoying the spoils of 
coup planning. Thus in Nigeria, the "spoils of coup planning" is the appropriation of 
power and government positions for personal gains. This was invariably restricted to an 
inner cabal that planned, risked their lives and executed the coup. All others were 
deemed outsiders, likened to cowards. Affairs of the nation were carried out based on 
patronage using a close circle of those in the good books of the leadership. 59 There was 
no coherent process of involving and engaging the led by the leaders in governance 
processes. 
 Professor of African politics, Ali Mazrui, posited that the years leading up to 
1979 were the “closed years” for Nigeria as the military governments controlled and 
released only information that they determined the public needed to know, and any 
attempt to lift the veil of secrecy was met with brutal suppression.60 
5.3.9  Retroactivity of Laws 
Another manifestation of the military's modus operandi in governance evidenced itself in 
the enactment of retrospective decrees. By their nature they went against the very grain 
of the doctrine of the rule of law.  They were structured to make persons liable for 
punishment without their having had the opportunity to avoid breaking the law. Put 
differently, the retroactive laws turned an otherwise innocent person into an offender 
for an act done yesterday, which the law had made an offence today but attached a 
punishment with effect from yesterday. Two examples stand out here.61  
Decree No.20 of 1984 was introduced with drastic penalties to deal with various 
crimes including possession of cocaine. The decree was deemed to have come into effect 
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60 Mazrui, A. A., The Africans, A Triple Heritage, Little Brown & Co (P); Mti edition (September 1987) at 
182. 
61 Akanbi, note 3 at 6. 
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on 31st December, 1983 although it was actually promulgated on the 6th of July, 1984. 
The consequence of this retroactivity was that what was lawfully done before the 
promulgation of the law suddenly became criminalised. As a result three convicted 
drug dealers were sentenced to death and executed by firing squad on April 14, 1985.62  
Another was the Lands/Title Vesting Decree No 52 of 1993, whose effective date 
was backdated to January, 1975. The import of the section was to circumvent the Land 
Use Act of 1978, which vested ownership of land in the state government raising Rule of 
Law concerns about whether such decrees were for the public good, to protect the 
interest of the society or to advance the interest of some highly placed individuals in the 
country.63 
5.3.10  Personification of Law by Military Rulers 
Dicey64 and Wade65, two of the foremost proponents of the rule of law concept, 
envisioned a situation where all men, no matter their status or position in the society 
will be considered equal and treated as such by the law and that the law would be pre-
eminent and men under the law. The prevalent situation during Nigeria's military 
regimes was a sad testimony against the above thesis.  
Most military governments suffered from what can be termed the “Alpha and 
Omega” syndrome, which is a situation whereby the military in power believes that 
they are above the law. What they determined was the law and had to be obeyed 
without question; otherwise consequences of their choices would follow.66 Two 
incidents, catalogued by Akanbi, exemplify this. 
In 1985, Chief Odumegun Ojukwu, the former Biafran leader was forcefully 
ejected from his residence in Lagos by a multitude of armed men without due process 
and against a subsisting court order. The Supreme Court, while describing the forceful 
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63 Jegede, J.K., The Rule of law in a Military Government: An appraisal, 1999, Nigerian Law and Practice 
Journal, 19. 
64 Dicey, note 1. 
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ejection as an act of executive lawlessness, went further to reiterate that the “…essence 
of the rule of law is that it should never operate under the rule of force or fear”67  
Yet again, arising from a traffic offence involving the late chief M.K.O Abiola’s 
son and an Air Force driver, the latter took the law into his hands and invaded the 
chief's house, molesting and detaining the chief and members of his family. This act was 
condemned as outrageous, brutish and barbaric and not “…only an assault to the 
dignity of Chief Abiola but that it was also an assault on the rule of law and freedom of 
the people of Nigeria.” Yet there was no remedy for the act of lawlessness by a 
supposedly lawful entity. 68 
It must be concluded, therefore, that the contemplation of a military regime and 
constitutionalism coexisting is a mutually exclusive proposition. To expect a military 
government to hold itself subject to and limited by a supreme constitution whose 
foundations are built on the principles of the rule of law is a contradiction that is 
unlikely to manifest itself. Principles and concepts inherent in the rule of law idea such 
as a fair hearing, the separation of powers, and the independence of the judiciary and 
personal liberty, though allowed to exist on the statute books, were only observed in the 
breach. This is so because, ab i nitio, their coming into power negates in a fundamental 
way, the principles of the supremacy of law, which exist in each of the civilian 
constitutions that they supplanted. Section 1(2) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal 
Republic of Nigeria, which provision existed in each of the previous Constitutions, 
provides that: 
The Federal Republic of Nigeria shall not be governed nor shall any group of 
persons take control of the government or of any part thereof except in 
accordance with the provisions of this Constitution 
 
 To conclude the examination of the fate of the rule of law under the military 
regimes in Nigeria, the words of Claude Ake are worth quoting here: 
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…the military and democracy are in dialectical oppositions. The 
military is a taut chain of command; democracy is a benign anarchy 
of diversity. Democracy presupposes human sociability; the 
military presupposes its total absence, the inhuman extremity of 
killing the opposition. The military demands submission, 
democracy enjoins participation; one is a tool of violence, the other 
a means of consensus building for peaceful co-existence.69 
  
 An analysis of how the rule of law doctrine fared during the period of 
democratic rule follows. This period is very relevant as it was during the 1980s that the 
economic reforms gained traction leading to the establishment of IRAs into Nigeria.   
5.4  Civilian Dispensations 
Prior to the civilian rule of May 1999, Nigeria’s human rights record was a monotonous 
one characterised by brutal military regimes with a brief punctuation of attempted 
civilian rule between 1979 and 1983. Unlike military regimes, civilian regimes by their 
democratic nature seek to acquire power through a political process. This route includes 
an electioneering process of selling their programmes to the voting public 
(campaigning) to seek an electoral mandate from the electorate to govern based on the 
programmes they espoused during the electioneering process. The basic instrument that 
spells out the political economy of the nation, who gets what, how and for what 
purposes, and guides the whole process is the Constitution.  
The legal instruments that have guided civilian regimes in the several civilian 
governments since independence have been the Republican Constitution of 1963, the 
1979 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, and the 1999 Constitution of the 
Federal Republic of Nigeria. 
Apart from its numerous provisions that spell out the architecture of power in 
the nation, each of these Constitutions contained provisions that implicitly (and in 
certain cases explicitly) acknowledged and endorsed the separation of powers concept. 
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They also included among others the basic human rights, termed “Fundamental 
Human Rights”, that relate to rights to life; dignity of human person; personal liberty; 
fair hearing; private and family life; freedom of thought, conscience and religion; 
freedom of expression and the press; peaceful movement, assembly and association; 
freedom from discrimination and the right to acquire and own immovable property.  
A consideration of the architecture and contours of the rule of law and the 
government adherence to its ideals under the democratic dispensations will therefore 
be undertaken, judging their performance against the grand norm - the Constitutions.In 
the light of the importance and relevance rule of law to the effective functioning of IRA 
model, an attempt has been made to be as contemporary as possible. Extensive reliance 
has been placed on recent country studies by locally based human rights organisations, 
international rights monitors, and scholars in the field.70 
Some of these international bodies are the leading global NGOs that propagate 
adherence to human rights, while the National Human Rights Commission of Nigeria is 
the statutory body set up to monitor and report on the state of human rights in Nigeria. 
The last two are Nigeria’s leading human rights advocacy NGOs. 
The state of human rights enforcement and rule of law regime in Nigeria since the 
return to democratic rule from 1999 to date, from the reports listed above, shows that 
government’s human rights record has been poor. There have been some marginal 
improvements in a few areas but the overall picture is bleak.  
Worthy of mention are the improvements that have the direct benefit of the 
ushering in of democratic governance. Unlike during military regimes, the separation of 
powers concept has seen fulfilment in the current dispensation save for the continued 
foray of the executive arm into the jurisdiction of the other arms of government in a bid 
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the State of Human Rights in Nigeria, 2007, National Human Rights Commission of Nigeria; Amnesty 
International Human Rights Annual Report, 2012; Human Rights Monitor, Nigeria; and Civil Liberties 
Organisation, Nigeria. 
175 
 
to control and dominate them. Ouster clauses, special courts and tribunals, and the 
retroactivity of laws are no longer a feature of Nigeria’s legal landscape. All laws in 
force before the commencement of the 1999 Constitution that are deemed repugnant to 
the democratic ethos, are by the clear wordings of Section 1 (3) of the 1999 Constitution, 
rendered nugatory.71 With the existence of a tripod system of power sharing under the 
Presidential system, the era of closed government has gone as citizens have various 
avenues to give vent to their views and participate in governance. 
Even with these improvements major problems still abound.72 A survey of the key 
elements of the constitutionally guaranteed rights buttresses this point.  
The primary mechanism through which the rule of law affects IRAs is its impact on 
the system of private property. This right to property starts with one’s rights to life 
which is invariably the most fundamental property any person can possess. At birth, 
humans find themselves jealously and desperately guarding their lives from harm and 
death, and the pursuit of prosperity in the business arena takes a second place. There 
would be no business if there was no life.  
This basic personal right to life and dignity of the person has major enforcement 
challenges in the present civilian dispensation. The culture of lack of respect for human 
life and dignity of the person in the Nigerian society is reflected in the high number of 
extra-judicial, summary, and arbitrary executions prevalent in Nigerian society. This 
has been compounded by the long period of military rule, which has affected the 
psyche of the law enforcement agencies that carry out their functions in circumstances 
devoid of human rights consideration and respect for rule of law.73 Torture, cruel, 
                                                     
71Section 1(3) states that “If any other law is inconsistent with the provisions of this Constitution, this 
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72 Ojo, note 43. 
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inhuman or degrading treatment or punishments have routinely become tools of 
investigation and a modus operandi in the hands of law enforcement agencies.74  
 The Country Reports referred to above catalogue some of the human rights 
violations that have defaced Nigeria’s record since the return to civilian rule. These 
include numerous arbitrary or extra-judicial killings by government and its agents 
including vigilante killings, prolonged pre-trial detention and denial of fair public trial, 
executive influence and control of the judiciary, and infringements on citizens’ privacy 
rights. Others included restrictions on the freedoms of speech, press, assembly, religion, 
and movement, official corruption, violence against women, child abuse, female genital 
mutilation/cutting, infanticide, and sexual exploitation of children. The other violations 
documented were trafficking in persons, discrimination based on sexual orientation, 
gender identity, ethnicity, regional origin, religion, and disability, forced, bonded and 
child labour.  
 Some of the most serious human rights abuses committed during the immediate 
past periods were by Boko Haram,75 which conducted killings, bombings, abduction, 
rape of women, and other attacks in almost all the states in the northern part of Nigeria. 
They resulted in numerous deaths and injuries, and widespread destruction of 
property.  In response, the Army has been engaged in extrajudicial killings, torture, 
rape, beatings, arbitrary detention, and mistreatment of detainees.76 In addition, a fertile 
ground for violent militancy emerged, because of the failure of government to address 
the widespread poverty, corruption and police/army abuses. As a result, since 1999 
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76 Amnesty International in a written statement to the 28th Session of the United Nations Human Rights 
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more than 18,000 people have died in inter-communal, political, and sectarian 
violence.77 
Since the return to civilian rule there has been the introduction of Sharia law in some 
northern states. Part of the penal structure includes, punishments such as amputation 
for theft, stoning to death in case of adultery, caning for fornication and public 
drunkenness. It is still a live argument as to whether punishments such as caning 
constitute “torture or … inhuman or degrading treatment” as stipulated in the 
Constitution.78  
 Even though the 1999 Constitution provides for an independent judiciary which 
is the bastion of the rule of law,79 in practice the judicial arm remains susceptible to 
influence by political leaders at both the state and federal levels, and suffers from 
corruption and inefficiency. This has manifested in several ways. 
 After barely four months in office, the civilian government of Shehu Shagari 
deported a Nigerian, Shugaba Darma, the majority leader of the Borno State House of 
Assembly to Chad Republic, by declaring him a prohibited immigrant. The grounds for 
his deportation were that government believed Darma was a serious danger to public 
safety and order as well as to the rights and freedoms of others in Nigeria. These were 
serious allegations that required a thorough investigation before the applicant could be 
declared guilty. At the immigration office before his deportation, Darma had insisted he 
was a Nigerian and that his claim should be investigated. Rather than accede to his 
request, and seek an order of the court authorizing his deportation, the Minister 
purportedly acting under the Immigration Act 1963, went ahead to deport him. It is 
interesting to note that Darma was of the Great Nigerian People’s Party while the 
central authority was controlled by the National Party of Nigeria. His party had an 
overwhelming majority in the Borno State House of Assembly, and the party’s 
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candidate also won the governorship election.80 The deportation order was quashed by 
the Borno State High Court, and later affirmed by the Federal Court of Appeal.81 
 Secondly, in 2004 and  notwithstanding the Supreme Court ruling ordering the 
Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN) to release the withheld funds due to the Local 
Government Development Authorities created by the Lagos State (an act the FGN 
considered illegal), the FGN refused to obey the decisions until the Yar’adua 
government came in.82 
 
 Thirdly, the rule of law has come to be mean what the ruling party or the 
President says it is since the return to civilian rule. The continued flagrant disregard for 
the rule of law led the Nigerian Bar Association (NBA) to embark on a nationwide 
boycott of the courts to press home their demand for the government to return to the 
path of recognising and respecting court orders and rulings.83 The brazenness of the 
Executive disobedience of court orders and sometimes interpreting them to suit their 
purpose became alarming,  with the NBA recording a total of 75 cases of disregard for 
or disobedience of court orders and processes from the inception of the democratic rule 
in 1999 to 2009.84 
 
 Fourthly, underfunding or starving the judiciary of funds has been a regular 
occurrence, further undermining the rule of law.85 Wherever the executive perceives 
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assertiveness and independent traits on the part of the judiciary, the weapon of 
withholding allocations becomes a ready means to helm them in.  
 
 Finally, the executive arm of government has displayed contempt for other arms 
of government as evidenced by the unilateral declaration of a State of Emergency in 
some states and the suspension of democratic structures without due process and in 
flagrant contravention of constitutional provisions.86 
 
5.4.1  Abuse of the Separation of Powers Doctrine 
The three arms of government, especially the executive and the legislature, have on 
several occasions trampled on the constitutionally sanctioned separation of powers 
concept rendering it ineffective. This in turn has made the attainment of the ideals of 
constitutional democracy a mirage in Nigeria so far.   
For instance, the quest of the executive arm to control the legislative and judicial 
arms of government which is an afterglow of the military foray into political 
governance, dimmed the hopes for the entrenchment of an enduring democratic 
culture. Where they were able to, the executive bought and dictated both to the other 
two arms, and where they are unable, they selectively chose which of the legislative 
initiatives and judicial pronouncements they would abide by. 87 
Conversely, the legislature has continued to attempt repeated forays into the 
executive jurisdiction through encroaching into essentially pure executive functions 
such as budget-making and implementation, while at the same time seeking to not only 
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make but also interpret laws, a function assigned to the Judicial arm, for mostly self- 
seeking and selfish reasons.88  
In addition, the attempt by the executive arm to distort the rule of law doctrine 
has also continued to manifest in its horizontal relationship with components of the 
federal structure, thus infringing on federalist principles enshrined in the 
Constitution.89 This has manifested in the several acts of manipulation of the legislative 
and judicial arms in several states to force the impeachment and removal of 
democratically elected governors through extra legal means. 90 
5.4.2  Breaches of the Rule of Law 
Breaches of the rule of law during the civilian era also sprouted in areas where the 
executive exercised its powers outside the constitutional ambits and stipulations. In 
simple terms, the rule of law was reduced to rubble during the tenure of the Shagari .91 
Obasanjo’s tenure as a civilian head of state between 1999 and 2007 has been 
adjudged in constitutional historical circles as the worst in ranking for abuse of the rule 
of law and constitutionalism.92 This may be understandable considering his leadership 
style and high-handedness which was a throwback his military background as a retired 
army general. Under his tenure, serial disobedience of court decisions; deployment of 
state security agencies and anti-corruption agencies to witch-hunt and beat political 
opponents into line; distortion of the federal structure by unilateral and 
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unconstitutional acts; unlawful impeachment and removal of elected governors;93 
among others,94 acts that can be rightly termed “official lawlessness” were the norm.95 
 
5.5  Conclusion    
The foregoing consideration of the state of Nigeria’s adherence to the rule of law 
principle since independence, transcending both democratic and military regimes, has 
returned a verdict of poor performance. A study of the architecture of the regimes and 
the nature of the political economy of Nigeria points to several reasons for this poor 
observance of rule of law:96  
First, the high illiteracy level in the country cannot easily safeguard human rights 
and the rule of law. Nigeria has an abysmal level of literacy between 39% -51% with 
32% male and 21% female secondary schools. That means more that 50% its male and 
80% population are illiterates.  With such a high percentage of the citizenry completely 
illiterate, mass mobilisation of civil society and the citizenry to be alive to and fight for 
their rights becomes a daunting task.  
Second, closely linked to this, is the lack of a virile and enlightened civil society 
that is undergirded by vibrant media. Even where citizens are aware or conscious of the 
abuse of their rights, the institutional processes for redress are unknown to them or 
cumbersome and costly to undertake. The link tying literacy, human rights abuse and 
democratic vitality, avers that “democracy is not safe in a country where a large 
minority of the population is illiterate.”97 
Third, the pervasive poverty in the country accounts in a major way, for the lack 
of flourishing of the rule of aw concept and its accompanying rights. This worrisome 
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reality is underlined by the information that approximately 21.9 % of Nigeria’s labour 
force was unemployed in 1998. With an estimated active labour force of 55.75 million in 
2000, this translates to over 12 million Nigerians who were in need of suitable 
employment.98 This fact was much underscored by the erudite scholar and jurist, 
Akintola Aguda who stated: 
 
  The practical actualization of most of the fundamental rights 
  cannot be achieved in a country like ours where millions are 
  living below starvation level… In the circumstances of this 
  nature, fundamental rights provisions enshrined in the 
  constitution are nothing but meaningless jargon to all those of 
  our people living below or just at starvation level.99 
Four, the pervasiveness of corruption in the body politic has in no small measure 
affected the fate of the rule of law concept. As aptly stated:  
 Corruption renders codified law ineffective. By weakening    
  property rights, corruption deprives investors of compensation   
  for risk taking and increases uncertainty about potential    
  investment payoffs. This decreases the incentive to invest,    
  which in turn dampens economic growth.100 
 
The legitimate expectation that when Nigeria returned to democratic 
governance, the rule of law would flourish with the attendant dividends of citizens 
enjoying a robust cocktail of human rights contained in the Constitution has so far been 
dashed in Nigeria. This failure has also shown that the disregard for the rule of law is 
not the exclusive feature or preserve of the military government, as democratic 
governments have also been implicated in the rule of law's travails in Nigeria. Nigeria 
can thus be considered to have a Constitution that espouses an ideal which is devoid of 
constitutionalism and the rule of law. 
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A Nigerian political scientist, Julius Ihonvbere, writing in a book honouring the 
late Professor Billy Dudley lamented, personal freedoms that were not allowed during 
the period of colonial rule are paradoxically “severely limited” even during the periods 
of democratic governance in Nigeria .101 This is a sad but true conclusion on the state 
and condition of the political economy of Nigeria and its rule of law landscape. 
The trend continues. The culture of corruption at all levels, arbitrariness, 
executive attempts at dominating and controlling other arms of government, the neglect 
of education as a tool for development and mass mobilization all points to a gloomy 
future for the rule of law concept. Given the rule of law’s poor scorecard and recalling 
its centrality to the functioning of the IRA model, it is doubtful if IRAs have a suitable 
climate to deliver on their mandate in the wake of the institutional deficits of the rule of 
law. 
Chapter 6 will seek to undertake a review of the performance of the IRAs in 
Nigeria so far, testing their efficacy against the ideals of the concept weighed on 
comparative scales with Brazil and Ghana, two countries with similar cultural and 
developmental features as Nigeria. 
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CHAPTER 6 
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF INDEPENDENT REGULATORY AGENCIES IN 
BRAZIL, GHANA AND NIGERIA 
6.1  Introduction 
 The preceding chapters dissected the rapid spread of the Independent 
Regulatory Agencies (IRAs) as a solution to the infrastructure deficits across countries 
including Nigeria. The process revealed that key institutional structures, norms and 
systems that should be in place to support the successful transplant of the IRAs into 
Nigeria are either missing, or where they exist, are in a very weak state. Given this 
finding, this chapter undertakes a comparative investigation of how the IRA model has 
fared in two selected developing countries that also have weak and fragile institutional 
structures. The countries chosen are Brazil and Ghana. 
 The choice of these two nations is informed by the shared commonalities in their 
political economies and the lessons that the comparisons portend for Nigeria.  
 
 Brazil’s demographic composition is similar to that of Nigeria, with a large 
population (Brazil - 202 million and Nigeria 160 million people); each nation is 
endowed with a substantial measure of natural resources; and each has experienced 
European colonialism, though of different types. Both nations have a long tradition of 
authoritarian politics characterised by long periods of military incursion into political 
governance with severe consequences. These include, stark poverty, social 
marginalisation by elite classes leading to crass inequality, clientelism, political and civil 
violence.1 
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 As a result, the political economies of both nations are dotted by extensive 
corruption, patrimonialism2 and impunity. Each have in the recent past transited to 
democratic governance, with a Presidential system of government as the model. 
 
 Furthermore, with regard to economic reforms generally and infrastructure 
regulation in particular, Brazil like Nigeria, within the past three decades undertook 
major institutional reforms promoted by intermediating agencies led by the World Bank 
and the International Monetary Fund that resulted in the setting up of IRAs in key 
utility sectors. The pattern of distribution of IRAs in both nations is largely similar. 
 
 Ghana also shares certain commonalities with Nigeria that are also germane to 
this thesis. Apart from being neighbours in West Africa, both countries went through 
British colonialism and became independent within six years of each other. In each, the 
military intervened into political governance under similar circumstances by 
overthrowing the civilian leadership that emerged at independence. What followed in 
both nations was a long interregnum of military rule that has now been replaced by a 
presidential system of government.  
 
 Coincidentally, both nations embarked on economic reforms under authoritarian 
military regimes.3  Equally too, reforms were promoted by intermediating agencies. 
Like Nigeria, the State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) that were set up to serve as the engine 
room of economic development performed poorly within the context of government 
                                                                                                                                                                           
 
2 Patrimonialism is used here to describe a style of authority where a ‘big man’ rules by dint of personal 
prestige and power, while followers are treated as extensions of his household. Authority is personalised 
and shaped by the ruler’s preferences, rather than any codified system of law. The ruler ensures political 
stability and personal political survival by selectively distributing favours and material benefits to 
followers or clients. 
3 Aryeetey, E, The Institutional and Policy Framework for Regulation and Competition in Ghana, Centre on 
Regulation and Competition, Working Paper Series, Paper No. 46, December 2002 at 5. 
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assuming the conflicting roles of owner, manager and regulator.4  The discovery of oil 
in 2007 in Ghana heightened expectations for additional revenue to fund socio-
economic development while at the same time raising concerns for the resource curse 
phenomena.  Ghana has also undertaken reforms leading to opening up of 
infrastructure provision and services to the private sector in three major utilities, water, 
electricity and telecommunications, though the public sector is still predominantly 
involved in the ownership and provision of infrastructure and services.    
In order to undertake a comparative analysis of IRAs in the two selected 
countries that is coherent, verifiable and meaningful, it is necessary to specify the 
benchmarks used. The adopted guide is derived from the key principles that 
underpinned the conceptualisation of the IRA model in the United States of America 
(USA) and its eventual adoption by the intermediating agencies, who in turn 
recommended to developing countries as a part of the reform package.5  
6.2  Conceptual Principles of IRAs 
For an IRA to satisfy its conceptual origins, it must possess three basic ingredients, 
namely credibility, legitimacy, and transparency. Firstly, on credibility, investors must 
have confidence that the regulatory system will honour its commitments.  This is central 
in attracting private sector investors especially in utility sectors that typically require 
long tenured investments whose return on investments takes time to mature.  Private 
investors in the utility sectors have two primary concerns that a credible regulatory 
system must aim to satisfy. One is the necessity to obtain clear regulatory commitments 
from government, and the other is the assurance that the commitment will actually be 
honoured in order to allow investors to recoup their investments and have a reasonable 
return thereon.6 The credibility test also serves as an insulation against short-term 
populist or politically induced pressure to reduce prices in volatile developing 
                                                     
4 Ibid at 18. 
5 Brown, A, et al.,  World Bank Handbook for Evaluating Infrastructure Regulatory Systems, 2006, The World 
Bank, Washington, DC. 
6 Ranjit, L. and Saeed, K., What International Investors Look for When Investing in Developing Countries, 2003,  
Energy and Mining Sector Board Discussion Paper 6, World Bank, Washington, DC, at 10 in Brown, note 
4 at 108. 
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economies especially with an eye on electoral cycles.7 Thus, the structure of the 
regulatory system should be of the kind that would attract credible commitments that 
would incentivise investors to invest with the comfort that their investments will be 
recovered within the regulatory time frames and guarantees.  
 Secondly, pertaining to legitimacy, consumers must perceive the regulatory 
system to be one that can protect them from the exercise of monopoly power or 
exploitation from service providers, whether through high prices or poor service, or 
both. This entails a balanced and fair evolution and implementation of the regulatory 
tools by IRAs, to ensure that the expectations of both the investors and consumers are 
satisfied through a regime of trade-offs and incentives. The role and effectiveness of 
IRAs is undermined where legitimacy is lacking, as neither party in the value chain 
considers the regulatory process legitimate. 8 
 Thirdly, on transparency, an IRA must carry out its mandate in a transparent 
manner so as to attract to itself respect and acceptance by both the investor and 
consumer.   The entire regulatory system and processes must be fair, impartial and 
open, with all the parties given the opportunity to participate in the process. 
Furthermore, at the end of every regulatory intervention, there must be a written 
statement detailing the evidence taken into consideration; a summary of the different 
representations and a full rendering of the basis for the final decision by the IRA.9 
 
 Encapsulated in the above ingredients are key principles that must underpin the 
structure and operations of an IRA for it to be deemed credible, legitimate and 
transparent. These include independence from all the players in the value chain; 
accountability for its actions; transparency and participation in all its systems and 
processes; the clear delineation and clarity of roles in a basic law, accompanied by 
                                                     
7 Newbery, D., Rate of Return Regulation versus price regulation for public utilities, 1997 available at 
http://www.econ.cam.ac.uk/faculty/newbery/files/palgrave.pdf. 
8 Kapika, J., and Eberhard, A., Power Sector Reform and regulation in Africa: Lessons from Kenya, Tanzania, 
Namibia and Ghana, 2013, Human Sciences Research Council Press, Cape Town, SA. 
9 Brown, note 5. 
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clarity in its operational rules buoyed by the requisite powers to carry out its mandate; a 
regime that engenders predictability and certainty; appropriate institutional 
endowments; and integrity.  
 These principles are deemed best practice10 as they seek to accomplish both 
internal and external objectives. Internally, they are designed to ensure fairness, 
balance, and substantive discipline in the decision-making processes of the IRAs. 
Externally, however, they are meant to protect and preserve the integrity, legitimacy, 
independence, and accountability of regulation and the IRAs. Although adherence to 
these principles alone will not necessarily achieve the intended objectives, failure to 
adhere to them will almost certainly put at risk the possibility of achieving them. 
 
 This thesis will now focus on the political economies of the two nations that are 
the subject of the comparison, tracing in the process the history of their infrastructure 
provision and the challenges faced, that led to the assimilation of the IRA model into 
their economic trajectory.  Thereafter, it will ascertain the extent of adherence to these 
core principles in the institutional framework of IRAs in the countries given the 
contextual peculiarities of their institutional endowments. 
 
6.3  Legal and Regulatory Framework of Independent Regulatory   
  Agencies in Brazil 
The recorded history of Brazil began with the encounter of the indigenous people  with 
Europeans at the opening of the 16th century under the sponsorship of Portugal. Their 
arrival signaled the beginning of a period of colonialism that lasted from the 16th to the 
early 18th centuries. The colonial settlements in the country expanded mainly along the 
coast lines of the south and west as trade routes.  
                                                     
10 Ibid  
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 Within this same period, other European countries, attracted by the vast natural 
resources and untapped land, tried to establish colonies in several parts of Brazilian 
territory until November 15th, 1822, when it declared its independence from Portugal.11  
 A military coup in 1889 established a republican government which was 
overthrown by a dictatorship (1930–1934 and 1937–1945). This was followed by another 
period of military rule (1964–1985) whose effects still haunt the nation till today.12  In 
the 1970s the military government embarked on a number of ambitious projects in 
infrastructure development ranging from hydroelectric to nuclear power plants which 
were never completed. The economy was affected and inflation soared in the process. 
The country turned power over to civilians in democratic rule in 1985.13 
 Ownership and management of infrastructure had over the years resided both in 
the public and private sectors. Its quality and availability had however been ineffective 
and unable to meet the demands of a growing population. By the time the civilian 
government assumed power in the 1980s, reforms were all but inevitable. As a first step, 
the government passed the Law of Concessions14 in 1995. 
 
 The Law of Concessions enabled government to offer public utilities for sale to 
the private sector, with the understanding that the latter was better equipped to manage 
them. The transfer would in turn, allow government to focus on planning, coordinating, 
regulating and monitoring the different sectors of the economy. It is to be noted that the 
Law of Concessions sought to operationalise Article 175 of the Federal Constitution, 
which lays out the broad rules and principles by which the government authorises 
private entities to offer public services. The Law of Concessions specified the 
                                                     
11 For a complete history see The New York Times, A Brief History of Brazil, 
http://www.nytimes.com/fodors/top/features/travel/destinations/centralandsouthamerica/brazil/riodejaneiro/fdrs_fea
t_129_9.html?pagewanted=2&n=Top/Features/Travel/Destinations/Central and South America/Brazil/Rio de 
Janeiro accessed on 26/03/15. 
12 Ibid.  
13 Ibid.  
14 Law 8,987/95. 
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procedures to be followed in transferring the erstwhile public utilities to the private 
sector through a transparent and competitive process.15 
 
 This law was followed by reforms that were aggressively undertaken through 
privatisation of public monopolies to accelerate infrastructural investment across a 
range of sectors. As a consequence, between 1996 and 2005, ten IRAs in electricity, 
telecommunications, oil, gas, and other infrastructure sectors and services were set up.16  
 The architecture of these reforms began with the World Bank and the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) recommending to 
Brazil to sell off ailing SOEs and establish IRAs to regulate the entry and participation 
of the private sector as owners and managers of the public utilities in the place of 
government.17  
  Four major reasons accounted for the reforms: dwindling national treasury 
receipts that were unable to finance investments in the nation’s developmental goals; 
technological advances that refuted the natural monopoly position for several utilities 
such as electricity and telecommunications to justify public ownership; and the collapse 
of the eastern bloc/communist ideology that was overly sensitive towards private 
                                                     
15 Batista, T.C., Control of the normative power of the regulatory agencies by the Judicial Branch, George 
Washington University - School of Business, Center for Latin American Issues, The Institute of Brazilian 
Issues, The Minerva Program, Washington – DC, Spring 2014. 
16 The agencies set up included Brazilian  Electricity Regulatory Agency (ANEEL; Brazilian Agency of 
Telecommunications (ANATEL); National Agency of Petroleum, Natural Gas and Biofuels (ANP); 
National Regulatory Agency for Private Health Insurance and Plans (ANS); Brazilian Health Surveillance 
Agency (ANVISA); National Water Agency (ANA); Cinema National Agency (ANCINE); National 
Waterway Transportation Agency (ANTAQ); National Terrestrial Transportation Agency (ANTT); 
National Agency For Civil Aviation (ANAC); Batista, T.C., Control of the normative power of the regulatory 
agencies by the Judicial Branch, George Washington University - School of Business, Center for Latin 
American Issues, The Institute of Brazilian Issues, The Minerva Program, Washington – DC, Spring 2014; 
Silva, M.B., Independence after Delegation: Presidential Calculus and Political Interference in Brazilian Regulatory 
Agencies, Brazilian Political Science Review, (2011) 5 (2) at 40. 
17 Prado, M.M., The Challenges and Risks of Creating Independent Regulatory Agencies: A Cautionary Tale from 
Brazil, Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law [Vol. 41:435 - 503 at 444; OECD, The OECD Report on 
Regulatory Reform: Volume II: Thematic Studies (1997); OECD, Regulatory Policies in OECD Countries: 
From Interventionism to Regulatory Governance (2002); World Bank, World Bank Technical Papers No. 
399, Concession for Infrastructure: A Guide to Their Design And Award (1998), available at 
http://rru.worldbank.org/Documents/Toolkit. 
191 
 
ownership.18 However, the overriding motive for the setting up of the IRAs was 
government's signal not to act opportunistically against private investors once the 
investments were made and to offer credible commitments of consistency in policies, 
assurances that the private sector needed to invest.19  The last reason appears to be the 
most apposite as Brazil was moving from an era where political actors had a propensity 
for being “demagogic and populist”20 by interfering in tariff matters with an eye on the 
electoral cycle. As has been argued, Brazil has a  
 
  history replete with examples of government opportunism; debt   
  payment moratoriums, confiscation of savings, use of utility tariffs to  
  control inflation, several price freezes, manipulation of economic   
  variables, reneging of contracts, disrespect of intellectual property   
  rights, arbitrary rule changes...21 
 
 Thus, their establishment was a pointer to a change in policy direction from 
unpredictability to certainty in policies and goals. This was also a departure from the 
prevailing governance model wherein self-regulation by departments within ministries 
was the norm to one in which the defining feature was independence from the political 
class.22  
 The overarching factor in the reforms was the desire to move away from public 
towards private ownership of infrastructure in order to attract private sector 
investment.23 Unlike in the past where the political will to make those far-reaching 
reforms was missing, the government of President Cardoso (1995-2002) showed 
commitment in pursuing the reforms. Each line ministry was assigned the task of 
designing the structure of the IRA for its own sector. Prado notes that this process was 
                                                     
18 Goldstein, A., and  Linhares Pires, J.C., Brazilian Regulatory Agencies: Early Appraisal and Looming 
Challenges, Centre on Regulation and Competition,  Working Paper Series, Paper No. 43, December 2002. 
19 Mueller, B. and Perreira, C., Credibility and the Design of Regulatory Agencies in Brazil,  Brazilian Journal 
of Political Economy, vol. 22, nº 3 (87), July-September/2002; Prado, note 15. 
20 Nester, A.W., Informativo Justen, Pereira Oliveira and Talamini, Judicial Review of the Independent 
Regulatory Agencies,  Advogados, Curitiba No. 43, September 2010 accessed at 
http://www.justen.com.br/informativo.php?informativo=43&artigo=8&l=en on 31/7/15 at 11.05am. 
21Mueller and Perreira, note 19; Prado, note 17.  
22 Silva, note 16 at 40. 
23 Prado, note 17 at 467. 
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carried out without a holistic plan; neither were there public discussions on the 
principles undergirding the independent regulatory model that as adopted nor the 
expected outcomes.24  The direction of the reforms was therefore essentially dictated by 
three tendencies: the Presidential state of mind;25 the inclination of the political head of 
the line ministry in question; and the mindset of the ministry bureaucrats.26 
 
 Worthy of note is the fact that even though the IRAs were set up in different 
sectors, their institutional design had inherent similarities. Top on the list of the 
similarities was the all the IRAs were a creation of an enabling law that incorporated 
their functions, powers and institutional arrangements.27 In addition, the common 
distinguishing feature was the independence and insulation of the IRAs from  
 
 Secondly, independence of the IRAs was enshrined in the enabling laws to 
insulate them from all other actors in the various sectors including the Executive, the 
regulated entities and the consumers. This was done in a number of ways. Firstly, the 
process of appointment and removal of Commissioners of the IRAs was scrupulously 
provided for as a most important feature of the independence of the IRAs.28 There were 
institutional safeguards requiring Senate approval of Presidential nominations and 
removal of Commissioners in IRAs. This provided a check on the executive and ensured 
                                                     
24 Ibid.  
25 Mueller and Perreira, note 19 at 68. 
26 Ibid. The author indicates that the telecommunications Minister was regarded as the second most 
powerful person in the government after President Cardoso. Thus, despite the different interest groups 
making discordant demands regarding the regulatory agency’s design, the Minister were able to impose 
what he thought was the best option for the sector. 
27 Vasconcellos, R.A.L.,  Brazilian Regulatory Agencies: Future Perspectives and The Challenges of Balancing 
Autonomy and Control, School of Business and Public Management, The Institute of Brazilian Business & 
Public Management Issues, The George Washington University, December, 2009. 
28 Essentially restricting the power of the Executive to abridge the terms of Commissioners is considered a 
central institutional test of IRA independence. See Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. 
REV. 2245, 2247 (2000); Geoffrey Miller, The Debate over Independent Agencies in Light of Empirical Evidence, 
1988 DUKE L.J. 215, 216 (“The distinguishing feature of [independent] agencies is that their principal 
officers are protected against presidential removal at will.”); Alan B. Morrison, How Independent Are 
Independent Agencies?, 1988 DUKE L.J. 252, 252 (“There is no official definition of an independent agency . 
. . but for me an independent agency is one whose members may not be removed by the President except 
for cause.”). 
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that only credible persons competent and fit to occupy the offices were nominated, in 
order not to risk a veto from the Senate.29 It also served to make Commissioners so 
appointed owe an allegiance to the system and not to the appointing authority. Where 
no restrictions exist on the ability of the executive to remove a Commissioner without 
due cause, it will be unlikely for that Commissioner  to make decisions that are at 
variance with what the appointing authority wanted.30   
 
 Thirdly, the adoption of a collegial system of decision-making as opposed to a 
sole Commissionership and staggered terms31 that outlives the lifespan of a particular 
government in an electoral cycle, were provided for in the enabling laws. Typically 
collegial decisions lessen the likelihood of Presidential or other external interferences in 
the conduct of the affairs of IRAs, as opposed to a situation where decisions are made 
by an individual Commissioner.32   
 Fourthly, another vital guarantee of independence for IRAs was financial 
autonomy. This route involved the granting to the IRA, alternative funding streams that 
were outside that of the state treasury. 33 The reasoning behind this provision was to 
insulate IRAs from external control especially from the executive arm, as whoever 
provided for the financial needs of the IRAs would be positioned to unduly influence its 
autonomy.  
 Fifthly, all the enabling laws gave IRA Commissioners the powers to determine 
their organizational structure including who to employ in addition to reserving the 
                                                     
29 Smith, W., Utility Regulators—The Independence Debate, PUB. POL’Y FOR PRIVATE SECTOR, at 3 
(World Bank Group, Note No. 127, Oct. 1, 1997). 
30 Prado, note 17 at 470. 
31Lei No. 9.472, arts. 24–25, de 16 de julho de 1997, D.O.U. de 17.7.1997; Lei No. 9.472, art. 25, de 16 de 
julho de 1997, D.O.U. de 17.7.1997. (Brazil). 
32Joskow, P.L.,  Regulatory Priorities for Reforming Infrastructure Sectors in Developing Countries, paper 
prepared for the Annual World Bank Conference on Dev. Econ., Wash., D.C., Apr. 20–21, 1998), available 
at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTABCDEWASHINGTON1998/Resources/joskow.pdf at 30–31. 
33 Smith, note 29; For example Decreto No. 4.691, art. 2, de 8 de maio de 2003, D.O.U. de 9.5.2003 a 
presidential decree limited the travel expenses of the employees of all executive branch bodies to 60% of 
the total amount spent in 2002 which was interpreted to mean all those drawing funds from the state 
treasury. 
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powers to hire external consultants to enrich the regulatory processes. The ability to 
attract and retain a qualified work force that can navigate the multi-faceted and inter-
disciplinary nature of IRA’s functions and powers is important for its legitimacy and 
performance.34 The ability to hire its own staff in no small way operated to assert the 
independence of the IRAs. 
 
 Sixthly, embedded in the enabling laws was an institutional arrangement that 
required IRAs to be transparent in their processes and procedures and impartial in their 
handling of regulatory functions. In addition, they were required to be accountable35 for 
their actions by involving all stakeholders before any regulatory decision is made36 
while at the same time subjecting their decisions to judicial review. 37 
 Notwithstanding the elaborate institutional safeguards contained in the enabling 
laws to insulate the IRAs from external influence and control, IRAs in Brazil have not 
enjoyed the level of independence the law designed them to have. Even though the IRA 
model is still in its early stages of implementation in Brazil, the regulatory outcomes 
when measured against the ideal deliverables show a patchy picture of a pattern of 
inability to adequately address the infrastructure deficits in Brazil. A review of 
literature38 on the level of attainment of the best practices principles by IRAs in Brazil 
points to ten reasons for the lack of independence and ineffectiveness of IRAs in Brazil. 
 First, in the process of transplanting the IRA model in Brazil, certain institutional 
features inherent in the USA IRAs from where the IRA derived its roots were either not 
implemented or not transplanted into Brazil.  
                                                     
34 Brown, note 5. 
35 The Legislative arm has powers to amend or repeal any regulations or laws made by IRAs acting under 
its delegated powers if those regulations or laws are found to be inconsistent with the original delegating 
instrument- the basic law under the legal principle of "Democratic Rule of Law" See Vasconcellos, note 27 
at 28. 
36 Ibid at 30. 
37 Brown, note 5; Vasconcellos, note 27 at 28. 
38 Prado, note 17; Vasconcellos, note 27. 
195 
 
 An example was the absence of a mitigating legislation akin to the 
Administrative Procedure Act39 in the USA that minimized the risk of the Executive 
tampering with IRA independence by reducing to the minimum the exercise of 
administrative discretion by the Executive towards IRAs. With the absence the 
Executive in Brazil has over time been able to interfere in the affairs of IRAs thus 
weakening the independence provisions in the enabling laws.40 
 
 Secondly, certain successful institutional features of the USA political and legal 
frameworks were unsuccessful in Brazil. In some of the USA IRAs, the 
Chairman serves at the President’s pleasure and can be dismissed from the position at 
any time. Even though this appears less protective, the system worked well and has 
seen few cases of executive abuse, partly attributable to the strengths of the system 
coupled with maturity of the political class. In the Brazilian model however, despite 
being more protective than USA model by granting a fixed term to the Chairman, the 
length of that term is left to the discretion of the Executive.41 This has been utilised 
severally to undermine the independence of the IRAs by fixing terms to align with 
electoral cycles and to meet political ends.42 
 
 Thirdly, certain features of the USA model that have institutional problems were 
notwithstanding transplanted to Brazil, replicating the same problems that have long 
existed in the USA.  One is the matter of independent funding of IRAs. In the USA, in 
order to ensure IRA independence, alternative streams of income outside the national 
budget were provided for in the law. Notwithstanding this, between the President and 
the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) the “power of the purse” tendency was 
                                                     
39 The 1946 Act minimized the risk of political interference by reducing administrative discretion, 
increasing transaction costs to change policies, and granting courts power to interpret agency statutes, 
which limits the ability of new appointees to announce new interpretation of statutes. McCubbins et al  
The Political Origins of the Administrative Procedure Act, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 180 (1999). 
40 Prado, note 17. 
41 Ibid at 473. 
42 Ibid.  
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deployed to hamstring the financial independence of IRAs.43 It took Congress action 
through a legislation to halt the interference of the Executive.44 In spite of the apparent 
subversion of the independence of IRAs through “power of the purse” tendency, the 
Brazilian model adopted the path and with it came the same challenges the USA model 
faced. What has ensued from this is that despite clear provisions in each of the enabling 
laws granting IRAs financial autonomy, the executive has through executive actions 
subverted and rendered those provisions nugatory by subjecting IRAs to budgetary 
controls.45  
 
 Fourthly, the operational independence of IRAs which allows them to develop 
systems and processes that they deem will best allow them deliver on their mandate has 
been tampered with by removing their powers to defend their decisions on appeal in 
courts of law.46 That in turn has not allowed IRAs to adequately defend their decisions 
and evolve a body of stare generis to be relied upon in future as it relies on another 
Executive body to defend its decisions in courts of law.47  
 
 Fifthly, the fixed terms provisions for Commissioners of IRAs have been 
compromised by the two inter-related concepts: the “throwing in the towel” and 
“political drift.” “Throwing in the towel” and “political drift” may occur where a new 
Head of State still finds ways to “convince” commissioners to resign before the end of 
their tenure, leaving a vacancy that will be filled by the Head of State’s own nominees. 
                                                     
43 Carpenter, D. P., Adaptive Signal Processing, Hierarchy, and Budgetary Control in Federal Regulation, 90 AM. 
POL. SCI. REV. 283 (1996). 
44 Moe, T.M.,  Regulatory Performance and Presidential Administration, 26 AM. J. POL. SCI. 197 (1982); B. Dan 
Wood, B.,  and Waterman, R.W.,  The Dynamics of Political-Bureaucratic Adaptation, 37 AM. J. POL. SCI. 497. 
(1993). 
45 Prado, note 17 at 490-496. 
46 By Implementing Order nº 164 of the Advocacy-General of the Union, of February 20, 2009 attorneys of 
IRAs were barred from defending the decisions of these bodies in the higher courts (Supreme Federal 
Court and Higher Courts of Justice). Thus, the defense of the decisions of the agencies before higher 
courts is now responsibility of a specific department of the Federal General Attorney Office - PGF, which 
is linked to the AGU, which is subordinate to the President. 
47 Vasconcellos, note 27. 
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The phenomenon has its origin in the USA but has in the recent past been mitigated by 
the provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act, 1946. 
 
 Sixthly, in spite of the administrative independence of IRAs, Presidents have 
through other legislation, subjected IRAs to its controls as a result of conditions 
inherent in the Brazilian political economy that incentivises Presidents to interfere with 
the autonomy of IRAs 48.  Silva49 has argued that because the responsibility for economic 
performance and outcomes is that of the executive arm, a democratically elected 
President will desire to determine the tariffs and quality of services especially in 
utilities. For example, after the change of government in 2003 President Lula 
complained many times “that it was unacceptable for an elected President, who has to 
be accountable to the population, to have less power than a director appointed for a 
five-year term that cannot be removed from office.”50 
 
 The US model of regulatory governance has mitigated the above challenge faced 
by the Brazilian governments in seeking to control IRAs through the instrumentality of 
the Administrative Procedure Act. This legislation acts as a barometer for ensuring that 
all regulations and rulings of IRAs in USA pass the legitimacy test. That in turn ensures 
what Batista refers to as the “homogenization” of these agencies in order to introduce 
harmony and synergy in government policies.51  The practice that has crystallised is that 
an IRA must first demonstrate the reasonableness of an order or ruling, its cost-
effectiveness as well as the buy-in of relevant stakeholders before such a determination 
can take effect.52 
 
                                                     
48 Examples of this include the administrative control via hierarchical appeal; Federal Court of Accounts 
control over IRA accounts. 
49 Silva, note 16. 
50 Luiz Carlos Bresser-Pereira, Folha de São Paulo, August 13, 2007 in Vasconcellos, note 24. 
51 Batista, note 15 at 14. 
52 Ibid. at 15. 
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 Seventhly, the desire for synergy within government is yet another incentive for 
intervention by the executive arm in the affairs of IRAs. As the executive arm is 
responsible for the development and implementation of economic policies, the need 
arises to ensure synergy and cohesion in the evolution of economic policies towards the 
overall developmental objectives of government. Where there is a potential for overlaps 
and conflicts between those policies and regulatory determinations of IRAs, especially 
touching on macroeconomic and social policies being implemented by government, 
governments in Brazil have always intervened to curtail the powers of IRAs.53  
 
 Eighthly, the existence of a Federal Court of Accounts (Tribunal de Contas da 
União. TCU)  within the Brazilian political system introduced a dimension that has 
been argued to be a case of institutional overlap occasioned by the Federal Constitution 
that portends conflicts and the undermining of the autonomy granted IRAs. Under the 
Federal Constitution, the TCU is the body empowered to consider the merits of 
administrative actions and to assess the economic validity of decisions of the IRAs. The 
role of the TCU covers three areas: financial and budgetary audit, analysis of the 
administrators’ accounts, and opinion on the provision of Executive's annual accounts. 
It has been argued that the structure of the court lends itself to political influences as the 
court does not have the technical wherewithal to perform audits on IRAs in the 
performance of its highly technical areas. This control by the TCU raises issues that 
relate to the sanctity of the IRA independence and may actually be considered as a 
provision that conflicts with the IRA model of regulation.54 
  
  Still on the scope of the TUC oversight powers, is  the potential, if not the 
actual presence, of institutional overlap within the Brazilian regulatory trajectory given 
the oversight powers over IRAs. This apparent overlap portends regulatory uncertainty 
                                                     
53 Silva, note 16 at 40-41; Vasconcellos, note 27 at 21. 
54 Vasconcellos, note 27 at 24-26. 
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and confusion. From simply providing audit oversight on IRAs, the TUC has assumed 
oversight powers of reviewing the purely technical ruling and decisions of IRAs.55   
 Ninthly, the institutional weaknesses in the judicial system have undermined the 
effectiveness of the IRA model in Brazil. The track record of the Brazilian judicial 
system is poor especially as regards the upholding and enforcement of property rights. 
Inordinate delay in the determination of commercial disputes and a winding and 
complicated civil procedure has been the face of the Brazilian judiciary.  The respected 
Financial Times of London, had in a frontline article, noted the dysfunctional state of 
Brazil’s judiciary which has come to be seen as an impediment to national development. 
The article noted that the judiciary: 
 
  allows debtors of all kinds to abscond at will, knowing that none but  
  the most determined of creditors will pursue them through the   
  courts. It forces banks to lend at astronomical rates of interest   
  because they cannot foreclose on debts. More worryingly, it means   
  that vital infrastructure projects are stalled because investors   
  cannot be sure the judiciary will uphold their rights.56 
 
 Pinheiro57 in a study of the Brazilian judiciary opined that the mediocre quality 
of laws and the many veto points inherent in it are partly to blame for the compromised 
application of justice. On the other hand, Saddi and Faria have shown that the formal 
structure of the law, especially as regarding the many procedural layers and formalities 
that litigants must surmount, has rendered the judicial system to be “fragmented and 
                                                     
55 Eduardo Magalhães, G.G., The independent regulatory agencies and the Federal Court of Accounts: a 
jurisdictional conflict?Journal of Public Administration, Rev. Adm. Pública vol.40 no.4 Rio de Janeiro July / 
Aug. 2006; GOMES, M.B, External control of regulatory agencies in Brazil in comparative perspective: lessons, 
recent events and future challenges, In: INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS ON DEL CLAD LA REFORMA DEL 
STATE Y DE LA ADMINISTRACIÓN PUBLIC, 8. Annals ... Panama, May.  2003 
56 Financial Times. Why Brazil's judicial system is driving the country nuts. Author: Jonathan 
Wheatley, 24 May 2005. 
57 Pinheiro, A., Reforma do Judiciário: planos, propostas e perspectivas. Rio de Janeiro: Booklink Publicações, 
2003. 
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hardly systematized.” This has made the responsiveness of the judiciary to be sluggish 
without meeting the ends of justice.58  
  Tenthly, Batista59 argues that even though the Brazilian IRAs are tailored after 
the US model, there has been a failure in developing the participation procedures that 
grant legitimacy to the decisions there. Public participation in the regulatory process 
accords transparency and legitimacy; and allows for a buy-in of all relevant 
stakeholders upon whom regulatory decisions would have impact. Batista further notes 
that as at spring of 2014, only ANEEL, the electricity regulator, had established a 
methodology and developed processes and procedures for holding activity hearings 
and public consultations, in addition to the public meetings of the Board of Directors. 
This is just one out of the ten IRAs established.  
 
 This lack of public participation has led to an erosion of public support for 
decision-making processes of the IRAs, thus opening up the floodgates for court actions 
that impugn the legitimacy of IRAs.60  
 
 Given the centrality of property rights protection to the survival of the IRA 
model, the dismal state of the judicial system has a major impact on economic growth, 
and by extension the effective functioning of IRAs.61  
                                                     
58 Saddi,J., The connection between the judiciary and credit as an instrument of national development: the case of 
Brazil, Centre for Brazilian Studies, University of Oxford, Working Paper Number CBS-82-07,2007;  Faria, 
J.E.,  Direito e Economia na Democratização Brasileira. São Paulo : Ed. Malheiros, 1993. 
59 Batista, note 15 at 16. 
60 The Brazilian Associations of Infrastructures and Basic Industries’ Report of 2008 notes that the number 
of court actions against IRAs relating to their regulatory mandates had increased in the past years. The 
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the normative power of the regulatory agencies by the Judicial Branch, George Washington University - School 
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Washington – DC, Spring 2014, Appendix B. 
61 Pinheiro, A.C., O judiciário e a economia: evidéncia empírica para o caso 
brasileiro”, in Judiciário e Economia no Brasil, 2000, edited by Armando C. Pinheiro, Sumaré in Goldstein  
and  Pires, Esta publicação é parte da Biblioteca Virtual de Ciências Humanas do Centro 
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 The Brazilian experience underlines five challenges developing countries face in 
setting up IRAs within the context of weak institutional endowments. 
 First, the Brazilian experience shows that the state of a nation’s political economy 
is a major factor constituting impediments to institutional reforms in developing 
countries.62 Political economy here refers to the interplay of political institutions, the 
political environment, and the economic system influence each other within a nation 
state. In the Brazilian context, a long period of military rule laid the foundation of a 
centralized command-like leadership structure where power flows from the top to 
bottom with little or no lower-up inputs. This constrains citizens’ participation in policy 
evolution thus denying policies acceptability and legitimacy. The transplanting of the 
IRA into the Brazilian mix without public participation and buy-in is a case in point.   
 Second, the Brazilian case highlights the dangers of adopting an “overly 
idealized view of the way the transplanted legal system operates in the country of 
origin”63 and it occurred in Brazil. Transplanting models from other climes for the 
simple reason that they have worked there and expecting them to equally work in the 
same manner in a developing country is too simplistic an idea. A deliberate attempt at 
calibrating it to local conditions and particularities is desirable.  
 
 Third, cultures that have a long history of authoritarianism and military rule 
tend to have a militarised response to reforms, and a suitable foundation needs to take 
in place before institutional reforms such as IRAs that require democratic concepts such 
as separation of powers and the rule of law to succeed are introduced. Military rule in 
                                                     
62 Prado, note 17 at 503;  Vasconcellos, note 28. See also the Comments of Prado that “If the President will 
be held electorally responsible for what the agencies are doing, he has strong incentives to try to influence 
them to implement popular policies. For example, the President could try to make the agencies reduce the 
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privatisation.”: Prado, M., Institutional reforms, legal transplants and political systems, paper presented at 
SELA Conference, June 2007 at 10-11. 
63 Ibid at 442. 
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Brazil had a hierarchical system whereby power did not devolve from the very top of 
the leadership to the bottom. The autocratic leadership was inimical to democratic-
friendly cultures such as public discourse, ventilation and due consideration of 
alternative viewpoints, a vibrant press, and civil society organizations. These did not 
thrive in a manner to assist in the evolution of people centred programmes in the 
Brazilian context.   
 
 Four, the outcome of reforms in developing countries has a lot to do with the 
political will and personality of the head of government. This brings into focus the 
argument of the primacy of leadership over institutions in Nigeria. Prado makes the 
point that the reforms in Brazil that institutionalised the IRA model were not feasible 
until the emergence of a strong President that possessed and displayed a strong 
political will to see through the reforms.64  
 
 Five, the rise in the number of court actions against IRAs in Brazil points to a 
major failure of its umpire role in Brazil’s political economy. It can be safely argued that 
the multiplicity of law suits is an indication of the IRAs’ inability to balance the 
contending interests of all the players in its regulatory space and value chain. This 
portends regulatory conflicts and uncertainty and belies the lack of the effective 
institutionalisation and stabilisation of IRAs in Brazil’s political trajectory.65  
 
 The lessons drawn from the Brazilian context in its attempt at instituting IRAs 
point to the challenges that developing countries need to dwell on before adopting the 
model. A consideration of the contextual endowments and limitations of the nation 
should be an overriding factor in a quest to institute foreign models that have worked 
elsewhere but may have local challenges. 
 
                                                     
64 Prado, note 17. 
65 Batista, note 15. 
203 
 
6.4  Legal and Regulatory Framework of Independent     
  Regulatory Agencies in Ghana 
Prior to the reforms in the 1980s, all the essential utilities in Ghana were in the hands of 
government as SOEs. This was because of their monopolistic characteristics and the 
large financial resources required for owning and managing them. Private investors 
nursed fears borne of a lack of a suitable climate to permit the recovery of 
investments.66  By the 1980s however, these SOEs were suffering from mismanagement, 
poor operational performance and distorted tariff structures that resulted in poor 
service delivery and the near absence of essential utilities to a large section of society. 
The government used this as a rationale to seek private sector through participation and 
investment through privatisation. This gave rise to the evolution of a new legal and 
regulatory framework to deal with the entry of the private sector into the erstwhile 
wholly owned public utilities. 
 
 The institutional design of IRAs in Ghana, like in Brazil, did not have the benefit 
of stakeholders’ participation in the formulation of its underlining principles, goals and 
outcomes to the nation. There was therefore no concerted engagement and acceptance 
of the new policy thrust particularly from two critical stakeholders in the value chain: 
the regulated entities and the consumers.67  
 
 What gave the final impetus to the economic reforms were the public protests 
that broke out in 1997 against a 300% price increase in services by the two electric 
power utilities, the Electricity Company of Ghana (ECG) and Volta River Authority 
(VRA), ostensibly as a part of the reforms measures that were promoted by the World 
Bank. As a result, the government of Ghana stepped in, first to suspend the price 
                                                     
66 Aryeetey, E. and Ahene, A.S., Utilities Regulation in Ghana, Centre on Regulation and Competition 
Working Paper Series, Paper No. 111, June 2005. 
67 Ibid.  
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increases and then went ahead to set up two IRAs in the utilities sectors to regulate the 
provision of water, telecommunications and electricity.68   
 
 While the Public Utilities Regulatory Commission (PURC) and Energy 
Commission (EC) were established in 1997 to regulate the provision of water and 
electricity, the National Communications Authority (NCA) was set up to regulate 
telecommunications. The purview of EC extended to the regulation of petroleum and 
gas.69 PURC is considered an economic regulator in charge of tariff setting, performance 
monitoring, promotion of competition and complaints handling, and the EC known as 
the technical regulator was primarily responsible for licensing, technical standards and 
performance monitoring, in addition to serving as a policy advisory organ of the Energy 
Ministry.70 
 
 Even though the IRAs in Ghana were set up about the same time, their 
institutional features varied from sector to sector. It is an open question as to whether 
the institutional design of IRAs in Ghana is in alignment with the international best 
practices tests of credibility, legitimacy, and transparency.71 It has been argued by 
Kapika and Eberhard72 that in terms of the allocation of powers, the two utility 
regulators meet the standard of best practices for effective regulation. This argument 
appears to be oblivious to the several limitations in the power architecture and design 
of the Ghanaian IRAs. 
 
 Firstly, in terms of possessing the requisite institutional powers that are 
consistent with international best practice,73 the EC Act does not give it such powers as 
                                                     
68 Ibid.  
69 Kapika and Eberhard, note 8. 
70 Ibid.  
71 Brown, note 5. 
72 Kapika and Eberhard, note 8 at 214-215. 
73 Brown, note 5. 
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it is merely an advisory body.74 This is further highlighted by the Ministerial powers 
mandating the Minister to give directions to the Commission.75 In the case of PURC, 
even though the PURC Act stipulates that “the Commission shall not be subject to the 
direction or control of any person or authority in the performance of its functions” the 
Minister of Energy is on record as having categorically stated that as long as PURC 
derives funding from the state treasury, it cannot be considered an independent body.76  
 
 Secondly, with respect to the adequacy in the clarity of roles and responsibilities 
between the IRAs and the other players within their regulatory space, it is submitted 
that vesting similar powers in two IRAs within the same regulatory space in a 
developing and immature political environment such as Ghana’s is an open invitation 
for turf wars; and the accompanying confusion can only be avoided where careful 
coordination among the IRAs is maintained. Thus, the prevailing concerns of regulatory 
overlaps and uncertainty may not be unfounded.77  
 
 Thirdly, in terms of financial independence, while the EC derives most of its 
funding from the Energy Fund that is controlled by the Finance Ministry, PURC has 
four major sources of funding including government subventions, loans and grants and 
internally generated funds, the first source being the primary one. Thus, both the EC 
and the PURC depend almost wholly on budgetary funding streams from the state 
treasury. This has impacted negatively on their independence, capacity and legitimacy. 
  For example, over the 10-year period from 1999 to 2008 the approved budget of 
PURC was on average 47% lower than the amount proposed by it.78 This in turn has led 
                                                     
74 Kapika and Eberhard, note 8 at 213. 
75 Section 3. 
76 Kapika and Eberhard, note 8 at 214. 
77 Ibid at 214 – 215 and 232. 
78 PURC noted in its second annual report (1999) that “funding constraints still remain a problem due to 
the rather arbitrary ceiling imposed on the Commission’s budget proposals submitted to government for 
approval. Inevitably, the budget fell short of what was required to sustain the Commission’s programs”. 
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to unattractive remuneration packages which do not attract the best professionals 
needed.79  
 
 Fourthly, touching on administrative and functional independence, 
Commissioners in both EC and PURC are liable to be removed from office by the 
President on the occurrence of four events, one of which is for “any just case”.80 This 
raises serious questions of arbitrariness and the possible exercise of discretion without 
verifiable parameters. Regarding staffing, both the EC and PURC Acts81 give the 
President the power to appoint officials and employees of the Commissionn acting on 
the advice of the Commission. On a last note, the EC Act allows an aggrieved party to 
appeal against a decision of the EC to the Minister thus undermining the autonomy and 
legitimacy of the regulator.82 
 
 It can thus be surmised, contrary to Kapika and Eberhard’s position above, that 
IRAs in Ghana lack the requisite institutional powers to carry out their functions. 
  
 The review of the legal and regulatory framework for IRAs in Ghana above 
indicates several challenges.  
a) The establishment of IRAs was not carried out with deliberation but as a hasty 
reaction to public protests. The manner it was done (out of compulsion mainly to 
satisfy donor requirements and not as an institutional innovation meant to 
address the concerns of consumers) did not allow for an informed discuss of its 
desirability and relevance as the template that best met the state of Ghana’s 
political economy and peculiar characteristics. 83 
                                                     
79 A 2010 amendment to the PURC and EC laws seeks to ameliorate the situation. See Kapika and 
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b) The relevance of the political economy in crafting a suitable regulatory template 
for a nation is brought to the fore in the Ghanaian context. Ghana has had a long 
history of brutal military dictatorships that abridged the culture of civil 
engagement and communication in favour of a militarized society. This 
tendency manifested in the lack of a robust public engagement of the new 
regulatory template before its adoption by government. The IRA model was 
taken as a given and therefore suitable, having been presented by intermediating 
agencies. 
c) The duplicity in functions and roles portend overlaps that are open to conflicts 
and regulatory uncertainty. A case in point is that while PURC has the powers to 
set tariffs and monitor technical standards, it lacks the powers to license entry 
into its regulatory space as the powers reside in EC. This has constrained PURC 
from monitoring and enforcement. Similarly, too the hands of EC are tied as it is 
not empowered to monitor technical standards.84  
d) Achieving a full cost-reflective tariff has proven a herculean task because of 
consideration of the needs of the poor in society. Government pro-poor policy 
influences regulatory actions, thus curtailing the independence of the regulator 
through active influence from the government.85 
e) There are inadequate investments as a result of a hastily crafted regulatory 
framework, and this has made the work of the IRAs difficult, especially in terms 
of rigidly enforcing licence terms and conditions and imposing penalties that 
could affect the already precarious financial positions of the utilities.86 
f) There is palpable lack of skilled manpower in the regulated sectors which 
translates to a dearth of professionals to populate the IRAs and fulfill their 
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mandates. This lack has affected regulatory independence, competence and 
neutrality.87  
g) Regulatory effectiveness is hampered by limitations in the availability and access 
to information and data on the economic and social parameters of national 
development. This in turn affects planning and effectiveness of the IRAs.88  
h) On the independence of the IRAs, the blanket powers give to the President in the 
enabling Acts setting up IRAs to remove a Commissioner for “any just cause” 
raises concerns of arbitrariness  and have the potential of undermining the 
independence of the IRAs.89 Further exacerbating the weakened state of IRAs in 
Ghana are the powers residing in the President to appoint staff the IRAs. 
i) In terms of financial independence, both the EC and the PURC depend almost 
wholly on budgetary funding streams. This, apart from limiting the ability of the 
IRA to act independently and in the adjudged best interests of the industry, 
makes it susceptible to influences of the quarters from which it derives its 
funding. This undermines the independence and legitimacy of the IRAs to act 
effectively and competently. 
j) The most significant constraint on the thriving of IRAs in Ghana, and indeed 
most developing countries is the wide information gap existing between 
providers of services and the users of those services. The information gap is 
engendered by the poverty of the users of services and their low level of 
education. When infrastructure service providers use advanced technology that 
is beyond the means of the majority of the users of the service either in 
comprehension or affordability, the regulator’s task of setting tariffs becomes 
extremely difficult to carry out meaningfully.90 
 
                                                     
87 Lafont, J.J,  Regulation and Development, Federico Caffe Lectures, 2005, Cambridge University Press. 
88 Aryeetey and Ahene, note 66. 
89 Ibid. 
90 Aryeetey, note 3 at 45. 
 
209 
 
 It can be seen therefore, that both Brazil and Ghana assimilated the IRA model 
under similar circumstances without any attempt at public involvement in its evolution. 
As a result, the model’s implementation is undergoing turbulence and its future is at 
best hazy given the contextual challenges it faces in these countries.  
 
 This thesis will now consider the Nigeria reception of the IRA model and how it 
has fared so far and further juxtapose its institutional features and performance with its 
counterparts in Brazil and Ghana. 
6.5  Legal and Regulatory Framework of Independent     
  Regulatory Agencies in Nigeria 
Until the 1980s, Government utilised SOEs as a vehicle to promote economic 
development and the provision of infrastructure and utilities. SOEs were established in 
virtually all the sectors of the economy with extensive monopoly powers to provide 
public goods and services and also in hard infrastructure such as transportation (rail, 
road, inland waterways, marine and air) oil (oil prospecting, exploration, refining and 
marketing), cement, fertilizer and motor assembly plants; steel, paper mills, 
telecommunication, postal system, electric power, banking and insurance sectors.91 
Social or soft infrastructures made up of schools and hospitals were included. A 
survey92 showed that there were nearly 600 public enterprises at the federal level alone 
and an estimated 900 at the state and local government levels. By 1990, Nigeria 
possessed the largest SOE portfolio in sub-Sahara Africa. 
 Dwindling oil revenues and a global economic recession coupled with failure of 
the SOEs to attain the goals for their set up, led government, on the prompting of the 
intermediating agencies93, to commence structural adjustment economic reforms. 
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 A major plank of the reforms was the minimisation of the role of the state in the 
ownership of infrastructure and provision of services and the opening up of erstwhile 
public monopolies to private sector ownership and management through privitisation. 
With these reforms came IRAs as a model of regulatory governance that would balance 
the interests of all the players in the value chain.94 IRAs were established in the 
telecommunications and the electric power sector while new ones are in the process of 
being set up in oil and gas, transportation, maritime and postal services. 
 This research will consider those already existing IRAs in the two utilities above 
as they match the precise contours of an IRA.  
6.5.1  Telecommunications  
 The telecommunications sector was grossly under-developed before 
deregulation in 1992 with the setting up of the Nigerian Communication Commission 
(NCC).95 In spite of this, continued government ownership and management of the 
main service provider, Nigerian Telecommunications Limited (NITEL), constrained 
deregulation until 1999 when a new law, the Nigerian Communications Act 2003 (NCA 
2003) strengthened the capacity of the NCC to function effectively as the IRA for the 
telecommunications industry.  
6.5.1.1  Institutional Characteristics, Requisite Powers, Clarity of Roles and    
  Independence 
The NCA 2003 is the primary legislation that contains all the basic provisions that allow 
the NCC to operate optimally as an IRA for the sector. 96 The law spells out the 
functions of the NCC 97 and further clarifies and delineates the roles of all the other 
stakeholders in the sector including the line ministry98, the licensees99 and the 
                                                     
94Newberry, D., Rate of Return Regulation versus Price Regulation for Utilities in Kapika and  Eberhard, note 
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95 The Nigerian Communications Commission Act,  1992. 
96 Section 1 and 2 of the NCA Act, 2003. 
97 Section 4 of the NCA Act, 2003. 
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211 
 
consumer.100 In addition, it specifies the procedures and powers101 to be utilised in 
carrying out the functions, and grants the NCC the requisite powers including the 
powers to make regulations and bye laws that will allow it to effectively achieve its 
mandate.102 The law also grants to the NCC the powers to hire its own staff,103 a critical 
area where IRAs are often compromised as a result of low remuneration. 
 The clarity of roles provision is especially important in the Nigerian context 
considering the fact that prior to the reforms, government was the owner of the 
incumbent utility, NITEL, in addition to being the manager and provider of 
telecommunication services while simultaneously acting as the regulator for the sector. 
In the latter role, government determined the prices of services which were not cost 
reflective. In order for the private sector to have the assurances to invest, a level playing 
field had to be provided. 
 The extent of NCC’s powers includes undertaking quasi-judicial proceedings to 
resolve disputes between licensees.104 The nature of these powers would be of concern 
to separation of powers theorists who, as in the USA model,105 argued that vesting IRAs 
with powers of arbitration and adjudication conflicts with that time-tested doctrine. 
While in the USA, this matter has been laid to rest by numerous judicial 
pronouncements,106 in the Nigerian context, it remains an untested area. However, as it 
relates to powers to conduct public hearings of a civil nature by IRAs, the decision of 
the Nigerian Supreme Court in Garba Vs. University of Maiduguri107 suffices. In that 
case, the court recognized the power of administrative bodies to conduct hearings. 
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Thus, while an administrative body may not hear criminal matters, it can hear matters 
in respect of civil conduct. The Supreme Court’s recognition is also in line with the 
dictates of the 1999 Constitution which merely sets out the parameters for validity of 
administrative hearings by reference to adherence to rules of natural justice.108   
6.5.1.2  Independence 
For an IRA to be able to function effectively and deliver on its mandate, it ought to have 
some degree of independence109 in order to ward off both political and regulatory 
capture. This is done by maintaining an arms-length relationship with all players in the 
value chain. The NCA 2003 adequately provides for this in Section 25 (2): 
  In the execution of his functions and relationship with the    
  Commission, the Minister shall at all times ensure that the    
  independence of the Commission, in regard to the discharge of its   
  functions and operations under this Act, is protected and not   
  compromised in any manner whatsoever. 
 
Furthermore, this insulation from control and influence takes several forms consistent 
with the best practices above, as follows. 
 
a) Regarding appointment and removal of Commissioners, the NCA 2003 provides 
that the President shall appoint, subject to the confirmation of the Senate. In 
addition, the tenure of IRA members cannot be abridged except on due cause 
and only upon being given a fair hearing prior to removal. This safeguards the 
tendency of regulators to take decisions that may not be in the best interest of the 
sector but rather to please their appointees. This protection is also contained in 
the legal framework of Brazilian IRAs though it is missing in the Ghanaian 
model.  
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b) The NCA Act also grants fixed terms for Commissioners but does not provide for 
staggered appointments unlike the Brazilian model. Staggered nominations 
mean that within one agency term, the terms of office of directors will not 
overlap. A system of staggered terms guarantees a higher degree of 
independence if it reduces or eliminates altogether overlapping nominations. 
This insulation seeks to fence off regulators terms from Presidential abridgement 
of tenures of Commissioner with electoral cycles in mind. Thus this aspect of 
protection and the related independence is missing in the Nigerian and 
Ghanaian model of IRAs but present in the Brazilian model. 
c) Another form of independence in the NCA 2003 is in the funding streams that 
are separate from the national treasury. This is amply provided for in Part 5 of 
the NCA 2003 and the NCC has been able to maintain its independence by 
relying on levies and fees derived from the regulated entities for its sustenance. 
The financial independence the NCC contrasts sharply with the Brazilian and the 
Ghanaian models. While in the Brazilian model, the protection exists on the 
books, the executive has in practice, devised ingenuous ways to circumvent it 
and require all budgets of IRAs to receive approval of the executive. In the 
Ghanaian situation, this insulation is totally absent and the performance and 
effectiveness of the IRAs has been undermined by dictation and interferences for 
the Executive arm of government.  
 
d) On operational and structural independence, the NCA 2003 is designed to make 
the NCC independent of external control and influence, by expressly requiring 
them not to take directives from any external bodies or persons except on policy 
matters. 110 In addition, the NCC has the powers to hire its own staff, determine 
remuneration levels and also to engage external consultants. This allows them 
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the ability to attract and retain qualified personnel.111  This same power exists in 
the Brazilian IRAs but is absent in the Ghanaian model where the President has 
the powers to appoint officers into the IRAs.112 This route, apart from 
undermining the independence of the IRAs in Ghana, has served to delay the 
appointment of even junior staff thus affecting the effective delivery of 
services.113  
 
e) Furthermore, the adoption of the collegial system of administration within IRAs 
which is a feature of the Brazilian model has also been transplanted into the 
Nigerian context, though it is missing in the Ghanaian situation. This is a system 
whereby decisions of the IRAs are arrived at by consensus among the body of 
Commissioners as opposed to a single individual. Where Commissioners take 
decisions in a group-setting, it limits the extent of internal interferences as it is 
easier to influence one director than it is to influence a commission that makes a 
decision under a collegial process. 
 
6.5.1.3  Accountability  
As the powers of the IRA are delegated, there are built-in mechanisms in the NCA 2003 
to hold the NCC accountable in the discharge of its functions and exercise of powers. 
These mechanisms are in two parts: first, the requirement that the NCC tables a report 
before the National Assembly detailing its activities in the preceding year alongside its 
audited accounts.114 The second is in subjecting all its decisions to judicial review in the 
event of any party being aggrieved by them.115 The legislative oversight power of the 
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National Assembly allows it to inquire into the affairs of IRAs116 which power exists 
both in the Nigerian and Ghanaian context.  
6.5.1.4  Legitimacy, Transparency, Public Participation, Predictability 
Best practice117 requires that the regulatory systems and processes must be fair and 
impartial and open for public participation. Even though this can be achieved in 
different ways, as a general rule, all those to be affected by regulatory decisions must 
have prior notice of the impacts and the opportunity to be heard in order to ventilate 
their views before a decision can be arrived at by the IRA. 
  Sections 57 – 67 of the NCA 2003 detail the procedures to be undertaken by the 
NCC in its interface with stakeholders. The full import of these provisions is that the 
public ought to be involved in and consulted prior to the determination of any 
regulatory direction or any change thereof and whatever decisions that are arrived at 
must be in a recorded form that contains the basis for the decision and is open for the 
public to access. This encourages public participation, transparency and legitimacy in 
the whole regulatory process.  
6.5.1.5  Performance of Telecommunications Sector 
The performance of the telecommunications industry since the establishment of the 
NCC as a fully-fledged IRA, when compared with what was obtained prior to the 
reforms, indicates major improvements.118 However, Nigerians continue to clamour and 
complain about the poor quality of telecommunications services, a situation which puts 
the NCC as the regulator in a dim light.119 More pointedly, there have been muted 
complaints of industry capture by the regulated entries owing to the lack of 
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improvement in services and the apparent helplessness of the NCC, even though these 
complains have so far not been substantiated.120  
 The overview of the legal and regulatory framework in the telecommunications 
sector indicates certain institutional limitations in the design of the framework. This has 
given rise to some emerging challenges to the successful implementation of the model 
in Nigeria: 
a) Even though there are adequate safeguards securing the tenure of 
Commissioners within the NCC, government, as a part of its overreaching and 
illegal steps, recently purported to remove a Commissioner before the expiration 
of his tenure without giving him a fair hearing in accordance with the NCA 2003.  
The courts held the removal to be unlawful.121 This underlines the thin line 
between independence from and influence of the government. 
b) There have been incidences of overt interference in the discharge of the NCC 
functions by government acting through the line Minister. One instance which 
readily comes to mind is that in 2008 the NCC, through an auction,  awarded 
three 3GHz spectrum licenses to three companies: Mobitel, Multilinks and 
Spectranet. The Minister ordered the cancellation of the award alleging that the 
entire process was tainted by corruption and lacked due process. In reaction, one 
of the licensees went to court, in the case of Mobitel  Vs Minister of  Information 
& Communication, and 2 others to challenge the Minister’s action  and the court 
held that the Minster’s intervention was unlawful.122 
                                                     
120 Industry capture involves the control of regulation by parties not pursuing the public interest. 
121 Gwandu v President Federal Republic of Nigeria and Attorney General of the Federation, 
(unreported). Suit No. NICN/ABJ/23/2012 
122 Suit No. FHC/ABJ/M/312/09/CA/A/117/10, Mobitel v Minister of Information & Communication, and 2 
others. 
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c) Allegations of regulatory capture by the regulated entities have continued to test 
the regulatory process in the light of the poor services rendered and the inability 
of the NCC to enforce its licence terms to improve service delivery.123   
 
6.5.2  Electricity 
Prior to the reforms in the sector, government was responsible for policy formulation, 
regulation, operation, and investment in the Nigerian power sector. Regulation of the 
sector was done by the Federal Ministry of Power while operations were undertaken by 
the National Electric Power Authority (NEPA), a SOE responsible for power generation, 
transmission and distribution.124 The overlapping roles coupled with the poor 
performance of the incumbent provider, NEPA, made the availability of power an 
essential commodity that was rarely experienced, with power supply hovering between 
3000 and 4000 megawatts for a country of over 160 million people.125  
 As a result, government passed the Electric Power Sector Reform Act of 2005 
(EPSRA 2005) which established the Power Holding Company of Nigeria (PHCN) and 
subsequently unbundled it into 18 successor companies. The reform objectives included 
the transfer of management and financing of successor companies operations to the 
private sector; the establishment of an IRA to regulate the entire industry; and the 
delineation and restriction of the role of government in the industry to policy 
formulation and long-term development of the industry. With these in place, the 
projection was that it would lead to increased access to electricity services; improved 
efficiency, affordability, reliability and quality of services; and higher outlay of 
investment into the industry to stimulate economic growth and development.126 Since 
                                                     
123Olumide, note 119.  
124 Nigeria Electricity Privatization Project. http://www.nigeriaelctricityprivatisationproject.com 
accessed on 1/8/15 at 10.10a.m. 
125 Adaralegbe, B., Foreign Private Participation in the Electricity Sector of Developing Countries: What Works? 
An Examination of Nigeria’s Electricity Sector, The Journal of World Investment & Trade, 2009, Volume 10, 
Issue 2, 269 – 295. 
126 Nigeria Electricity Privatization Project, note 124. 
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then, the sale of the 18 successor companies has been carried out and a competitive 
market in the electricity market is imminent with the private sector leading.   
6.5.2.1  Institutional Characteristics, Requisite Powers, Clarity of Roles    
The EPSRA 2005 establishes NERC as an independent technical and economic regulator 
(IRA) for the entire industry. The functions of NERC include, but are not limited to,  
promoting competition and private sector participation, when and where feasible; 
establishing or, as the case may be, approving appropriate operating codes and safety, 
security, reliability, and quality standards; establishing appropriate consumer rights 
and obligations regarding the provision and use of electric services; and licensing and 
regulating persons engaged in the generation, transmission, system operation, 
distribution, and trading of electricity. In addition, NERC is empowered to approve 
amendments to the market rules; monitor the operation of the electricity market; and 
undertake such other activities which are necessary or convenient for the better carrying 
out of or giving effect to the objects of the Commission.127  
6.5.2.2  Independence 
The depth of the legal independence the law grants to the telecommunications 
regulator, NCC, is lacking in the electricity industry.128 The EPSRA 2005 does not make 
explicit provisions safeguarding the independence of NERC from ministerial 
interference; rather there are copious references empowering the Minister to give 
directions to the regulator on matters related to the industry.129  
 On operational independence, the EPSRA 2005 grants to the NERC the power to 
hire its own staff. The appointment and discipline of Commissioners is made the 
prerogative of the President but subject to confirmation of the Senate.  
 On financial independence, even though the EPSRA 2005 allows the NERC to 
earn revenue from fees, charges, levies and other income from regulated entities within 
                                                     
127 Section 32 (2). 
128 Section 25(2) of the NCA Act. 
129 Sections 24 (2), 27,28,29,33, of the EPSRA 2005. 
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the industry in addition to the funds appropriated by the National Assembly, the reality 
has been that the NERC has relied almost wholly on appropriations for its work. It is 
only recently that the Commission was removed from the recurrent budget as the result 
of the increase in its locally generated income following the privatisation of the 
unbundled successor companies in 2003 and 2004. 
6.5.2.3  Accountability  
The NERC is made accountable in several ways for the performance of its duties under 
the EPSRA 2005. Sections 51, 55, 56 and 59, 82 obligate the NERC to render periodic 
reports to the Minister on its activities and financial affairs including budgets.  In 
addition, the EPSRA empowers NERC to present quarterly reports to the President and 
National Assembly on its activities.130 Noteworthy too is the judicial oversight that 
NERC has been subjected to. The decision of the High Court in the case of PHCN & Ors 
v. NERC131 further reinforces the accountable nature of the powers of NERC to courts of 
law as all its decisions are subject to appeal and review by any aggrieved party.  
6.5.2.4  Legitimacy, Transparency, Public Participation, Predictability 
Sections 47 – 50 grant NERC the powers to conduct public hearings and review its 
decisions on the application of an aggrieved party within its regulatory space. 
However, a close reading of the provisions indicates that the powers of NERC to 
conduct quasi-judicial hearings have been circumscribed by the ambiguous wording of 
the EPSRA 2005 and a prevailing court decision in PHCN & Ors v. NERC132 unlike the 
case of the NCA Act.133 In the NCA Act, an aggrieved party cannot approach the court 
until it has exhausted the internally conducted processes of NCC.134  However, in the 
case of NERC, a party can approach the courts without recourse to NERC.  
                                                     
130 Section 32 (1)(g). 
131 Unreported Suit No. FHC/ABJ/CS/35/09/08. 
132 Ibid.  
133 Section 88(3) provides that a person shall not apply to Court for a judicial review unless he has first 
exhausted all other remedies provided under NCA. This provision was affirmed by the Court in the case 
of N.C.C. V. M.T.N. 2008 (1086) 229. 
134 Section 88 (3) of the NCA. 
220 
 
 In the PHCN case above, a petition was filed before NERC on a Power Purchase 
Agreement. The Applicants challenged the jurisdiction of NERC on the ground that 
there was an arbitration clause in the agreement. NERC ruled that it had jurisdiction to 
entertain the matter and the Applicants filed an application for judicial review at the 
Federal High Court, urging the court to quash the ruling of NERC and to stay further 
proceedings of NERC. The Court held that NERC had no power to entertain the petition 
in view of the arbitration clause and that section 50(1) of the EPSR 2005 was not 
mandatory but optional. In other words, NERC does not have exclusive jurisdiction or 
powers to hear disputes within its purview as of first instance and a party is at liberty to 
seek judicial review of the decisions of NERC without reference to the latter. Clearly 
this decision restricts the powers of NERC to regulate licencees within its regulatory 
purview as well as abridging its quasi judicial power.135 
 This development, known as “forum shopping” in legal parlance, has allowed 
persons to pick and choose which court or forum they consider would best deal with 
their complaints as against the express powers of NERC in the enabling law. With the 
rampant cases of corruption indicated earlier in this thesis, a veritable window has been 
opened to subvert the jurisdiction and powers of NERC. 
 An overview of the legal and regulatory framework of the electric power sector 
points to distortions in the structure of the NERC and a lack of independence flowing 
from government interference. 
a) The wordings of the EPSRA 2005 does not make explicit provisions safeguarding 
the independence of the NERC from Ministerial interference; rather there are 
copious references empowering the Minister to give directions to the NERC on 
matters relating to the industry. This in practice has undermined the 
independence of the NERC, and the line ministry has continued to attempt to 
influence and dictate to the IRA as a result of the weak legal framework. 
                                                     
135 Idigbe, note 108. 
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b) Despite the clarity of the roles in the EPSRA 2005, a new law was recently passed 
setting up another technical regulator “Nigerian Electricity Management Services 
Authority for the industry.”136 The implication is that, all the powers of the NERC 
that relate to technical regulation and enforcement will be excised and 
warehoused in the new regulator. The collateral effect of the new law will be a 
lack of clarity of roles, functions and powers in the industry with roles 
overlapping and functions clashing between two agencies of government over 
the same area of coverage. In addition, it will inevitably introduce regulatory 
uncertainty in the market and is capable of sending worrying signals to the 
investing private sector on policy somersaults and changes. This would 
inevitably have the real potential of depressing further investments in the sector.  
c) Even though the appointment and removal processes have been clearly specified 
in the EPSRA 2005, government in 2009 purported to suspend all the NERC 
Commissioners on allegations of corruption without following the process 
enshrined in Section 38 of the EPSRA 2005. It is noteworthy that the courts struck 
down the suspension and removal from office as unlawful and government 
entered into an out of court settlement that determined the matter amicably.137  
6.5.2.5  Legality of NERC Decisions 
The period since the electricity regulator, NERC started regulating the market fully (in 
2003) when the unbundling and sale of the state monopoly utility company was 
consummated to date is too short to make a conclusive determination on its regulatory 
effectiveness. However, it is instructive to note that within this short period there has 
been a major tumult in the market owing to the increase in tariffs within the framework 
of poor and intermittent supply of power to consumers.  
                                                     
136 The National Assembly in May 2015 passed a law to establishing Nigerian Electricity Management 
Services Authority (NEMSA) as a technical regulator in the electricity sector. 
https://www.nassnig.org/nass2/legislation.php?id=2110 . 
137 Suit No.FHC/ABJ/CS/295/09, Dr. Muhammed Alimi Abdul-Razaq and the Attorney General of the 
Federation and 7 others. 
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There has been a torrent of court cases filed against NERC138 that relate to and touch on 
its powers to regulate tariffs. While the court cases are yet to be determined, there is a 
discernible pattern in them all: the lack of or inadequate engagement with and 
consultation by NERC with stakeholders. This is clearly against the provisions of 
Section 46 of the EPSRA 2005.139 This makes the case for a re-evaluation of NERC’s 
procedures and processes to make them amenable for stakeholders’ input in 
consonance with the EPSRA 2005. 
6.6  Summary of Comparative Analysis  
On a consideration of the international best principles upon which the IRA model of 
regulatory governance was conceived140 it is evident that it requires a stable political 
system that recognises and adheres to the principles of Separation of Power, Rule of 
Law, democratic tenets and due process.  
 The discernible success of the IRA model within the USA is situated within the 
context of her long years of democratic maturity that has nurtured institutions to 
maturity. At the heart of this success has been the respect for and adherence to the 
separation of powers and the rule of law doctrines. In this way, the different arms of 
government work in synergy to achieve common purposes and even where 
overreaching tendencies emerge from any one arm of government, they are mitigated 
                                                     
138 Suit No: FHC/L/CS/438/2015: Phoenix Steel Mills Limited and 4 Others Vs NERC and 11 Others; 
FHC/L/CS/1040/15: Nigerian Bottling Company PLC (a.k.a. Coca-cola) and 4 Other Vs NERC and 11 
Others; Suit No: FHC/L//CS/960/15: 1004 Estates Ltd & Anor Vs. NERC and  3 Others; Suit No: 
FHC/OW/CS/94/2015: Nweke Ishmeal and 2 Others Vs NERC and 3 Others; Suit No: 
FHC/L/CS/768/15: Toluwani Adebiyi Vs NERC.  
139 S. 46 states NERC “ may hold a hearing of any matter, which under this Act or any other enactment is 
required or permitted to conduct or on which it is required or permitted to take any action and the 
Commission shall hold public hearing on matters which the Commission determine to be of significant 
interest to the general public.” and “Where the Commission is required to, or otherwise decides to, hold a 
hearing, all persons having an interest in such matter shall, as far as reasonably practicable, be notified of 
the questions at issue and given opportunities of making representations if they so wish.” 
140 Regulatory governance refers to the design of the regulatory environment: legal and institutional 
framework, clarity of roles and objectives, resources available to the regulator and issues relating to 
regulatory commitment, independence, accountability, transparency, participation and legitimacy. See 
Eberhard, A., paper prepared for the World Bank Conference Towards Growth and Poverty Reduction: 
Lesson from Private Participation in Infrastructure in Sub-Saharan Africa, June 6-7, 2005, Cape Town, South 
Africa. 
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and reined in by other arms of government that have learnt through years of experience 
to secure and protect their constitutionally allotted turfs. This rich history of experience 
anchored upon strong institutions and tempered by a robust respect for democratic 
ethos which has stood the USA in good stead is what is glaringly lacking in the 
reviewed jurisdictions and Nigeria. 
 A discernible pattern evident in the way the IRAs have fared in the countries 
reviewed and in Nigeria displays certain trends: 
a) The political economy of a nation is a necessary factor to consider in the 
reception of the IRA model especially in the context of long histories of military 
dictatorships and authoritarian rule. These nations tend to have volatile and 
fragile institutions that elevate men above institutions. Rule of Law 
considerations are often in short supply. The political economy of a nation 
therefore ought to be a major factor in designing IRAs. 
b) Regulation of utilities and the institution of IRAs have a higher degree of 
credibility and legitimacy within political climes such as the USA that have a 
mature in-built system that restrains and restrains the arbitrary use of 
discretional powers by political actors against the IRAs. These maturity and in-
built mechanisms or restraint are lacking in the reviewed countries and Nigeria. 
c) Transplanting institutional templates such as IRAs that have existed and 
matured in developed nations into immature developing economies without 
minding the pitfalls that the mature nations had gone through, sets up the 
developing countries to make the same mistakes, often with disastrous 
consequences.141 
d) Major information asymmetry trail the regulatory landscape of the reviewed 
nations as a result of the low illiteracy levels and the tendency for service 
                                                     
141 Trebilcock M.J., and Prado, M.M., An Advanced Introduction to Law and Development, Elgar Advanced 
Introductions, 2014, Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, INC, USA at 55. 
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providers to capitalise on these to maximise profits and abuse customer rights 
and interests in the process.   
e) Political will and leadership matter a great deal in the design of IRAs in 
developing or weak democracies. Typically, the delegation of powers to IRAs is 
engendered by the willingness of both the executive and the legislative arms to 
share some of its powers with IRAs for the purpose of securing credible and 
technically balanced regulatory decisions and outcomes. Where the culture of 
hoarding power and over-centralising decision-making processes at the top 
layers of government predominates as it had in the reviewed countries, the 
necessary will is lacking. 
f) In spite of clear provisions insulating IRAs from external interferences, 
governments in the reviewed countries have on several instances arbitrarily 
removed IRA members who were thought not to be in the good books of 
governments. Government has in addition been seen to have openly and overtly 
interfered in the day to day management and discharge of the IRAs’ mandate. 
g) With the Nigerian context in mind, despite the establishment of IRAs in the 
telecommunications and electric power sectors, quality of services has not being 
positive. For telecommunications, the penetration and accessibility has greatly 
improved. The electricity sector has however been bedevilled by deteriorating 
service delivery, power outages and a dwindling new customer base as a result 
of low generating and distributions capacity. Clearly, therefore, the 
establishment of IRAs as a regulatory innovation to address the infrastructure 
deficits within Nigeria have not yet yielded the anticipated benefits. 
6.7  Conclusion  
In tracing the path that led IRAs into the governance trajectory of the two selected 
countries, Brazil and Ghana, the research has revealed that the two countries share 
several similarities in their political economy with that of Nigeria. For example, the 
route of the reception of the IRA transplant in both the reviewed countries was the 
same as Nigeria. Both were labouring under a yoke of economic problems occasioned 
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by under-performing SOEs that became a burden too much to bear given the global 
economic recession of the 1980s. In addition, the reviewed countries and Nigeria share a 
political economy that has been characterised by a long history of authoritarianism that 
affected almost all the aspects of their socio-political order. These included regimes that 
privileged strong men over strong institutions thus contributing to a very weak 
institutions framework pervading all the facets of the countries socio-economic life. The 
weak institutional foundations gave rise to patrimonialism, corruption and insecurity.  
 In the recent past however, all the reviewed countries and Nigeria have moved 
to democratic governance with a system that has three arms of government that are 
equal but independent of one another. Within the context of this nascent assimilation of 
democracy, the IRA model is struggling to find suitable launching pads to survive and 
sustainably deliver on its mandate. These pads accounted for the success of the IRA 
model in developed countries. These include separation of powers, rule of law, and an 
independent judiciary that secures and protects private property rights. The preceding 
thesis has shown the gradual and tortuous journey the IRA model is having in these 
countries’ political economies in the midst of weak institutional frameworks and near 
absent critical democratic nuances that are supposed to be its veritable support.  
 The one major lesson from the experiences of these three developing countries is 
that development policies should not only identify the appropriate institutional reforms 
that will provide developing countries with the capacity, clarity and wherewithal to 
improve their conditions, but should also inquire into their adaptability and 
functionality. The challenges encountered by each of these countries in a bid to 
guarantee the independence of their IRAs are germane to and consistent with the 
problems of instituting development policies and reform initiatives in developing 
countries around the world without giving prior thought to the contextual limitations of 
the host country.  
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 It is clear from the above that the political economy of countries matters. The 
imperative of ensuring the internalisation, localisation and adaptation of the IRA 
mantra into local conditions and particularities of the hosting country has never been 
clearer. As Prado states, there are ominous dangers in “adopting a mythical, idealized 
view of the transplanted legal system rather than developing the necessary critical 
analysis”142 before assimilation. A careful fitting of the model into local peculiarities is 
therefore desirable before it can stand the chance of thriving.  
 
 Chapter 7 sets forth a summary of the findings of this research and makes 
appropriate recommendations. 
 
                                                     
142 Prado, note 17 at 503. 
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSION 
7.1  Introduction 
A statist approach to economic development was the preferred route when Nigeria 
attained independence. Capitalism was abhorred as being a part of neo-colonialism. 
The government owned and managed all the economic structures ostensibly to lay a 
foundation for sustainable economic growth and development. State-Owned 
Enterprises (SOEs)1 were set up across sectors of the economy as a vehicle to drive 
economic activities. A bulging portfolio of SOEs emerged as a result thereby exerting a 
major demand on the nation’s earnings. This demand was however ameliorated by the 
discovery of petroleum which boosted the financial fortunes of the nation.  The 
emergence of petroleum led to the establishment of a distorted consumerist economy 
that depended on that primary resource for its sustenance. In the process, agriculture 
which was the mainstay of the economy was relegated.  
 A slowdown in economic growth occasioned by the international financial crisis 
of the 1980s and 1990s and the fall in oil prices at the international market led to a 
wholesale implementation of a structural adjustment programme of economic reforms 
that were recommended by the intermediating agencies2 led by the International 
Monetary Fund as a condition precedent for economic assistance.  
 The programme had as one of its components the setting up of Independent 
Regulatory Agencies (IRAs) to superintend the burgeoning private sector that was 
being positioned to take over the public sector as the engine room for economic growth.  
IRAs have now been set to regulate the provision of infrastructures, goods and services 
in key utilities and sectors of the economy with more being proposed.  
                                                     
1 State-Owned Enterprise (SOEs) are defined in Chapter 1. 
2Dubash, N., Regulation through the Back Door: Understanding the Implications of Institutional Transplant, 
Working Paper No. 42, Jerusalem Papers on Regulation and Governance, March 2012 at 4. 
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 The IRA model of regulatory governance conceptually assumes the existence of 
strong regulatory commitments on the part of government that is undergirded by 
strong institutions that can withstand external pressures and deliver a transparent and 
credible regulatory regime.3  Given this background, the thesis has dwelt on the sub-
optimal performance of IRAs so far in Nigeria and the two selected countries (Brazil 
and Ghana), within the context of major challenges and limitations.4  These challenges 
form the fulcrum of the main findings of this thesis.  
 
 The thesis endeavour has in the main, posed and considered one central 
question:  Can the IRA model of regulatory governance function in Nigeria in a manner 
analogous to its counterparts in the developed economies and is it able to deliver the 
outcomes it promises within the context of her contextual limitations? A quest to 
resolve this question has led to a consideration whether the IRA model is the best 
framework for addressing the challenge of the transition from public to private 
ownership of utilities in Nigeria.  
7.2  Main Findings 
In tracing the journey of IRAs in the USA from the beginning to when it became a 
global trademark of infrastructural regulation, this thesis has established that in climes 
where the IRAs have succeeded, there has been a democratic system of government that 
adheres to the rule of law undergirded  by virile state and supporting institutions as a 
prerequisite. Within the Nigerian context however, IRAs have not fared well. The 
                                                     
3 Eberhard, A., Regulation of Electricity Services in Africa: An Assessment of Current Challenges, a paper 
prepared for the World Bank Conference Towards Growth and Poverty Reduction: Lesson from Private 
Participation in Infrastructure in Sub-Saharan Africa June 6-7, 2005, Cape Town, South Africa. 
4 Kapika, J., and Eberhard, A., Power-Sector Reform and Regulation in Africa, Lessons from Kenya, Tanzania, 
Uganda, Zambia, Namibia and Ghana, 2013, Human Sciences Research Council, Cape Town, South Africa. 
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following factors have played a significant role in creating an unfriendly or even hostile 
atmosphere to the successful establishment and functioning of IRAs.  
 
7.2.1  Institutional Fragility 
The structure of institutions that ought to ‘police’, support, restrain and ensure the 
channelling of socio-political endowments of the country towards productive use have 
been weakened by ill-prepared leaders leaving the public and private sector in an 
essentially compromised and ineffective state. The executive arm of government 
dominates and overreaches the other arms of government in disregard of the concept of 
separation of powers. This development has prevented the judiciary and the legislature 
from performing their constitutionally allotted functions as a check on the executive.  
The judiciary particularly still operates in a subserviently weakened capacity both at de-
facto and de-jure levels. The electoral body that is central to giving legitimacy to the 
political process operates at a lame level hamstrung by the executive arm.  
 The institutional frameworks that should secure the property rights regime that 
are the lifeblood of a private sector-driven economy, lack depth. Key essential 
institutions such as the central bank, financial institutions, stock exchange, and a 
corporate governance regime operate on the fringes of the nation’s economic life 
without the meaningful impact of sustainable development. Additionally, supporting 
institutions in the social network spheres such as civil society organisations, the media, 
political parties, and the public service are nascent, weak or non-existent. To compound 
the situation the capacity-building institutions that are the feedstock for the needed 
manpower to drive the workforce operate in a weak state within the framework of a 
dilapidating educational system.  
 This has aggregated to a fluid and shallow growth of the democratic experiment 
that suffers from infancy problems.  A fitting eulogy to Nigeria’s attempt at building 
critical institutions that would undergird IRAs is that they all lie prostrate in an 
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environment driven by powerful interests of an all – powerful, selfish, patrimonial 
state. 
7.2.2  Corruption 
The endemic nature of this vice has eaten deep into every facet of national life. The 
attendant impact has been enormous, ranging from retarding socio-economic 
development to the diversion of assets away from their intended use, and stifling 
foreign investments thus trapping the resources available for infrastructural 
development. This has engendered acute poverty and inequality within the nation’s 
political economy. As a natural consequence, it has abridged investments in 
infrastructure and undermined the relevance of IRAs. 
7.2.3  Political Leadership  
The nature and calibre of leaders that have governed Nigeria since independence share 
common characteristics. These include, their emergence through a route that has 
generally been accidental, ill-preparedness for high office, incompetence, lack of vision, 
selfishness, and morally bankrupt, driven for the most part only by steep corruption 
and crass impunity. This has been against the backdrop of the fact that developed 
countries economies’ are generally a product of good governance watched over by 
leaders that have the interests of the commonwealth at heart as opposed to the servicing 
of personal agendas and interests that is prevalent in Nigeria. The incompetent 
leadership has impacted negatively on reforms and the thriving of IRAs. 
 
7.2.4  Strong Men over Institutions 
The level of impunity in the subversion of clear provisions of the enabling laws of IRAs 
points to the malaise that has been pinpointed in the course of the research: the display 
of impunity in the conduct of the affairs of the nation by strong men masquerading as 
leaders. Abridgement of the tenure of regulators without due process and in disregard 
of the rule of law coloured the landscape of the two IRAs reviewed. This manifestation 
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has a corroding effect on the vitality and sustainability of the IRA model of governance 
that thrives on due process, respect for the sanctity of contracts and credibility. 
7.2.5  The Rule of Law 
The rule of law as a central plank of democratic governance has undergone systematic 
subversion since independence and continues to face the same fate. Nigeria can thus be 
rightly considered a nation of many laws including a Constitution that espouses an 
ideal, but the governance trajectory is devoid of constitutionalism and the rule of law. 
Judicial capacity and independence are still in its formative stages, and the pitiable state 
of the rule of law has cast dark shadows over the sanctity of contracts and their 
enforceability, thus providing an inherent check on the development and sustainability 
of the private sector and the attendant vitality of IRAs.  
 
7.2.6  Lack of Credible Commitments 
Even though the standard model or best practice prescriptions by the intermediating 
agencies have been followed in the setting up of IRAs, complete with all the 
characteristics that make them independent with the requisite powers and functions, 
the government has consistently been shown to find creative ways of influencing 
regulators. There has been a large difference in what ideal prescriptions in the laws 
setting IRAs and what is obtained in practice.5  
 
                                                     
5 Tremolet, S., and N. Shah. 2005. “Wanted! Good Regulators for Good Regulation: An evaluation of 
Human and Financial Resource Constraints for Utility Regulation.” ERM and Tremolet Consulting 
report, World Bank, Washington, D.C; Eberhard notes, for example, in the six years since the Electricity 
Regulatory Board was established in Kenya there have been five different chairmen. The Electric Power 
Act provides for a four-year term of office and regulators can only be removed under specified conditions 
(such as fraud). However, the Kenyan government has used another law, the State Corporation Act, 
which gives the president authority to remove heads of state institutions: Eberhard, A., Infrastructure 
Regulation in Developing Countries: An Exploration of Hybrid and Transitional Models, Working Paper No. 4, 
2007, Public-Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility (PPIAF). 
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7.2.7  Insecurity 
Nigeria faces debilitating conflicts of many dimensions: ethno-religious conflicts; a 
general state of insecurity; and political and economic based violence that has led to the 
wanton loss of thousands of lives and the destruction of property. These pose a grave 
danger to any meaningful economic activity and do not allow for a suitable climate for 
investments and the thriving of business. Acute poverty driven by high illiteracy levels 
have been implicated in these conflicts, as they fuel the armies of the illiterate and 
jobless populace. Against this background, are weakened and corrupt law enforcement 
institutions that provide the coercive apparatus to IRAs to enforce their mandates. 
 
7.2.8  Information Asymmetry 
One overarching limitation to the implementation of the IRA model in Nigeria is the 
lack of attention paid to the vast information requirements for a sound regulatory 
process. Effective regulation envisages that the consumer and the provider of a service 
both have certain basic information about the processes, systems and costs associated 
with the production and distribution of services or public goods.  
 However, as a result of the dismal literacy levels and dearth in capacity-building 
institutions in Nigeria, the providers of goods and services operate at an advantageous 
level in fixing tariffs and determining the quality of services without informed scrutiny 
from the consumer. The IRAs that should mitigate this information deficiency by 
brokering information exchange between the service provider and consumers are 
hampered by limited capacity both at institutional and individual levels. 
 
7.3  Comparative Findings 
The challenges Nigeria faces are replicated in other jurisdictions that share common 
political economies such as Brazil and Ghana whose experiences have been reviewed.  
The two countries have had similar challenges and have undergone periods of struggles 
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and failures on account of the challenges. The logical deduction from these experiences 
is that it would be pedestrian to suggest that the IRA mantra is the only means available 
for the provision of adequate, safe, reliable and affordable infrastructure, services  and 
goods that the country needs very badly.6   
 This thesis has in the main posed and considered one central question.  Can the 
IRA model of regulatory governance function in Nigeria in a manner analogous to its 
counterparts in the developed world and is it able to deliver the outcomes it promises 
within the context of her contextual limitations? The primary answer to the above 
research question is that the fabric of which IRAs are made is ill-suited to Nigeria’s 
present developmental state, and indeed developing countries at large, and hurts rather 
than enhancing developmental outcomes.  
 
 The kernel of this thesis is that Nigeria must find a good regulatory fit to tackle 
infrastructure regulation. What this calls for is a systematic process of finding matching 
solutions for problems that are country specific. The thesis has shown that there are no 
“best practices” in addressing infrastructure regulation. An effective infrastructure 
regulatory system varies not only by industry, but also by country7 and even region. It 
is potentially damaging to propose a regulatory concept as the ideal, the way the IRA 
has been propped up. A regulatory framework should be preceded by a keen 
understanding of the institutional contexts of the country and the outcomes which the 
                                                     
6 Even in countries with reasonably competent judicial systems, dealing with regulatory matters can be 
very difficult. The concept of independent regulatory agencies is new, and the subject matter is often 
arcane and outside the normal experience of judges. This is particularly the case where courts have 
historically played a limited role in regard to administrative matters. Moreover, judicial systems may not 
be structured in such a way as to handle regulatory matters expeditiously. Bureaucratization and 
multiple layers of appeals can be quite disruptive to effective regulation, even in those circumstances 
where the courts are fully functional. Thus, transitional arrangements are always something that 
might be contemplated in regard to the role of the courts. Brown, A., et al, World Bank Handbook for 
Evaluating Infrastructure Regulatory Systems, 2006, The World Bank, Washington, DC at 103. 
7 Stern, J., The Regulatory and Institutional Dimension of Infrastructure Services, Trade and Development 
Board, Trade and Development Commission , Multi-year expert meeting on services, development and 
trade:  the regulatory and institutional dimension  Geneva, 17–19 March 2009. 
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regulatory trajectory will attract. As Estache and Wren-Lewis have stated, “one size 
does not fit all in regulation either!”8 
 Worldwide reports of failures of regulatory interventions through IRAs have 
forced governments and investors alike to ask what wrong with the IRA model. From 
India to Ecuador to Senegal and Brazil and Nigeria the same challenges keep cropping 
up: the IRA model has been unable to deliver the outcomes intermediating agencies 
touted them to.9 
 In a survey carried out by Lamech and Saeed,10 investors frequently blamed the 
lack of reliable and affordable services on flaws in many of the more than 50 new IRAs 
recently established in developing countries. Of particular note and ironic too is the 
finding that IRAs do not respect regulatory commitments they themselves have put 
out.11 The authors have argued that there has been too much emphasis on creating IRAs 
                                                     
8 Estache, A., and Wren-Lewis, L., Towards a Theory of Regulation for Developing Countries: Following 
Laffont’s Last Book, ECARES Working Paper 2008 _018. 
9Bakovic,T., et al, Regulation by Contract: A New Way to Privatize Electricity Distribution? 
Energy  and Mining Sector Board Discussion Paper, Paper No 7, May 2003;  In India, the AES 
Corporation informed the government of its desire to sell its ownership interest in a local distribution 
company because it saw no way to make the company a viable commercial enterprise. Shortly thereafter, 
another Indian power company that had invested in three other distribution companies months later also 
threatened to leave. In Ecuador, the government announced that it was abandoning its plans to privatize 
17 state electricity distribution companies after receiving a poll that showed that more than 71 percent of 
the general public was opposed to such privatizations. In Senegal, a new government terminated its 
agreement with Senelec, a consortium of Tractebel/Hydro Quebec, after accusing the consortium of 
failing to improve the frequency and duration of blackouts. In Brazil, AES experienced major financial 
problems for Electropaulo, its distribution company in Sao Paulo—problems caused in part by a 
significant drop in sales and revenues following in the wake of a government-mandated rationing 
program. In Nigeria, the quality of service offered to customers with the GSM technology continues to 
deteriorate with the utility regulator unable to stem the tide while the electricity regulator NERC despite 
its several tariff orders and rulings has been unable to ensure the dispensing of light but rather darkness!. 
10Lamech,R.,  and Saeed,K., What International Investors Look for When Investing in Developing Countries, 
2003, Energy and Mining Sector Board Discussion Paper 6, World Bank, Washington, DC. 
11 Recently the Nigeria’s electricity regulator, NERC, was faulted for the same reason by Generation and 
Distributions companies who accused NERC, (and not without merit) of reneging on the commitments 
that were contained in the licenses terms derivable from the licenses issues by NERC!. 
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as the key to successful privatisation, pointing out that this amounted to a naïve a 
recommendation for most developing countries.12  
 Thus, it is necessary to search for alternative means of achieving the desired 
outcomes of accountable and responsible regulation of utilities, taking due cognisance 
of the peculiarities of local extenuating circumstances in Nigeria. 
 The imperatives for this search are underlined by the recent admission of the 
World Bank, the original architects of the IRA model, that the model has not worked as 
intended especially in the temperamental and weak institutional environments that 
abound in developing economies.13  What Nigeria needs at this point therefore, is the 
evolution of a unique regulatory governance template(s) that is situated within her 
contextual institutional and legal limitations to address the infrastructure deficits. This 
route offers more hope for sustainability than simply transplanting international best 
practices and parachuting them into an inhospitable environment which portends harm 
rather than good.14 
  Furthermore, the need for the evolution of a home-grown contextually relevant 
solution to address the dearth of infrastructure provision has been acknowledged by a 
leading writer in this field, Eberhard, who has argued that the  
  biggest single mistake made in African power sector reform is the  
  almost automatic presumption that the ‘reform models’ that may  
  be appropriate in large industrialised and electrified countries with  
  revenue sufficiency would be equally applicable to small, poorly  
                                                     
12 Even though this survey was in the electricity industry, the utility nature of the services and the nature 
of the governance system are the same as other infrastructure utility sectors. 
13 Eberhard, Note 3; Public and Private Sector Roles in the Supply of Electricity Services Operational 
Guidance for World Bank Group Staff 2004. In addition, in a recent speech to Eastern European energy 
regulators, Katherine Sierra, Vice President for Infrastructure, observed that: “While a ‘fully independent’ 
regulatory entity is clearly ideal, it is unrealistic to expect that such a regulatory institution can be created 
and fully functioning in a short period of time.” Conference of the Energy Regulators Regional 
Association, Budapest, Hungary, 11 April 2005. 
14 The statement by the Fyodor Dostoevsky in the Brothers Karamazov,  Book 11, chapter 9 bears quoting 
here: “There you have it—reforms on unprepared ground, and copied from foreign institutions as well—
nothing but harm!”. 
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  electrified African countries with tariffs that often fall far short of  
  recovering costs.15  
  Notwithstanding the foregoing, which has shown the illfitting nature of 
IRAs within intemperate political economies of developing countries such as Nigeria, it 
needs to be recognised and acknowledged that the issue is multi-dimensional and has 
two sides – the western investors and the local players, and ought to be seen as such.  
While the western donors who bring the private sector financing need to craft systems 
and processes including IRAs that would secure and guarantee a repayment of the 
loans they have made, there is also the need to take into consideration the concerns of 
local consumers and local peculiarities. This situation calls for a delicate balance 
between the demands and desires of these two constituencies, especially as their 
interests differ markedly.  
 
7.4  Background to Recommendations  
The overriding challenge therefore is to craft a regulatory template that addresses the 
concerns of the primary players in the value chain: the private investor, government 
and the consumer. Private investors’ two major concerns about regulatory reform and 
systems are firstly, obtaining clear regulatory commitments from government, and 
secondly, receiving assurances that the commitment will actually be honored in order to 
allow them to recover investments and have a reasonable return thereon.16 The 
consumer on the other hand desires the best possible products and services and 
affordable prices devoid of collusion, exploitation and anti-competitive practices.  The 
government, as a third variable, is essentially interested in economic and political 
tranquility: a regime that ensures harmony within the body politic, devoid of protests 
                                                     
15 Eberhard, note 3 at 21.   
16 Ranjit, L.,  and Saeed, K., What International Investors Look for When Investing in Developing Countries, 
2003,  Energy and Mining Sector Board Discussion Paper 6, World Bank, Washington, DC, at 10 in Brown, 
note 4 at 108. 
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and discontent arising from poor services at high prices, a sure recipe for election 
losses.17  
 As a natural follow-up, such an adopted template must seek to ameliorate or 
mitigate the inherent weaknesses in the institutional, legal and socio-political economy 
of Nigeria including factoring into those ingredients that would reduce and ultimately 
eliminate corruption within the regulatory value chain. 
7.5  Introduction to Recommendations  
In the global theoretical architecture of infrastructure regulation, there are two major 
variants: the Anglo model which has its roots in the USA18, and the Continental West 
European Model, also referred to as the French model or Ministerial Regulation, with 
emphasis on detailed concession contracts.19 Even though both variants have 
weaknesses in their structure and operations, these have been toned down by the 
presence of strong institutions, a vibrant rule of law regime and mature political 
systems in the host countries.   
                                                     
17 Brown, et al, note 6 at 98 and 99. Two recorded occurrences therein bear this out succinctly:  It was 
reported that the president of one Latin American nation, when informed that the electricity regulatory 
commission had raised retail electricity tariffs by more than 10 percent without consulting him, said, 
“Who is this guy and how can I fire him?” Secondly Mark Jamison, director of the Public Utility Research 
Center at the University of Florida, writes that “[w]hen the Governor of Iowa appointed Dennis Nagel to 
be chairperson of the Iowa Utilities Board several years ago, the only thing that the Governor requested is 
that Dennis not do anything that would cost the Governor the next election. The Governor didn’t 
mention protecting consumers, protecting shareholders, or obeying the law. The Governor asked only 
that Dennis not cost him the next election.” Mark Jamison, 2004, “Survival Guide for the Independent 
Regulator,” Working Paper, Public Utility Research Center, University of Florida, Gainesville, Fla., p. 1; 
available at http://bear.cba.uf l.edu/centers/purc/. 
18 This model is generally seen as the epitome of independent regulation, with its emphasis on specialist 
regulatory institutions operating within a highly rule-based and legalistic framework. It is explicitly 
adversarial with an emphasis on public hearings. The resulting structure is locked into a system of 
administrative law in which the courts (up to and including the Supreme Court) play a major role. 
Indeed, the courts and legal concerns can take over the substance of regulation as well as its form. 
19 This model is where a government department regulates (and typically sponsors) a state-owned 
monopoly utility. This is the pre-1989 England and Wales model with the Department of Energy 
regulating the CEGB, in association with the Treasury. It was the standard West European model in the 
period 1960-90 and was adopted in many countries. 
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 For the Nigerian context however, in order to harvest the strengths of these two 
variants while at the same time mitigating and ameliorating the identified weaknesses 
in Nigeria’s political economy, this thesis recommends the fusion of two models drawn 
from a wealth of literature.20 The literature identifies the following as being in the 
family of transitional/hybrid models suitable for developing economies. These include 
regulatory contracts, contracting-out or outsourcing of regulatory functions, advisory 
regulators, and partial-risk guarantees for regulatory failure. 
 
 The accompanying Table 2, developed from parts of the reviewed literature,21 
presents in a tabular form the strengths and weaknesses of each of the 
transitional/hybrid models. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
20 Laffont, J.J., Regulation and Development, Federico Caffe Lectures, 2005, Cambridge University Press; 
Eberhard, note 3; Brown, note 6; Kapika and Eberhard, note 4. 
21 Ibid. 
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TABLE 2 
Hybrid Models: Their Features, Strengths and Weaknesses 
S/N Model Essential features  Drawbacks Strengths 
1 Regulation 
by Contract 
Regulation by contract entails 
the prior detailed specification 
of the governance regime in 
one or more legal instruments 
including the enabling law, 
subsidiary legislation basic 
law, secondary legislation, 
licenses, concession contracts, 
and power purchase 
agreements. The enforcement 
is then left either to a 
regulator or line ministry with 
limited discretion.  
 
Applying the letter of an 
agreement executed over 
time could elicit outcomes 
that would be detrimental 
to economic outcomes and 
the regulatory intents. 
Unforeseen developments 
in exogenous variables 
including with contract 
terms themselves impact on 
risks and costs and produce 
outcomes totally unrelated 
to original intents.  
Model promotes regulatory 
certainty, minimises  
discretion; and gives for 
room for predictability;  
constrains political leaders 
from tampering with 
contracts; and also provides  
comfort for investors. 
 
2 Contracting-
Out or 
Outsourcing 
Use of external consultants, 
either IRAs or as stipulated in 
a regulatory contract, to 
perform functions such as 
tariff reviews, bench-marking, 
monitoring of compliance or 
dispute resolution. Very 
useful where regulatory  
independence, competence, 
capacity or legitimacy is 
lacking. 
 
Can be politically sensitive 
raising concerns about 
national security and pride 
especially where 
international consultants are 
involved. The model also 
attracts resistance from line 
ministry and bureaucrats 
who resent contracting out 
functions to consultants as 
these hedges them from 
interfering.  
Five major potential 
advantages: A cost –benefit 
choice that enhances in-
house capacity building 
through training and 
mentoring; increases 
regulatory competence 
through access to                          
specialized skills and 
knowledge, and leveraging 
international reputation; 
enhances regulator’s 
independence and 
legitimacy. With external 
diversified skills, regulatory 
decisions are perceived to 
be more credible. 
3 Advisory 
Panel 
Advisory regulators merely 
offer advices to the line 
ministry or regulator with no 
obligation for its adoption. 
There are emerging variants 
termed “strong advisory 
regulator model”, in which 
the advice must be given in a 
public document that 
provides a clear statement 
and explanation of the 
decision. 
Although this is a politically 
convenient compromise,  
one that allows politicians 
to shift blame in the event of 
public repercussions, it also 
has the potential of being a 
dead-end rather than a 
short-term transitional 
arrangement. 
This model is strong on 
accountability by requiring 
the line ministry or IRA to 
publicly justify positions 
taken when they act on  an 
advice issued by a Panel.  
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4 Partial Risk 
Guarantees 
(PRG) 
The essence of a  
PRG is to provide private 
investors with explicit 
financial compensation if a 
government fails to live up to 
a specified regulatory 
commitment that has been 
guaranteed. Within regulatory 
systems they are a form of 
insurance against defined 
regulatory risks. It only falls 
due if an investor can show 
noncompliance. Then the 
World Bank (or some other 
financial institution) will 
make a payment to the 
Investor and recoup from the 
government. 
PRGs are only feasible if 
they are accompanied by a 
fairly detailed tariff-setting 
system which is normally 
explosive in developing 
economies. No insurer, 
whether it is the World 
Bank or some other 
financial institution, will be 
willing to provide insurance 
unless the nature of the 
insurable event is 
reasonably clear. Tariff-
setting systems by their 
nature are unpredictable 
and flexible. 
PRG’s  strengths lie in the  
prompt settlement of 
entitlements where there is 
demonstrable infringement 
by the country government 
or infrastructure regulator. 
The payment is not delayed 
to the end of potentially 
long legal or arbitration 
processes. This liquidity 
support is greatly valued by 
and is a major comfort to 
reluctant investors. 
 
On the customer part, PRGs 
may help consummate 
transactions that otherwise 
would not have occurred 
thus making services 
available that otherwise 
would not have been. 
Secondly, they heighten 
investors’ confidence and  
this, in turn, lowers cost of 
capital, which leads to lower 
cost of supply, and 
ultimately to lower tariffs 
for consumers. 
 
Source: Table generated by Author 
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7.6  Recommendations 
Of the four hybrid models of regulatory governance above, the first two, regulatory 
contracts and contracting-out or outsourcing of regulatory functions offer more promise 
in tackling and ultimately mitigating the institutional, legal, political and other 
contextual limitations of Nigeria within the regulatory mix of IRAs.  The two models 
have fared well where they have being calibrated to fit into the peculiar circumstances 
of each nation that they have been implemented.  
7.6.1  Regulatory Contracts 
There are essentially two different operational definitions22 of regulation by contract.23 
One is regulation without a regulator.24 Under this definition, the regulatory contract is 
totally self-contained and self-administered like a commercial contract. All disputes 
arising over implementation are handled by a regular court, an administrative court or 
a special expert panel. This is an appealing concept because it offers the possibility of 
putting regulation on autopilot and eliminates the need to create a new regulatory 
entity. 
 A second definition is that, regulation by contract is a detailed tariff-setting 
agreement administered by an independent regulator. Under this definition, the 
regulatory contract does not replace the regulator but substantially limits the regulator’s 
discretion. In particular, it forces the regulator to set tariffs based on specific formulas 
rather than just general principles. 
                                                     
22 Even though these definitions are proffered within the framework of research in regulation of 
electricity services, it equally applied to and is germane to other utilities regulation such as 
telecommunications, etc.  
23 Bakovic,T., et al, Regulation by Contract: A New Way to Privatize Electricity Distribution? 
Energy  and Mining Sector Board Discussion Paper, Paper No 7, May 2003 at 16. 
24 Bakovic, et al note that in referring to “long-term concession or leasing arrangements, the World Bank’s 
1994 World Development Report stated that “these arrangements….do not require the establishment of 
independent regulatory bodies because regulatory procedures [and regulatory provisions in general] are 
specified in the underlying contract” (p.10). Alternatively, if there is a regulator, it is limited to 
functioning as a “contract monitoring office.” 
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 This thesis adopts and recommends the second definition for two reasons. Since 
IRAs have already been established in two major utilities in Nigeria and there are 
legislative initiatives in the National Assembly to establish four more, it will be ill- 
advised to adopt a model that side-lines institutional set-ups established by law within 
a sectoral setting.  Secondly, this thesis is not aware of any developing countries where 
the behaviour of a privatised entity is completely controlled by a regulatory contract 
alone, with no further intervention by a government or regulatory entity. In fact, 
research shows that regulation without a regulator exists in utility sectors only in the 
French water sector,25 but the conditions that makes it possible in France are not likely 
to be replicable in other countries, especially in developing countries such as Nigeria as 
a result of fragile systems. 
 Regulatory contracts combined with the IRA model have been implemented in 
many Latin American countries like Chile with commendable success. It has been 
successful in ushering in and sustaining the needed private sector entry, investment 
and participation in more than 60 privitisations. In addition, it has been implemented 
with commendable outcomes in Uganda in electricity generation26 and has also worked 
well in the French Water Sector for several years.27 It holds a lot of promise especially 
within the weak capacity endowments prevailing in Nigeria. Part of the appeal is that it 
can operate on “autopilot”28 with predetermined and thoroughly negotiated contracts. 
This mitigates the lack of local capacity in Nigeria to fashion and implement regulatory 
tools that would meet the regulatory challenges of infrastructure provision.  Most 
importantly too, with pre-determined and negotiated contracts in place, the exercise of 
discretion that breeds corruption will be tackled. Two studies by Ranjit with Saeed and 
                                                     
25 Shugart, C., Regulation-by-Contract and Municipal Services: The Problem of Contractual Incompleteness, Ph.D. 
thesis, Harvard University, May 1998. 
26 Eberhard, A., Infrastructure Regulation in Developing Countries: an Exploration of hybrid and transitional 
models, : a paper prepared for the African Forum of Utility Regulators 3rd Annual Conference, 15-16 
march, 2006, Windhoek, Namibia.  
27 Bakovic,T., et al, Regulation by Contract: A New Way to Privatize Electricity Distribution? 
Energy  and Mining Sector Board Discussion Paper, Paper No 7, May 2003. 
28 Ibid.  
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Brown, et al29 show that investors tend to prefer a regime that relies on long term 
regulatory contracts as opposed to IRAs simpliciter.   
7.6.2  Contracting-Out or Outsourcing  
Contracting-out or outsourcing is defined as the use by a regulator of an external 
contractor, instead of its own employees, to perform certain regulatory tasks or 
function(s) such as tariff reviews, quality of service competition and consumer 
protection issues. It is usually done on a temporary or transitional basis by an IRA.30 It 
has two main types: in advisory outsourcing, an external adviser presents several 
alternatives in a decision-making framework to the regulator; and in binding 
outsourcing, the recommendations given by the external provider must be directly 
applied, with no choice given to the regulator on alternative options.31 
 The strengths of contracting-out or outsourcing regulatory functions to outsiders 
better equipped to handle them allows for the sourcing of specialised skills and also 
attracts legitimacy and respectability to the regulatory process. Furthermore, 
outsourcing reduces costs without compromising quality, and allows for economies of 
scale as well as saving time. One other advantage of this model is that it bolsters 
regulatory independence as it allows the IRA to benefit from the reputation and 
competence of the external agent.32 Outsourcing comes well recommended as a tried 
and tested model that has been regularly utilised by nearly all IRAs globally.33 
 This thesis recommends that regulatory contracts and contracting-out or 
outsourcing have the potential of addressing the dearth in infrastructure provision and 
                                                     
29 Ranjit and Saeed, note 16 . 
30 Tremolet, S., Outsourcing Regulation When Does It Make Sense and How Do We Best Manage It? PPIAF 
Working Paper, No. 5, 2007. 
31 Ibid.  
32 Ibid; Eberhard, note 26; Tremolet, S, et al, Contracting Out Utility Regulatory Functions: A report by 
Environmental Resources Management  (ERM) for the World Bank, Washington DC. 
33 A survey of 5 IRAs globally by Tremolet, et al found that 75% outsourced at least some regulatory tasks  
and 205 to 30% of their budgets to outsourcing. Out of IRAs globally that do not as of yet outsource, 90% 
indicated that they were planning to do so in the future. 
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services, while at the same time surmounting the contextual limitations of Nigeria in the 
following ways:  
 
7.6.1.1  Credible Commitments 
The two recommended variants address the concerns of private investors’  in obtaining 
regulatory commitments from government, and  assurances that the commitment will 
actually be honoured to allow recovery of investments and a reasonable return on 
investments.      
 Governments in developing countries and Nigeria in particular are long on 
promises but short on honouring them. Commitments made are whimsically sacrificed 
at the altar of policy changes which has been the hallmark of government in Nigeria. An 
uncertain investment climate has been shown to be a sure recipe for investment shyness 
on the part of the private sector.  Regulatory contracts and out-sourcing of functions 
offers a window to mitigate the lack of credible assurances to the private sector. 
Typically regulatory contracts being long term and negotiated with the unforeseen 
future in mind, and are not subjective. They objectively set the broad principles without 
expressing subjective interests. This is important within the Nigerian context where 
personal interests have a major role to play in regulatory decisions, be it within the 
IRAs or line ministries. 
7.6.1.2  Mitigation of Corruption  
This thesis has demonstrated the negative effect corruption has had on the provision of 
infrastructure and services. Thus, for any model to be effective, it must address the 
corruption which pollutes all infrastructure streams.  A major advantage of regulatory 
contracts and outsourcing is that, by their very nature they serve to mitigate and tackle 
the menace of corruption at its root in the following ways: 
a) Regulatory contracts are typically long lasting. This discourages ad-hoc close-
hand dealings that exacerbate corruption, and rather promotes certainty.  
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b) One of the benefits of regulatory contracts and outsourcing is that they 
promote the minimisation of the exercise of discretion, a route through which 
corruption thrives. As this research has indicated, where discretion thrives, 
officials utilise it as an avenue for exercising it capriciously for personal as 
opposed to societal interests. 
c) Outsourcing allows outside professionals not having prevailing interests or 
within the regulatory space to dispassionately chart the way forward as 
opposed to regulators and line ministries that have vested interests. 
 
7.6.1.3  Predictability 
The long term nature of regulatory contracts allows for regulatory certainty and 
predictability. Nigeria’s investment climate is characterised by policy somersaults that 
have become the norm. A regulatory system that locks-in the roadmap of the regulatory 
space enables investors to take risks confidently and invest with the assurance of 
recovering investments, not worrying about changes in policy. Furthermore where 
contracting out occurs, the parameters utilised to arrive at decisions are transparently 
evolved and determined. This path to decision making lends itself to providing greater 
confidence to investors.  
7.6.1.4  Certainty  
Within the context of a rule of law regime, detailed regulatory contracts that spell out 
all the rules of engagement in a precise and comprehensive manner will serve as a 
check against corrupt judges who may want to interpret hazy parts of the contracts in 
such a manner that it attracts pecuniary benefits. In addition where regulatory functions 
are contracted and carried out by outsiders whose only interest is professionalism, the 
decisions are more likely to be sustainable. 
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7.6.1.5  Constraint on Political Leaders 
Regulatory contracts, being binding documents, serve to put political leaders on notice 
by tying their hands from abridging existing terms of a contract arbitrarily to satisfy 
short term political interests to influence electoral cycles. In addition, where regulatory 
decisions are contracted out the temptation for political leaders to pressurise regulators 
with a view to influencing them will be removed. This thesis has shown the overbearing 
influence political leaders have on institutions and a model that seeks to place 
constraints on this influence and the accompanying arbitrary exercise of power will 
allow for sustainable investments in infrastructure. 
7.6.1.6  Credibility  
IRAs have come to be seen, especially in a nascent democratic setting as in Nigeria, as 
just another arm of government. This thesis has shown that attempts by IRAs to assert 
their independence have been countered by strong leaders that employ different 
methods to frustrate their autonomy.  Thus IRAs do not attract the same kind of 
acceptance their counterparts in mature democracies do. Outsourcing mitigates this 
lack of acceptability. External consultants attract credibility to the regulatory process 
and enhance the quality of decisions in the eyes and minds of the consumer and the 
public. 
7.6.1.7  Address Institutional Fragility 
By utilising external and international capacity, the in-house capacity in IRAs that is 
lacking is ameliorated and a process of building internal capacity through the close 
interface of external consultants with regulators takes root.  The foregoing thesis 
identified the poor state of the educational system both at the lower and tertiary levels 
thus leading to paucity in research and training. Adopting a template that allows for 
accessing outside capacity to complement and build in- house capacity appears to be 
the way forward until the necessary capacity is built to populate IRAs. 
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7.6.1.8  Enhance Regulatory Capacity, Quality and Credibility 
Decisions arrived at within a regulatory space through outsourcing to external 
consultants and international experts tend to have more credibility and are more 
sustainable. This is more so within the context of a dearth of local capacity and corrupt 
influences that hinder a knowledge-driven regulatory processes that is anchored on 
transparency.  
7.7  Final Word 
This research has proceeded from a fait accompli position that IRAs have already been 
injected into Nigeria’s infrastructural governance regime. However, given the 
challenges within the Nigerian regulatory landscape, enhancing the capacity of the 
already created IRAs and the emerging ones is a key consideration, and the most 
judicious way towards attaining sustainable social and economic outcomes. Capacity 
here involves addressing the educational deficits in Nigeria’s school system such as 
allowing the churning out of graduates that will be empowered to meet the challenges 
of the day. In addition, research institutions must be nurtured to develop a specialized 
curriculum to meet the specific professional and cognate needs of IRAs. 
 
 Secondly, sequencing the setting up of IRAs must be deliberately calibrated. In 
the present landscape, the existing IRAs should move towards a regime of developing 
long term regulatory contracts that will comprehensively spell out the regime as if it 
will be on auto-pilot in order to allow for certainty and predictability in the regulatory 
systems. Where the existing and new IRAs utilise the window of developing long term 
regulatory contracts and contracting out some of their functions to competent external 
consultants, the regulatory process would be more credible.   Presently, given the 
limited endowments Nigeria has within the field of infrastructure regulation, IRAs are 
well placed to utilise the suggested models of regulatory contracts, and  contracting out 
some of their functions, in order to allow for harvesting and institutionalisation of the 
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appropriate institutional capacities. It takes years to build, equip and populate training 
and research institutions that can serve as the feedstock of professionals to work in 
IRAs. Until this capacity-building avenue is readily available locally, regulatory 
contracts and outsourcing of functions seem the reasonable way out. Any path outside 
of this would be “akin to trying to build skyscrapers but on foundations plied with mud 
and sand.”34  
 The limitations within Nigeria’s regulatory space are multi-faceted. Building and 
nurturing new institutions is not a quick fix. It becomes a more difficult situation when 
what needs to be done includes the change in the institutional character of existing IRAs 
that have developed habits that need to be reformed and done away with. 
 Furthermore political institutions take time to develop and evolve; so does the 
time-tested rule of law doctrine.  IRAs have developed over decades of learning in the 
USA and cannot take root overnight in Nigeria. Corruption, though a global menace, 
has become an institution in itself in Nigeria. To uproot it, a deliberate model that 
discourages or minimises the exercise of discretion, the entrenching of the separation of 
powers and the rule of law doctrines have to be absorbed. Only through this will 
Nigeria see the emergence of strong institutions as opposed to strong men as is the 
present situation. 
 There needs to be an analytical process of calibrating the IRA model into one 
smooth mix by utilising regulatory agreements and contracting out of functions until 
suitable capacity is built in-house in the IRAs. Such steps will allow IRAs to take into 
consideration the contextual limitations of their environment, and deliberately work to 
ameliorate and mitigate them while at the same time build in- house capacity as a first 
step towards intended regulatory outcomes.  The mere transplanting of the IRA model 
into the Nigerian regulatory climate, far from being an answer to the infrastructure 
                                                     
34Jarvis, D., Regulatory States in the South: Can they exist and do we want them?  The Case of the Indonesian 
Power Sector,  Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy  Working Paper Series December, 2010 Working 
Paper No.: SPP10-11 at 29. 
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deficits in Nigeria, is sure to produce outcomes totally unexpected, “reinforcing the 
poor governance outcomes they are designed to overcome.”35 
 
                                                     
35
 Ibid  
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